

**PEACE AND STABILITY EDUCATION
WORKSHOP REPORT**

13 – 15 SEPTEMBER 2005

**SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY
OPERATIONS INSTITUTE AT CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA**

The views expressed are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army War College, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Forward

What follows is the conference report from the first annual Peace and Stability Education Workshop, sponsored by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. This report has been transcribed verbatim from video and voice tapes of the plenary sessions, although the names have been deleted in accordance with our non-attribution policy. The reference CD to be sent to all participants will contain all the presentations and working group slides.

The workshop gathered general practitioners and subject matter experts from the military services, the U.S. Government, the United Nations, educational institutions and international and non-governmental organizations. The breakout groups worked diligently and provided new and perceptive recommendations to further the cause of education in what MG Huntoon, Commandant of the Army War College, referred to as an arcane science in his opening remarks. But if these recommendations are not acted upon no progress will be made. If we are still talking about these same problems at next year's workshop then we will have collectively failed. We need organizations and institutions to step up to the plate and take on those recommendations that they are able to influence in order to keep moving forward. PKSOI has provided one roadmap for a possible way ahead; we welcome alternative points of view. The only way we can collectively fall short is if we fail to act and not continue to move the ball forward.

PKSOI would like to thank each presenter and each participant for their dedication, time and effort in having made this workshop a success.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John A. Agolia". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized "A" and "G".

John A. Agolia
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, PKSOI

Executive Summary

Background

The Peace and Stability Education Workshop was conducted at the Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania from 13 – 15 September 2005. This was the first of what will become an annual conference on the educating of students and instructors in the field of peacekeeping, stability, and reconstruction operations (PS&RO). PKSOI is exploring incorporating this workshop into the Eisenhower series of seminars.

The education workshop was designed to accomplish three major goals:

- Capture best practices and identify gaps in education
- Identify the programs, subject matter experts and initiatives in the field
- Establish a collaborative relationship among all participants that can form the basis for continuing dialogue

Participants

The workshop participants represented a wide range of expertise in the PS&RO arena, including all services of the U.S. military, Department of Defense civilians, Department of State, the United Nations, civilian educational institutions, and representatives of international and non-governmental organizations (IO/NGO). Workshop facilitators were drawn from PKSOI and the Army War College.

Methodology

We constructed the workshop to maximize the contributions of each participant towards achieving workshop goals. This was accomplished by setting the workshop environment during the first day through a series of presentations by organizations actively engaged in PS&RO education in a plenary session.

Following the plenary presentations the assemblage was broken down into six break out groups: three to examine the best methods of integrating

PS&RO into current curricula while the other three examined the question of how we prepare and develop educators/instructors to stimulate thought on the evolving challenges associated with PS&RO. The second day all six break out groups discussed the same questions of determining the resources, current practices, gaps, and proposed solutions for education programs.

Presentations

Some initial presentations provided a foundation for the breakout groups to answer their specific questions. The first was the U.S. Army's Task Force Irregular Challenges briefing outlining the problems of asymmetric warfare and their implications on the US military. Next, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) provided an overview of its genesis, mission, and organization. The Marine Corps University then discussed current education within that service at the operational and strategic levels. The National War College outlined best practices and the future of PS&RO curricula in the joint arena. The National Defense University then provided a report on the 26/27 July Interagency Education Conference. Finally, the NGO Fund for Peace described the methodology of its conflict assessment system tool (CAST).

Secretary of the Army Presentation

The Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, spoke at dinner about the transformation going on within the Army and entire Department of Defense to develop capabilities to assist and deal with failed and emerging states. He noted that PS&RO is being recognized as a core competency of the Army, just as important as the traditional combat requirements.

Working Groups

The six diverse breakout groups made many recommendations to improve (PS&RO) education. Those recommendations reflected the varied and wide-ranging organizations from which the individual members came, but several common threads emerged. In order to make the recommendations of the various working groups a reality, PKSOI is currently discussing with many actors the idea of establishing communities of practice (COP), associations of like-minded organizations formed for:

- curriculum development
- sharing and development of educational resources and information
- educator and operator development

Conclusion

The primary goal of the workshop had been to establish/maintain a continuing dialogue among entities/individuals in the PS&RO community. In that the workshop succeeded greatly. The community now has stronger networks of personal and organizational contacts to draw upon.

PKSOI has taken the lead in attempting to organize the way ahead by developing communities of practice. In the area of curriculum development PKSOI is soliciting research through an Academic Consortium in cooperation with George Mason University. We are challenging the community to establish an Interagency Education Council to standardize PS&RO terminology and create a base line of educational objectives.

In coordination with OASD/Networks and Information Integration and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), PKSOI is working to develop a PS&RO web-based hub that integrates existing portals, electronic library/repository of case studies, syllabi, instruction materials, databases, simulations, points of contact, etc. that serves as a clearinghouse for information. This will give the community the ability to share information across agencies, services, and internationally.

Educator and operator development will be advanced through the annual PKSOI Education Workshop. Goals for this COP will be to develop an educator development course, including a portable web based “teach-the-teacher” program, foster Interagency exchanges of educators/operators, and develop tools to leverage student experience from the field.

PKSOI will facilitate a process to achieve success in the development of doctrine and educational tenants for peace, stability, and reconstruction operations.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Opening Speaker – Major General David Huntoon, US Army, Commandant of the US Army War College opened the workshop with these words:

John is a great leader and staff officer, so typically he gave me about 40 pages of opening comments, but I left them in my office. I left them there for a reason; not that they weren't well written but my message is really very simple; it's just "Welcome" to some great former friends and colleagues and for those of you who are new to this great place. We are delighted to have you here.

This is a very important conference for lots of reasons. You know this better than I do for you are the subject matter experts in a somewhat arcane science. There is a great deal of art in this business too. What you are fundamentally after this week, in the short time allotted, is how we approach education in this remarkable business of stability operations. We're trying very hard at the Army War College to hold together a very special team of our own experts, with operational and tactical experience – and some strategic experience – in this discipline. And we are expanding that organization and we invite all of you to join us. We are not only increasing our physical space, but hopefully adding to the intellectual capacity at the same time. This is not easy to do. There is still some cultural resistance in all our empires about this interesting topic, but I think we see more and more great support from all of the branches of the US government who are paying close attention to this because it is the way we are operating throughout the world. So I'm not going to give you any remarkable guidance or direction about what you should do for the next couple of days. I had a peek at the agenda and it looks like it makes all the sense in the world. We have brought together some really first class representatives of all the different disciplines that we must have in order to work through the issues.

All I would add to this opening is that there are some extraordinary resources here at the War College and if you don't have the chance to take advantage of them in the next 48 hours, you really need to come back to see us, because there really are some great information sources, and people, to support you in all your endeavors. Doug Lovelace heads the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), one of the more remarkable think tanks in the US

government, right here at Carlisle Barracks. Some of his products are arrayed on the table outside the door. Please take all of those you wish – your tax dollars paid for the publication of those documents and you deserve to take them with you, especially those of you who pay taxes in Virginia. SSI is an extraordinary resource – take advantage of it. The folks who work there have great insight into much of the work you are doing.

But think about our students also. This place is fundamentally a 10 month graduate degree resident course of 340 students each year, and we are in about week 4 of the class of 2006. And that's the heart and soul of this institution, with a remarkable staff and faculty which is made up of wonderful young men and women who have proven their mettle on the world. Fifty-nine percent of the current class of 2006 just got back from Afghanistan or Iraq. They have extraordinary experiences in lots of areas; they know about this business and work towards finding the best ways to take an educated approach to the rest of the world about the all the nuances of this kind of business. So tap into that. They are required to write things here in order to prove their academic merit this year and we're always interested in getting interesting topics for them to write about and so attack into that.

Do any of you have any interest in history? I suspect the answer is each and every one of you has some interest. History of the United States Army rests here at Carlisle Barracks. Fourteen million items are right across the street, outside the back gate, close by the 7th hole of our magnificent golf course. They now sit in a state of the art archival repository which we opened last September. For sure go see that place regardless of whether or not you do it for PKSOI purposes or just as great citizens of the world. You understand the value of history; it's a remarkable site. People are very interested in helping find whatever topic you would like to pursue. There are some very special pieces about the history of this particular section. Tap into that also.

That's probably it. I'm just happy to have each and every one of you. We have a very good agenda. I've got to race off to greet the Secretary of the Army who will be joining us for supper tonight and we'll hear his address. Please tap into our resources. This is an extraordinary place filled with great promise and hope in educating for the future. Of those 340 students, mostly Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard, but we also have 40 International Officers. The operational perspectives they bring to the table – the fact that we are not only building cohesion but trust and confidence

this year – at some point down the road, in some God forsaken place in the middle of the night, the work that takes place here will have made all the difference in solving some extraordinary problem. So welcome to all of you. We'll see you tonight.

Chapter 2

Plenary Presentations

First Presentation: SSI Irregular Challenges Briefing



I’ve been asked to set the foundation, from an Army perspective, for this group to generate some thoughts for the panel discussions that we’re going to have and also for the breakouts into the work group. And I thought about how to go about that and look at the conference goal of identifying capabilities and capacities and gaps in peace and stability operation education. And I thought if I started to talk about definitions of peace and stability operations specifically that I would do two things. One is, I would probably cover things that would be better to discuss, because the ideas haven’t hardened in all of our minds. It would be better fruit for discussion in the breakout groups. Second, because most of the folks in the room are much more expert in those discussions than I. So in trying to establish a foundation or a context within which to have those breakout discussions, I thought it might be useful to take a look at irregular challenges. And that

should provide us with a broad view and a context of how the Army gets involved in these things that we are going to train to. Most of what I have to say today is drawn from an Army War College and SSI effort to identify fundamental changes required in the Army to more effectively deal with irregular challenges. While I recognize this is not the full breadth of what we have to deal with as we talk through some of the things for security or stability operations, it is right now fairly important and fairly prevalent. So I thought I would start there.



Irregular Challenges

OSD Based Definition

The challenges to U.S. interests posed by terrorists, insurgents, and international criminals, as well as the challenges posed by failed states possessing weapons of mass destruction, harboring terrorists or criminal cartels, possessing critical energy resources, or threatening U.S. territory.

We started our look as any good effort does — we tried to find definitions that we could all agree to. And we found that there really weren't a lot of them when it comes to irregular challenges. So we did two things in our effort. The first was, we decided that we would align as closely as possible to the emerging writings and documentation out of OSD. The second thing that we did is, and it worked right in line with this, is that we decided to look at irregular challenges as opposed to irregular warfare. We used a threat base as our means of establishing the context within which to look at where we have capacity gaps and where we need to make improvements in the Army. That effort seemed a little challenging and a little daunting. There are so many things: basically irregular challenges fall under the category of

everything that is not traditional state/unstate warfare. So we had to scope it by some means. We did it by defining four basic groups. We said very broadly that irregular challenges are terrorists, insurgents, international criminals, or failed and failing states. Then we refined the failed and failing states because we said, you know, we don't need to be concerned with all of them. We still need to scope ourselves a little bit. We looked at failed or failing states with access to weapons of mass destruction, access to energy resources, and in close proximity to US borders, or that could provide sanctuary to one of those other groups. While extraordinarily broad, it seemed to be able to capture most of the challenges that we would be concerned with. Yet it did scope the effort, we did have some mark on the wall.



Scoping Analysis

The major combat challenges posed by traditional opponents remains significant, but:

- State-on-state conflict is a more remote possibility among modern societies;
- Proliferation of WMD and other high-technology weapons systems further limits the prospects of war between states while increasing the probability of their use by irregular enemies;
- Islam's internal struggle between radical extremists and moderates increasingly is played out in attacks on the West

The implications of those irregular challenges are the results of our initial scoping analysis. A couple of things that most of you in the room would agree to intuitively, but there was data in the literature search that backed it up. The first one is irregular challenges that are prevalent and important. They are here to stay. They are not a spike. It's not something that is an unusual phenomenon. The second major thing is, it doesn't mean that we won't in the future have another state on state major combat operation that we have to deal with.



Scoping Analysis Review

Nature of irregular challenges

- Prevailing form of conflict
- Diverse motivation
- Transnational scope
- Protracted operations
- Asymmetric and adaptive methods
- Difficult to predict incidence and intensity

Force Characteristics

- Campaign Quality Perseverance
- Integration (JIIM)
- Adaptable & Learning
- Psychological Precision
- Knowledge Based (Culture, Geostrategic, Geopolitical, and Intelligence)

I'm going to spend just a few minutes on this because I think it's fairly important to get the nature of the challenge correct before we start discussing some of the short falls or capacity concerns that we have with the Army. First thing I want to say about the analysis is this is an initial effort. I'm not telling you that these descriptors for the nature of the challenge are all inclusive. They are not. What I do want to tell you is, from our initial literature search and our initial analysis, this jumps out as pretty important and they are defensible. There may be others that we haven't picked up on. This is an initial effort, but I think and I've seen many lists to describe the challenge, but I think these are relevant.

The first one has to do with the fact that this is a prevailing form of conflict. And by this I mean there is nothing irregular about the irregular challenge. This is the dominant form of conflict. In the definition we talk about irregular and traditional, but this is the traditional form. What this is, it is not state on state, but it is the piece that we find ourselves in most often. A few interesting statistics: over 35 interstate wars are now ongoing in the world. And over half of the states in the international system have some type of insurgent activity inside their borders. There are over 75 terrorist

groups now active in the world and that number is increasing. Over the last 60 years, there has been a 5% increase in intrastate conflict. So what we're seeing is a trend line that shows that this is not only something that's here to stay, but it's something that's here to stay at an increased frequency from what we've seen in the past.

The next important piece of describing the nature of the threat has to do with the nature of their diverse motivations for being a threat. In general, they fall into three categories that we could tell. The motivations are economic, political, or ideological. It's very important when trying to counter a threat to understand what motivates them to start with. Otherwise, we're not going to get at the specific thing that generated them to start with. Looking at this notion of these three domains of economic, political, or ideological, you're dealing with multiple threats that are collaborating with each other, from the different motivations that are within this structure. This is a critical aspect as we'll get to later, in being able to defeat them. The threats are transnational in scope. I think that this may be one of the areas that is the cutting edge or the thing that makes the literature search and a review of insurgencies, which is primarily what we're talking about here. This makes the insurgency literature and what we're seeing on the ground is a little different. This idea of a Maoist regional insurgency is being transformed in what we are seeing on the ground into a much more collaborative, integrated nexus of the insurgent, the criminal organization and the terrorists. It broadens, then, the scope of the threat to something that's trans-national and much more difficult to deal with. The threat next characteristic is protracted operations, and by this I mean how long an operation against an insurgency needs to last. The idea is that these folks are around for a long time. They specifically, because they are not able in rapid decisive operations to confront western powers, they are using a different technique. That technique requires them to operate at a very low level over an extremely long period of time. We and generations are talking about measuring operations against irregular threats in terms of decades as opposed to weeks and months. What this does for the insurgent is it enables them to take opportunities to erode public support for their adversary. It also creates opportunities for them to build support within their organization or to take advantage of opportunities to get us to overreact to something that they did and make us look bad. I'm going to jump over the asymmetric and adaptive in that every threat forever has been asymmetric. Asymmetry meaning trying to pit one of their strengths against one of our weaknesses. The critical nature of why the asymmetric

and adaptive methods up here has to do more with the nature of this war being more in ideas and popular support and credibility. It has a lot more to do with information and public diplomacy and credibility. That's not necessarily how we've normally interpreted asymmetry. But that center of gravity being something other than the kinetic event is the asymmetric nature of the threat that is highlighted here.

The last characteristic is the difficulty of predicting the intensity and the incidence of this threat. As we all know, none of us can predict when we're going to have the next terrorist attack. We don't know where we're going to have the next insurgency; or where, as we push insurgents around, where they're going to move next, or where another group is going to emerge from. It is very difficult. It's also very difficult to figure out when you're winning and losing against this threat. When you take a look at the intensity of the operation, an increase in intensity may mean that the insurgency, or the irregular threat, is becoming more powerful. When they are feeling bold and they want to move to the next step. It could equally mean that they're in their death throws, and they are trying to gain some creditability and public support to try to build their recruiting base. Very difficult to know which one it is. And I think that's critical in understanding how to deal with them.

Well, that whole piece on the threat leads us to think about the characteristics of a force that's necessary to deal with the threat. We came up again, not with an exhaustive list, but with what we think are some of the most salient characteristics of a force that would be designed to deal with challenges that have the nature that I just described.

The first one is that we must have a campaign quality. We must be able to conduct this operation and maintain public support and credibility for the long haul—decades. That's what I'm talking about by campaign quality perseverance. Primarily because this is a fight that goes to credibility, that goes to public diplomacy, that goes to information, that goes to winning the support of a population. It is primarily not a military operation, and it's very important that we have the integration across the JIIM. The JIIM being a new acronym; or maybe it's an old one, but it's a new one to me. It talks about joint, (which we do pretty well) interagency, intergovernmental and multinational. The interagency and multinational pieces are the two that I want to highlight, in that, the joint piece I think we have. Intergovernmental; gets to the relationship of the federal to the state. While it doesn't have to do with an irregular challenge or threat, Katrina is an example of that aspect.

The next friendly force characteristic is we need to be adaptive in learning. It's absolutely critical in dealing with challenges that are so flat, and so adaptive, and so quick on their feet; it's very important for our leaders to be adaptive in learning.

Psychological precision is a new term or a term that we've kind of coined here. I'm not sure if it's exactly right, but it tries to get at the notion that whether we're talking about kinetic action, information ops, public diplomacy or just our character, (what it is that we bring to a scene when we show up as soldiers) it's very important that we gain the same degree of intended result as we do with our kinetic fight. In air/land battle and in fighting an MCO, we're getting very good at precision strike. Identifying a target and eliminating that target. We are not near as good in this environment of having the predicted outcome or the intended outcome as we are in our kinetic activity, our information ops or just our presence. The example that I like to use is the soldier that's walking around through the market on a patrol. Our intended consequence of that is to be friendly, to interact with the population. But when we wear sunglasses nobody can see your eyes and we are carrying a weapon and we are in a flack vest, and we are doing those things for all very important reasons. They have one intended consequence; the unintended consequence of perception associated with that is the antithesis of this psychological precision that I'm talking about. We have to find better ways to get the intended result. If our actions for personal security reasons might have an unintended result, we have to come up with ways to get the message across of why we are doing it to achieve the intended result.

The last one, of course, is that this needs to be knowledge based. And this gets to the whole notion of setting the context before we go into an operation to where we understand the ramifications of our actions. It gets to the notion of a strategic corporeal. Of how every action can raise itself in importance very quickly to a level that would be a national incident. And we must be a knowledge based organization to understand the cultural dynamics and the strategic implications of our action to make the right choices. The place that this has in importance to this group is not so much that any of these thoughts that I've just talked about are revolutionary. We've all talked about them. I might have packaged it a little differently than in some cases, but these are fairly defensible positions, both in the threat and the force characteristic. For this group, the real challenge is taking a look at this challenge, and developing what you believe are the training and education issues associated

with it. How we optimize our system to build those force characteristics into our current force. I'm going to get into a little bit of where we saw some of those capacity concerns and some notions that we had during our study-just as food for thought. But before I do that, I do want to talk about some of the good news story.



Relevant Actions Underway

- Innovative, confident, adaptable junior officers emerging from Iraq experience
- More culturally aware junior officers emerging from Iraq experiences; cultural awareness spans national cultures, services cultures, organizational and branch boundaries
- Right mix of experiences, training, and education for growing adaptive leaders and adapt soldiers
- Improved timeliness of our lessons learned process
- Commitment to lifelong learning
- Relevant combat training center experiences
- Improving the Foreign Area Officer program
- Officer and NCO Educational Systems under constant review


We are doing things. The Army has moved out. We're not standing still as we study this. And we're being fairly proactive in trying to change and adapt our organization to the environment we find ourselves in. I'll only highlight a couple of these because I know most of you are familiar with them. But the first thing, probably the most important thing is, we have a heck of a crop of junior officers and NCOs out there that have an experience level that the Commandant alluded to when he talked about the mix of the class this year. We have some tremendous first hand understanding of the problem that has not been evident or has not been realized by the Army for some time.

I want you to challenge my third bullet up there. I'm trying to say positive things on these next couple slides before I walked into the gaps. And I think we've made some tremendous strides in getting the mix right on how you

educate a force to deal with this kind of a situation in experience, training and education. But I'm not sure if we got the mix right. We have to continue to refine that because I think that the demands are going to be different as we bring this force back. They have come back with this wealth of experience. They are not going to accept old templates, and old "rubber stamp" kind of models. They know what they saw. Things will either resonate with them in their education and training models or they won't. And we're going to have to continue to mature and adapt those to be relevant to the force that's coming back. They'll be able to see through any weakness in old kinds of education and training models because of their experience. Weakness an earlier force may not have seen.



Relevant Actions Underway

- Modular Army Initiatives
 - Increased pool of deployable units
 - Increased high demand units (e.g. Infantry, Military Police, Civil Affairs, SOF)
 - Created more agile brigade based units
- Adopted wartime decision-making
- Fielded spiral enablers
 - Battle command good enough
 - Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI): force protection and soldier items
- Fielded Stryker capable units
- Fixing Army Aviation
- Rebalancing the Army
 - Field Artillery
 - Air Defense
 - Armor
 - Logistics
 - Military Police
 - Transportation
 - Civil Affairs
 - PSYOP
 - Biological Detection

I want to highlight three of these. The first one is the modular Army initiatives. Basically this is giving us units that are tailored or tailorable in small enough packages that we can operate a force generation model. No one believes we got this right. But the extent of change that the Army has undertaken here just within the last two years to develop this model and build organizational structures that are relevant to this fight is extraordinary for any organization. To find this in the Army in a bureaucracy that changes

organizational structure over time in a kind of a traditional way of doing it — what we've done with the modular Army has been truly revolutionary. We've also moved to this notion of fielding spiral enablers. In the past we've had a focus on the future and we've accepted risk in the current force in order to build a future transformed force. One of the changes in perspective that we have is that we no longer can accept risk in the current force because we're involved in a war. And what we're doing is taking the good ideas from that future force, and we're not waiting for the full package. We're taking nuggets of things like battle command, like the Stryker vehicles, like many of the soldier initiatives of individual equipment, to help the soldier that is on a patrol, on a street. We're pulling it out of that future force and we're fielding it to those that are deploying. That is also a revolutionary change in our institutional way of approaching this problem set. To bring in pieces instead of waiting for the whole. And to field it to a segment of the Army that's deploying instead of waiting until we can come up with a funding profile that will allow us to distribute it across the entire force.

The last one, I'll tell you, is we've made tremendous changes in rebalancing the Army from many of the things that we associate with major combat operations into many of the things that we associate with security and stability operations. I'm not sure if we've got that balance right and there's an awful lot of concern as we move and make this shift that we don't undermine, our Major Combat Operations (MCO) capability. Getting rid of excessive overmatch, which is a frequently coined term, is a good thing. But we don't want to leave ourselves vulnerable on the left side of that arrow. There's no one else out there that works the MCO piece like DOD. On the other side of the coin, we are a part of a much greater team and there is some backup should we not quite get the mix right as we move to the right side of that arrow.

I want to spend a few minutes on the next slide. This is essentially the heart of the briefing on where we think we are — meaning the task force and the initiative that we have. One thing that our scoping analyses and studies have shown is that the kinds of operations we're in are very labor intensive and they are very complex for a military organization, relative to state on state warfare against recognized and known armies. You can plan for that. We've been doing that for a long time. We understand our business and we're very good at it. I say, probably a little egotistically, that we don't have a competitor in the world. This is a lot more difficult. This is a lot more nuanced. And it presents itself and expresses itself in ways that



Capacity Concern – Cultural Shift

Significant increase in complexity

Current focus

Rapid
Military victory
Firepower
Kinetic precision
Net-centric
Joint

But also

Expanded view

Persistent
Strategic success
Influence populations
Psychological Precision
Counter network
JJIM, NGO, private sector operations

***Irregular Challenges require a shift in emphasis and focus,
not new thinking or an abandonment of current thinking***

are different and that you have to adapt to for each situation. Now, is that true of state on state warfare? Yes. But we've been doing that a long time. And to build up an Army we have indicators. We have things we can see. We can predict how they are going to fight. We can see their doctrine. We can look at their equipment. You have very few of those indicators in this type of warfare. That makes it much more complex from my perspective. This cultural shift that I talk about is just that. It is a shift. I'm not talking about anything revolutionary. There's nothing on the left side of this slide that I'm saying we need to move away from. We're not moving away from anything. We have to keep what's on the left side of this screen. And I'm not saying that we didn't have what we're moving to. If you apply any of these expanded view notions, to state on state warfare, they can apply. World War II was persistent. Influencing populations is critical in state on state warfare. We do that normally in traditional MCO operations by defeating armies and occupying terrain. What is different, the nuance that's different here is, that's not the coin of the realm. Influencing populations now is more about information; more about credibility. Much of what we have to do

operates outside the military domain. We've already talked to that to some degree, but this notion of an expanded view, we've got the joint pretty right. Moving into dealing with other multinational and interagency organizations with NGOs and with private sector firms and the role of contractors on the battlefield is becoming much more important. Not that it wasn't there before, and not that getting good at it won't apply to an MCO operation. The beauty of this side is, as we make this mental shift and cultural shift, we're just going to mature as a force. Everything on the right side applies to a major combat operation as well, and so if we get better at psychological precision in influencing populations and working with the interagency and contractors on the battlefield, we will also be good at doing that in major combat operations. It's almost the flip side of the coin of lesser included that we used to operate under. Where we do the MCO and all other operations that the military was involved with were lesser included pieces. That if we optimize for the MCO, the major combat operation, we could go do peace keeping. We could go do security. Well, we're finding the demands of security and reconstruction that now on a scale that we're seeing in the world today, as we optimize for those operations, we, in fact, are bringing capability to the major combat operation.



Overview of Capacity Concerns

Capacity Concerns

- **Human capital development**
- **Changing Army roles and missions**
- **External interface and influence**
- Sustainment (Army Processes)
- Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy

Now for our group and our analyses, we took a look at the nature of the threat. We looked at the force characteristics that would be ideal to defeat that threat. We looked at some of the things we were doing and we asked,

“Well, where do we have capacity concerns?” We use two words, capability gap, meaning we didn’t have the ability to do it at all. Or a capacity concern which is what we found was the predominant concern that we had. We could do something in almost every area, but it was like a volume or a rheostat knob. At the scale that we’re being asked to do many of the operations, we have a limited capacity to do several things that would be useful to that operation, but when you try to turn up that volume, our rheostat knob we just didn’t have a capacity to dig in. We came up with five areas that we thought, if we dealt with the capacity concerns in these five areas, that we would hit all of the important and relevant capacities necessary to move our current force into a force that is characterized by those characteristics I showed you earlier. With three of them we thought we could actually take some initiative and do something at it. The first three—human capital, the roles and missions and the interface. On two of them we thought that they were kind of tough nuts to crack. On the sustainment piece, we looked at sustainment both from a material perspective and from a force generation model perspective. What we thought was there’s an awful lot of effort right now in the Army and in DOD to address that sustainment issue. How are we going to continue the op tempo that we have today, and how are we going to alter the op tempo by building security forces indigenous to the nations that we’re in. I don’t know how that’s going to turn out. We’re recapitalizing our wheeled vehicle fleet. We are through a modernization program replacing equipment at a much greater rate than we have in the past. We have completely changed the whole perspective of how we’re pursuing Army aviation. The op tempo of Army aviation compared to what we were funded against is unbelievable; sometimes three and four times the op tempo that we’ve been budgeted for. We’ve taken some tremendous strides. We took a helicopter that by all accounts is exactly what we are looking for in that transformation force, and canceled it to have the resources to fight the current fight. We are doing wonderful things in the force generation model for rotation basis, to get a six year cycle or something in that nature for the Reserve component and a three year cycle for the active component, and the piece that modularity plays in that. We’re taking some tremendous strides and initiatives in sustainment, and so our analyses did not really dive into that too much. What we need to do right now is assess how well those things that we have started are actually working and make adjustments to that, and we didn’t feel like going out and finding new efforts for sustainment was going

to be particularly useful. I have to admit that the last bullet, the strategic communication/public diplomacy is one that we all agree is probably the most important aspect of this operation. It's the most important capacity concern that we have. I had absolutely no idea of exactly how to wrestle with this because the issue and the problem is much greater than the Army, and it expands beyond DOD. And so, that's going to have to be as we work that interagency and multinational aspect of our understanding, that's going to be something that's going to have to mature. It is absolutely critical, but as a briefing by the Army about the Army, I'm here to tell you that I don't know internally how we can address that particular one. So we did come up with some thoughts on the top three. And all three of them have an aspect of education and training that I would encourage you to think about.



Developing Human Capital

Leading the Army in an environment of irregular challenges will require leaders who can:

- **Communicate with people outside the Army**
- **Excel at creative problem solving**
- **Understand the thinking of others different than themselves**
- **Handle the ambiguity and complexity of missions across the spectrum of conflict**



Initiatives

- **Captain's Career Course**
- **Advanced Civil Schooling**
- **General Officer Leader Development**
- **Cultural Competence**


This is probably the most important one. The most direct one. The most easy to intuit the relationship of the role that education and training and the kinds of things that we're going to be discussing over the next couple of days in our workshops (as an impact). How do we develop the leaders, the NCOs, the Junior Officers, the General Officers who are going to lead the Army in DOD into the future, into this environment?



Changing Army Roles & Missions

The Army's expanding roles and missions in the JIIM approach to addressing irregular challenges require adjustments to Army capacities.

- Expansion - adjust Army capacities within the context of national objectives and risk management
 - Implications of reconstruction and stabilization operations
 - Implications of scope, depth, and duration of expanding governance, urban management, and economic development mission sets
- Implication for institutional (TDA) army missions, organizational structures, and processes



Emerging Concepts and Initiatives

- **Expanding mission sets**
- **Executive Agency – Stability Operations**
- **Deployable Institutional Modules**

Changing roles and missions. Right now there's a tremendous debate over a document called DOD3000, which lays out a couple of things. One was that, I believe, most of the debate centers on is executive agency for stability operations. The thing that's most appealing to me in the document is the notion of an expanded mission set for DOD in general and the Army and Marine Corps specifically: as it has to do with governance; as it has to do with economic development; and as it has to do with urban management. Clearly we are operating in those three domains. Clearly DOD and the Army are not the core competency players in those domains. We have a role. Defining that role and figuring out how much of a shift we want to make to meet those roles, is a critical question regardless of the outcome of the DOD3000 debate. What's actually happening on the ground tells us that we have a role in those three missions. And defining that role and our relationship with those folks that have the core competency in those roles, and how we make that transition or provide the environment for them to operate is a critical, critical debate. And while it might not have a specific, direct link to the education and training discussions you are going to have, I'll tell you that dialog on this in our education and training forums is absolutely critical over the next few years.



External Interface and Influence

Army operations increasingly involve the interagency and broader policy processes that contribute to successful outcomes or inhibit them.

- **Broad based involvement and dialogue to inform the development of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy**
- **Participation in the effective use of information operations and public diplomacy to influence populations**
- **Adjustment of Army policies, procedures, and organizational interface to increase effectiveness within interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national operations**



Emerging Concepts and Initiatives

- **Interagency education and exchange**
- **Interagency tours**
- **Interagency cadre and “reserve”**

The last one I want to talk about is the external interface and influence. Here I'm talking about getting a better cultural understanding of our own interagency process. Before we go and get a cultural understanding external, or maybe at the same time considering the fact that we're knee deep in operations. I think it's critical for the Army and DOD to look externally to those interagency multinational organizations that we're going to have to operate with, and understand their culture, their organization, how they make decisions, and what the decision making processes are. Because a better understanding is going to help us operate better in that environment. Many of you probably have more experience in this area directly than me; but during the development of this research, I got the opportunity to interface with people that were in the interagency (primarily State Department, USAID, some in Justice). It is amazing to me how closely aligned our goals and objectives are, and how closely we match in how we perceive the problem and what the solutions ought to be in a general way. What we don't understand is each other. What we don't understand are the hot buttons internal to our organizations, and the processes that have to be influenced in order to make change in our organizations. There is a tremendous amount of

concern and protection for each of our groups. And I think that this is also a critical area for education and training focus. And I offer it to you for the discussions in the work group.



Emerging Issues

- Significance of non-Islamist irregular challenges
- Role of state response to or support of irregular challenges
- Usefulness of Iraq model in future operations
- Appropriate role of the U.S. military
- Definitions of success, and metrics to measure

I'm going to close with some emerging issues. I'm talking about here, as I said in the very beginning, a very discreet set of circumstances that is focused on threats. It's focused on the irregular challenges. It's focused on terrorism and organized crime and insurgency. We're going to deal with talking about stability operations and the training of that; goes beyond what I'm talking about. And taking a look at the usefulness of things like the Iraq model and the appropriate roles for the US military goes beyond what I'm talking about here. So emerging issues has to do with things like Katrina and what are the security implications of that. As we're trying to do a humanitarian assistance operation internal to our own nation, and support of the Department of Homeland Defense and the State Governments. That really doesn't have to do with what I've been talking about on a threat base, but it has everything to do with emerging issues of the roles of the military and where we shouldn't go completely to an Iraqi or an Afghanistan model to design our education programs. The definition of success and metrics to measure that success is applicable to this operation, to this notion of not knowing when an intensity spike means that we are winning or whether we are losing, and trying to find metrics for that. It is equally applicable to the training and education of our soldiers. When do we have enough cultural

awareness? What kind of cultural awareness? At what level does the private or junior soldier need to have a certain cultural understanding of what's going on versus a mid-grade or a senior leader? How do you measure that? If we can't measure it, we won't even be able to figure out how to talk to each other about what we're trying to achieve. Language training is the same thing, and a very tough nut to crack. We are pretty good at cracking the nut in language training where we need something specific; we need interpreters; we need interrogators. We have MOS's, Military Occupational Specialty, jobs that dictate that, and we can build in our organizational models and say, yeah, we need more of them. We can come up with models that tell us about how many more, but how about for the general force? For the leader that's coming into the Army, going to be commissioned as an officer, what language requirement should he have? And how should we measure that? And there is a cost to that. It's very easy to measure the cost. How do we measure the benefit so that we know when we have the right balance? These metrics are critical. And I'll tell you that the training and education piece of these metrics is 75-80% of figuring that balance out. And with that I see I'm out of time and I will turn it back over to our host.

Second Presentation:

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Building America's Conflict Transformation Capabilities

Presentation by Christopher J. Hoh

Director for Response Strategy and Resource Management, S/CRS

PKSOI Education Workshop

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

September 13, 2005



I'll try to use my best command voice and the microphone. And I want to say thanks to you and your colleagues and John Agoglia not only for inviting me here, but for organizing this. Because I think it's very timely and important for all of us. I can see who's awake and who's not. I am glad to be here even though I know I'm the guy sandwiched between the coffee and the bathroom break. But I'll try to keep your attention just going through sort of five things this morning. And I apologize, some of the type on these slides is small.

Agenda

- **Introduction**
- **Mission & Status**
- **Tools**
- **Training**
- **Discussion?**



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To give you a little background of what we are trying to do at the Interagency level to better organize our government to respond to the kind of challenges that SSI so thoroughly and precisely identified in the previous briefing. And then to give you a little bit of an overview of some of our tools. And then get into a discussion on training. I will try to go over a lot of material up front quickly because I see from many friends and colleagues here that it will be familiar. On the other hand, I know there are some other folks here who are going to say, SCRS, what's that? So we've got to kind of cover both sides of the coin. SCRS is an office that was created about a year ago. And what led up to the creation was the sense that we have these kind of new threats that we've just heard about. That our new threats that threaten US interests, whether it's terrorists or criminals, traffickers, when the authority of a foreign government collapses then you don't have a sheriff in town. And the bad guys move in. That's an oversimplified way. That's what I call the mother-in-law speech. That's how you explain it to somebody who doesn't follow these things in and out. But it gets to the heart of why this is important.

S/CRS Genesis & Mission

- ▶ Weak and failed states create voids filled by terrorism, organized crime, trafficking (arms, people, narcotics) and other threats to U.S. interests
- ▶ Successful reconstruction and stabilization essential to exit strategy for military, peacekeeping and other international deployments
- ▶ 2-3 significant R&S operations concurrent since Cold War
- ▶ Consensus to do better among Congress (Lugar-Biden), think tank (CSIS “Winning the Peace”) and USG observers
- ▶ **Mission: Lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy**



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When you look at the history of US experience just since the cold war ended in the last 15 years, we find that our country has been heavily engaged in two to three of these operations every year, in some kind of launch phase or major operational phase. And that seems likely to continue for the next few decades of the 21st century. Given that, a lot of folks said can we better adapt ourselves at the interagency level to deal with these kinds of things? Yes, there's a lot of reform going on within the Army, and within the other services, and within DOD. There's also a tremendous amount of ferment within AID and its various components and at a management level of how you tie those together. Within the organization I come out of, the State Department, there's also a lot, whether you're talking about the refuge bureau or the political military folks or others. How do we better adapt and organize? But there was a sense that government-wide we need to do better. And whether you are talking to Senators Lugar and Byden, the think tank people at CSIS and the Association of the US Army who published, “Winning the Peace,” or many other institutes including many that are represented in this room. There was a definite sense we need to organize ourselves better. So the office that I now represent has this mission. I won't read it to you. But I will point out three things from it. It is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize. It is not to do. If we set up one interagency

Status of USG Efforts

- ▶ S/CRS created July 2004; Amb. Carlos Pascual 1st Coordinator
- ▶ Interagency office with 50+ staff including AID, OSD, JCS, CIA, Labor, DOJ
- ▶ NSPD mandating SecState lead
- ▶ Interagency PCC on Reconstruction and Stabilization with 8 working groups
- ▶ Contacts with and support from combatant commands, FSI, other schools and institutes on concepts, training and exercises
- ▶ “Internal McKinsey” e.g. Cuba, Nepal, Haiti, Sudan
- ▶ Various exercises, roundtables & trainings delivered



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belly button to conduct and coordinate all these kinds of operations, we would need a huge new cabinet department. That's what in fact Professor Francis Fukiama says is called for. But our leaders decided no, let's try to have a smaller operation that's leaner, hopefully not meaner, but will coordinate what others are doing. It is also designed to prepare for post conflict situations in failed and failing states. That's not to react. But to be proactive. And it was, then Secretary of State Colin Powell, who said to us, I want you folks to be heavily engaged in prevention. Because if you can head off a conflict or mitigate it in the early stages, you will save a lot in blood and treasure. And he certainly was right. And finally, it's to work in an intervention to put them on a sustainable path to peace, democracy, and a market economy. It is not make Bosnia into Switzerland. But it is to get those countries to a point where they can move forward under their own steam, maybe with some international assistance of various kinds. But of more traditional kinds. And this takes me back to the definition we saw out of OSD in the last presentation saying the scope needs to be narrowed to the countries that have things like weapons of mass destruction or terrorism or energy or proximity to US borders. And I think that's true and apt. But at the same time, if a country doesn't have any of those things but descends into chaos, like Somalia, it will become a base for the bad guys. It will become a vacuum that they are going to go in and fill. And it's not surprising that that was one of the places where Osama Bin Ladin got himself organized.


So where are we on the interagency organization effort? This office was created about a year ago. My boss, Ambassador Carlos Pasqual, was appointed the coordinator. We've got now over 50 staff from a variety of agencies. And from the military world I'll mention, because it just says up there OSD and JCS, that also includes JFCOM, Army Corps of Engineers, and Civil Affairs. So we've got, I think, a good representation among the interagency folks on the staff.

I have to edit this next bullet point. It says NSPD (National Security Presidential Directive) mandating the Secretary of State's lead. That's forthcoming. It hasn't been issued yet, but it's supposed to be out real soon. There's a bunch of other stuff including interagency working groups; a lot of work that's gone on with the combatant commanders, with the schools, with other institutions, training and exercises, we have a bunch of people, not only participating in the [Fortiss] defenses exercise at SOUTHCOM this week, but actually who've been involved since almost day one of our office in helping to develop the scenario and helping to marshal a larger interagency presence. So that that exercise will have a greater degree of realism when you get into the things that SSI just talked about in terms of the interagency and international connections with the operations.

Finally, we serve as a kind of internal management consultant within the State Department, within the interagency community on how better to organize and be effective; how to take lessons that we have learned and actually apply them.

Organization

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I'll get into some of the other things in a minute. This I'm sure is impossible to read but for people who like org charts, it's an org charts of our office that shows you, not only how we're organized, but sort of some of the specific things we're working on. And I'll go through each of these things in some detail. But if you have questions on this or anything else, let me know.

10 Innovations in Prevention and Reconstruction

1. Early Warning System

- ▶ National Intelligence Council Watchlist biennially, targets for focus & prevention

2. Common Civ-Mil Planning Framework for Reconstruction and Stabilization

- ▶ Links goals, essential tasks, and institutional responsibility and resources

3. Model to Deploy Civilian Teams to COCOMs for R&S Planning

- ▶ Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Teams (HRSTs)

4. New Interagency Mechanisms for Washington Coordination

- ▶ Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups (CRSGs), PCC & staff

5. Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs) to Organize Field Presence

- ▶ Embed with military at division or brigade level in combat environments
- ▶ Deploy at provincial level in non-combat scenario, e.g. UN PKO
- ▶ Provides immediate civilian leadership, unity of effort for R&S tasks



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I'll take another minute to give you a quick overview of some of the tools that have been developed or at least proposed to be created in the last year. I won't tick off all ten of these. Some of you have heard a lot about several of them. First is the early warning piece. National Intelligence Council comes out now every six months with a list of countries at the greatest risk of instability. It's a watch list of watch lists. They have a whole methodology. And then from that we try to boil it down to two or three and say let's focus intensively on these. Go to the Secretary of State after consulting with interagency partners, after consulting with regional bureaus and other experts in the State Department, and say we'll focus on these. Now, the vision is that we can do full up contingency planning on maybe three of them in a year. Since we are a new organization still trying to get resources, still trying to build up the staff, we are not able to do that yet. But it would be contingency planning full up on some of them and we can figure out what that means in a second. There would be conflict prevention kind of exercises that do some of the same analyses, but then get involved to figure out what can we do to change the dynamics on the ground without planning for some kind of big operation on a contingency basis. And there would be kind of exercises and responses in between. We should do a lot more of those. In my view every six months if the government were doing about three full-up contingency plans and about five or six in the middle, let's look

carefully at the rule of law piece, or the long term economic development piece or the reform of the intel systems piece in this situation. And another five to ten conflict prevention. A few round tables, maybe an exercise done by a combatant command and an embassy as we did in the case of Nepal with PACOM, AID and State Department folks out in Nepal. You know, about ten of those. That would be, I think, about right. It will take us a couple of years and several million dollars more to get up to the point where that's possible. But I think it's important to have that out there. The common civil/military planning framework is something that has been developed by some of our staff. We'll talk about the differences and definitions of training in a minute, but the idea is to say at a strategic level, what are the goals? What is it that our government and our international partners want to accomplish in this country? Now, to somebody relatively new to this, that would seem a pretty elementary starting point. But I think most of you here have enough experience to know that clarity about goals has not been a predominant feature of our interventions over the last 15 years. So we get into a lot of interagency scraps about we should do this, we should do that. And these arguments about who's in charge of this or who's trying to that, are really stalking horses for a question of what are our essential goals in this country. Two things about that strategic planning framework for conflict transformation: it aims to define goals, sub-goals and major mission element under those; and then looks at which agency has the lead on which piece and ties that to resources. But what it doesn't do is say, this goal is that agency and that goal is this agency. Because we have found these are all integrated. They are all interdisciplinary. They are all interagency. And so you've got to, at the level of goals and sub-goals and major mission elements, you've got to be able to say, here's all the people involved. The other thing it does is focuses on about a two or three-year time period. To say what is the period of conflict transformation? What are the drivers of conflict that we know about from experience, from a review of the literature. I'm no expert on that, but there are some people who are who've looked at this. And then what can we do to address those drivers of conflict in the society. We've had, what, five maybe successful interventions in Haiti in the last 15 years. We want to get to the point where we can one successful intervention, move out, turn it over to the people of the society. So you have to figure out what is the underlying source of the conflict. If you try to focus on a longer timeframe, I think you'll find our government's attention will have waned. We won't have the resources committed to continuing the intervention.

A few other things, we've got models for joint planning. There's a whole alphabet soup of acronyms but the third, the HRSTs, is to get civilian and military planning lashed up. The fifth one is, I think very important, unity of effort in the field, model for deploying teams in the capital, in the provinces where you put together a joint interagency team. And, yeah, we sort of have those with PRTs. We sort of had those the way some of the regional offices functioned in the Balkans. We had those, in a way, with some of the provincial offices and operations in Iraq. We end up over and over and over saying we have to coordinate at a field level. We've got to get all our players involved. We've got to have a coordinated US group so we can sit down with whoever, whether it's the UN or local officials, or NATO and have a more coordinated approach. This isn't to say we pick one person from one agency and say you're the boss of everybody else there. But you have a group that comes together regularly, at least daily, to say what's going on in our little area of operations here? Who's going to do what about it? Do we have overlaps? Let's deconflict those because we shouldn't both be spending resources on the same problem. Or do we have a gap? And if somebody doesn't address this issue then we've got a problem. So that kind of day to day coordination we end up over and over setting up structures to deal with. The model here is to say let's figure out what works in that. Let's figure out what doesn't work and be intentional about setting those up in the future. So I will be happy to go into that and other things later if people have questions.

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10 Innovations Continued...

6. Proposed a Response Corps

- ▶ Diplomatic and management personnel from key agencies to staff response teams.

7. Develop Global Skills Network of Capabilities for Conflict Transformation

- ▶ Deliver post-conflict technical assistance and transition to building local capabilities.
- ▶ Developing database to capture contracts.

8. Coordinate with International Partners for Effective Multilateral Responses

- ▶ Developing relationships with international and regional orgs and bilateral partners
- ▶ Allows for better coordination in the field and shared responsibility.

9. Capture Lessons Learned

- ▶ Thematic Guides: Developing to capture best practices on DDR, transitional governance.
- ▶ Seeking to create an interagency agenda for metrics, evaluation & training.

10. Proposed a Conflict Response Fund to Congress

- ▶ Pre-positioned funds and more flexible authorities for quicker movement of resources.



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On the other tools and innovations, some of them are proposed awaiting funding. Some are starting off in a prototype way. Others will be developed. But let me just turn to number nine, the capturing of lessons learned. It's one of the areas where the civilian world can really take a leaf from our military colleagues. Because it's not enough to learn the lessons, but they've got to be applied. And we've seen what that takes is procedures, doctrine, whatever you want to call it so you have a way of articulating it. It takes institutions that will disseminate it. And it takes training programs which brings us to why we are here. So we're involved in looking both sectorially at a couple things, a thematic guide on the issue for instance of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants into a society. It's one of those things that very often falls between the cracks. And we don't yet seem to have a good handle on how to get that right. So that's one where we've got a kinetic guide coming out. But we're also working, particularly with our colleagues at USIP, but also other places, to figure out how do we build into the civilian world the kind of lessons learned, distillation and application that has become SOP in the military world. And how do we make it real time so that today you know what's happening in Haiti for example, and that goes back to the questions of metrics.

So that's some of the things that our merry band of interagency personnel have put together. Let me take another second on personnel. Just to mention that Washington core coordination group is proposed to go to a course depth of about 80. But when we look at the response teams we found that unlike the military world where it's relatively clear, you have few people deployed in the field under the combatant command. You've got your active duty military and you've got your Reserves, and everybody sort of understands the system and how it works. Or at least that's how it seems to some of us on the outside. And in the civilian world, it's not clear. And there are some real gaps in terms of being able to mobilize people. What we're looking at then are three basic levels on the supply side for generating the personnel to respond. The first, we'll call a response corps. The proposal at the State Department is for an active response corps and a standby corps. These would be your first responders. These would be people who are set aside to deploy on short notice, who are specifically trained, oriented, prepared. And to develop where needed equivalent capabilities in other agencies. Some of them already have them. Some are developing more. For instance at AID you've got the office of foreign disaster assistance. You've got the office of transitional initiatives. They've got their rosters and their first responders.

And some of them are doing tremendous work now actually in the Gulf Coast in Katrina for example. So there're some good models there. On the other hand, they probably need to be expanded and made more robust as we look at what we're going to face in future decades. In other agencies there is a real problem just as was mentioned. Yeah, they're great, ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Criminal Training Assistance Program), OPDAT (Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training), all kinds of other people out there from Afghanistan to Serbia, but finding those kinds of people is hard, because they don't have a first responder system. So it's going to be from agency to agency a matter of tailoring and figuring out what's missing here and what's needed. But the idea is have a group within each of the civilian agencies that you can call on as first responders.

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Personnel

Washington leadership and coordination: S/CRS: 80 core positions

- ▶ *Lead, plan, coordinate, mobilize civilian response*

“Supply Side” for Response Teams

- ▶ **Response Corps:** Pre-assigned and prepared “first responders” in State Department Active & Standby Response Corps and equivalent personnel in other agencies
- ▶ **Civilian Reserves:** Permanent body of technically skilled private citizens deployed to provide essential tasks on ground – *under study and development*
- ▶ **Global Skills Network:** Specialists contracted and deployed to deliver essential tasks and build local capacity over sustained period

Advance Civilian Teams: Drawn from above and elsewhere as needed

- ▶ *Deploy with military at brigade or division level, e.g. PRTs*
- ▶ *Deploy in decentralized manner under Embassy coordination for non-combat PKO*



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Next level out then is what's been talked about a lot, a civilian reserve. This is very much in development. But it seems very much a priority of this Administration to build. That would be a body of people from, not just the private sector, but also state and local governments. So when you get into things like civil administration, public services, rule of law, policing,

all those core things that we find we need a lot of people for early on. And we need people who can understand how they are supposed to interact and can hit the ground running, if not as a formed unit, at least as a pre-prepared team. If pre-prepared is a word. That's where a civilian reserve should be focused. That doesn't mean you wouldn't use a civilian reserve for a lot of other things, too. But where do we really need to put the focus. It's in that rule of law and public administration and basic services area. We will hope to have in the President's '07 budget request a fairly significant amount to launch this.

And finally the third element we've called global skills network. That's a catchall. It's essentially a network of contracts. We have several of them in AID and other places. When you want to launch a new currency, when you want to do a rule of law reform, when you want to have engineering services or you want to do an assessment leading up to an election, there are some indefinite quantity contracts and technical assistance vehicles in place. But do we have across the board in all the sectors for all the geographic regions what we need so that if somebody said, okay, move into country X we could throw some money at that and bring on the people? No. Sometimes the contracts are missing. Sometimes the contracts have ceilings. And sometimes, even though there's a contractor and there's money, there aren't people. And so all those things need to be addressed as we build up this network. That's basically three levels where you get people from. Once they are in the field, then the question is how do you organize them? And that's what I was mentioning in terms of the model for integrated teams in the fields, the advance civilian teams. As my boss is fond of saying, if we can imbed CNN, why can't we imbed the State Department. Point is simply that in that early phase right at the end of combat operations you need to have some of the folks who have those core competencies in economics, in governance, in local culture available. It is not fair to take a Marine Colonel not matter how heroic, how intelligent and how motivated and say, "You be the mayor of Najaff." Chris Conlin will tell you that. He's written about that. He said, you know, we did a great job and there's many, many cases where in Afghanistan or Iraq our personnel have done tremendous jobs. But really, I think, we've done them a tremendous disservice to say you are going to be left holding the bag. Run this oil company. Work this health clinic. Get this water treatment plant moving again. When we have within our society and within our government, at the federal as well as state and local levels, people who are experts who could be there to assist. And it's obviously part


of the exit strategy for the military. So that's the ACT kind of vision. Which brings us finally to the subject of the conference on training.

Types of Training

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Target	General focus: "Everyone"; build awareness	Some focus: likely interaction; IWG; build understanding	Specific focus: country engagement teams; build skills	Specific focus: leading, managing; strengthen skills, knowledge
Ops; tools	<div>Introduction to S/CRS, I/A players, 1 day</div> <div>Module, 1½ hour</div>	<div>Basics, R&S operational concepts; 1-2 days</div> <div>Basics, R&S tool- e.g. Planning Framework 1-2 days</div>	<div>Team Planning</div> <div>Deployment security, Communications Xx days</div> <div>Military Exercise 5days+prep</div>	<div>Leading Planning Effort</div> <div>Leading Country Team</div>
Env; context	<div>Introduction to situation, 1 day</div> <div>Module, 1½ hour</div>	<div>Tech sector overview, tradeoffs</div> <div>Conflict-USIP or FSI or CMM or ...</div> <div></div>	<div>Country situation</div>	<div>maz: 12aug05</div>

Illustrative types of training for various audiences-USG, Others



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This chart gives overview of some of the things we've looked at on training. And it's the time for me to introduce my colleague, Mary Ann Zimmerman, who's there in the back with her hand up. She'll be here for the whole conference. I won't. But she's our Training Coordinator and expert. And she'll be able to take all your questions when I leave town. But the main point is that axes here of the focus. How specific or how general. And then there's a question as how much you drill down in depth. There are some people who need at least an introduction to how we are organizing interagency. And there's going to be people who are out there on the front lines who are going to need to know a lot about the country and about specific subject areas. And so this gives you a rough idea of one way to visualize what's needed. And Mary Ann has put together a training strategy. We've got charts. We've got descriptions of courses. There's a lot there and you'll be getting into some of that in the work groups. But I think I'll just mention the vision that we've put out there is not to take over the whole training field because that would be silly. But rather to say can't we put

together some of the core things, that are needed that are missing. Can't we make it available to people from throughout the interagency community. Rather than saying here's a great course and if you're from the Treasury Department, you just have to get your Department to pay for it. But rather to say, if you want to come and you're selected then it's paid for. We've got a lot more work to do on that. But we've actually made some progress. And I'll get into that in a second.

Critical R&S Performance Gaps

- **Unclear Strategic Goals**
 - Organizations' different missions, visions & values
 - USG, international, local, NGO
 - Bad goals leads to bad plans
- **Poor Understanding of Local Society's Priorities & Values**
 - Complicated by cultural and language differences
- **Lack of Common Principles**
 - No inter-operability
- **Competition for Resources**
 - Turf wars exacerbate incompatible SOPs – why cooperate?
- **Unsuitability of Skills for R&S Scenario**
 - Fluid & uncertain environment, worsened due to security threats



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The question is what are the gaps we're trying to meet? There's also the question of who are you trying to train? But a second on the critical performance gaps. What our analyses have come up are sort of five major areas where we really need to focus efforts where we can make a difference. One is that lack of clarity about goals that I talked about. So I won't go into that again, but obviously if you have bad goals, you're going to have bad plans. And there's got to be a real effort to address that. Another is we don't go into countries enough understanding their priorities, their values. And that's critical for that whole strategic communication piece. Third part, lack of common principles is one way to describe it. Lack of interoperabilities is another. It's everything from the radios to the understanding of who does what on the team. You are not going to be able to fix any of these

Training Strategy

- Audience? ACT, HRST, CRSG, ARC, IWG, S/CRS, other?
- Basic vs. Advanced
- Priority Offerings
 - Conflict & Post-Conflict Overview (1 day)
 - Planning Overview (1 day)
 - Inter-Agency R&S Operations (3 days)
 - Leading Integrated Planning Processes (2 days)
 - Managing Inter-Agency Projects (2 days)
- Other Needs
 - Technical & Sectoral Overview
 - Conflict Awareness
 - Military Exercises
 - Others...
- Training Advisory Group: FSI, AID/OFDA, NDU, USIP (& FMCS)



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things solely by training and education. But if you don't get the training and education piece right, you are not going to fix the problem. Competition for resources, turf wars—we have different procedures that are not compatible. But really what we get into is this question of why cooperate? Somebody is sent out there with a mission. They are going to do it, by God. That's why they were picked. And get out of my way. And we have great people like that who have delivered from AID, State Department, military. And you put two or three of those kinds of people in the same room, they're not necessarily going to say, how are we going to accomplish this together. And yet, what we're finding more and more, none of these challenges are ones that any single agency or single perspective can really address. If you're trying to fix rule of law, if you are trying to restart the economy, if you are trying to get a population to go back from a situation of unrest, you've got to bring in the expertise on the technical assistance side, the diplomatic side, the security side. And if you don't find a way to deal with these things in an integrated fashion, then you will not succeed to the level that frankly our taxpayers have a right to expect.

And finally we find that not necessarily does everyone have the skills they need. There was something in some of the previous slides about decision models and timeframes for delivery. We are talking about very fluid and uncertain environments. You've got to be flexible and adaptable. And we can't train you to be a flexible and an adaptable person if you are not that personality. But we can equip you with tools to help you understand on a more real time basis what's going on and how to adapt. So those are some of the key things that we have seen are needed in interagency training strategy.

First question is, who's the audience? If you care about the alphabet soup, I'll explain it to you. But the question is, are you training the people who are going to be out there in the front lines in the field? Are you training the joint planners? Are you training the interagency managers in Washington? Who? Obviously, that's the first point of departure. But a second big issue is how basic and advanced and where do you draw the line? Where do you say if you don't have this, we're not going to put you out there. And if you don't have this, we're not going to put you in charge. Those are tough issues. But they need to be defined ahead of time. What our office has managed to do is put together a few courses, some of which we've piloted, some of which will be offered for the first time this fall. An overview of conflict and post conflict, we're working on a little overview of the strategic planning stuff that is not only how do various agencies plan, but also what kind of planning is needed in reconstruction and stabilization. What we're calling a basic course, sort of three-day, not much time, but it's hard to get people to go, as you know, that is focused on the interagency piece of reconstruction and stabilization. Getting people to work together. And then there's the integrated planning at a more leadership level. Folks who've gone through year long planning courses look at this and laugh. They say, you know, how can you do planning in two days. But the fact of the matter is there is a lot you can do in two days that makes a big difference in somebody's ability to help agencies figure out what do we need to cover? How are we going to do it? And come up with the kind of a comprehensive, strategically oriented overview that you can give to deputies and principals and have them understand what's going on.

There are other things out there that we will hope to develop and work with others to develop in the course of the next year or two. One is the technical and sectorial overview. You may go out there and be the person responsible for security in this area of operations, or the person responsible

for launching the new currency in some country. And so you know a lot about security or you know a lot about economics and banking. But part of it is you need to understand at least the basics of the other disciplines so that you can work together as a team. And so that's something that we've identified as a gap. Conflict — there's a lot of stuff about conflict management, conflict analysis, understanding the parties to a conflict and all of that. But there's not something that really brings together all of that in a way that helps you understand what do you need to know to be oriented when you are suddenly thrown into the midst of one of these operations. Military exercise, as I mentioned SOUTHCOM, not only working to engage with a variety of commands and institutes, particularly JFCOM on figuring out — alright, if you can't get a major civilian participation in all the military exercises that are going to go on next year, but what are the resources to work the scenarios in so that those will really test and explore the interagency connections, the international connections that are out there. And I'll just mention that at the end, we do have a small training advisory group that has been advised, validated from State Departments Foreign Service Institute the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at AID's training element, National Defense University and US Institute of Peace, with some participation by the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service. Partly those were chosen because they are all in Washington. And we said to Eric Kjonnerad, okay, you represent the military world. We've obviously reached out here, Naval Post Grad school, other places as well. But that network needs to be expanded. And that's why I'm so excited that you are doing this conference. Nevertheless there is, I think, a need for more ... just communication. Who's doing what? What do you see as the challenges? How are we going to figure out the way ahead? And that's a discussion we very much want to be involved in.

So as you go into the workshops, here is some issues that come out of mostly the civilian world that I think have relevance for you. One is there's this whole definitional thing. Education ... training. I don't use those terms with the precision of a term of art. Other people do. But we need to be clear on some of that as we discuss with each other. Planning. You can get a State Department policy planner and an AID technical assistance program planner, a military operational planner or one of the strategic management by objectives kind of planners and they will all talk about plans and planning and mean completely different things. And so, you get great frustration when you say let's get together and try to figure out how to talk about planning.

That's one I think that really is at the beginning of the discussion. Another big challenge is we've got to operate on parallel tracks. It's not enough to just get our act together within the US government, although that's going to be huge. But rather within a multinational environment where there are other militaries, there are other civilian agencies, there're intergovernmental organizations, they are all working these things. We want to have burden sharing. And so we've got to figure out how do we interact with them and move in a similar vein as we develop our training agendas and we develop our sense of how are we supposed to work together. And the other is within the US military. For the civilian world, you know, it's easy to say the military. But actually as you folks know probably better than most, there are a whole bunch of different elements there and figuring out how to work with all of them can be a challenge.

Issues from Civilian World

- **Definitions**
 - “education vs. training”
 - “planning”
- **Parallel Tracks**
 - w/ multinational (military and civilian)
 - w/ U.S. military
- **Scarce Resources**
 - For development
 - For staff availability
 - Need for focal points within military
 - Need for easily accessed info on training/education
 - Need to divide labor, expand capacity, e.g. subject experts



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Discussion

Questions?? Comments??

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- ▶ www.crs.state.gov

- ▶ *Last updated September 8, 2005.*



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And then there's the issue of scarce resources. We could probably at the end of this have identified a great list of needs. But finding the resources to address all those needs, we'll never do. So then we've got to prioritize. One of the challenges is in the civilian world. Partly a cultural challenge. Colin Powell when he came to the State Department talked about how in his career as an Army officer, he'd gone into training for a year every few years. And that that was expected and normal and rewarded and absolutely necessary to advance. He picked as his senior foreign service person in the whole building as the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, a wonderful guy named Mark Roseman. Mark said I've never gone to training since I got out of my six-week orientation course. And I joined the foreign service decades before. And Mark wasn't particularly proud of that. He just noted that you can do pretty well in our business without going to training. Finding the people to go to training courses is difficult in the civilian world because they have what is seen as their job that waits for them. So if somebody goes somewhere for week, they are probably going to have to do a lot of work before they go and after they come back just to catch up. And not that that

doesn't happen in the military world because I know it does. But there is, I think, a very big difference and that is, if you are going to a training course in the military world, the sort of default position is that's part of your job. And I'm afraid in the civilian world the default is still that's something different that your job. And until we get that changed, we're going to have, I think, difficulties of getting the staff available. But I'm working on it. I know you guys will get me pumped up and I'll go and work on it some more when I go back to DC. There are some other things here, but they are all tied to the scarcity of resources. It's hard to find out who's doing what. This conference will help. It's hard to figure out for a civilian, who do you go to in the military because there are so many different organizations who all have a piece of it. And then, how do we, since none of us no matter how well the resources, none of us have all the resources we want. How do we come up with a sensible division of labor to say you focus on that, I'll focus on that. We'll work together, but we've got some sense of how we can share the work and attack the problem in a smart and strategic way.

Those are some things that I think you are going to need to dig into. I'll close here. I'm not sure if there's any time for questions, but I'll be around for the rest of the morning. And then look forward one way or another, because I did sign the little things. You guys can get my email and phone number to answer your questions one way or another. Thank you very much.

Question:

You say that you have 50 employees. How many of those people are State Department, FSOs, or civil servants?

Answer:

It's about 30 who are State Department of one kind or another. Some are on contracts. I think we have at a rough count, 10 FSOs, and I think 9 Civil Service folks.

Question:

How are you doing in the great battle for money for ‘06? Because everything you talked about here today at least in embryonic form has existed for almost a year. And the guts of whether or not SCRS is going to fly is whether or not it gets all the hundreds of people that it needs and a relatively huge amount of money.

Answer:

Good question. We don’t know yet is the short answer. Slide 16, there’s a bunch of backup slides I’m happy to address, has a figure of \$124 million.

INVESTMENT

\$124.1 m for civilian rapid response requested in FY ‘06

PAYOFF

<u>Military Operations</u>	<u>Faster Withdrawal</u>	<u>Savings</u>
Division	1 month	\$1.2 B
Division	6 months	\$7.2 B
 <u>Peacekeeping</u>	 <u>Faster Withdrawal</u>	 <u>Savings</u>
MONUC (Congo)	6 months	\$524 M (US: \$140 M)
UNMIL (Liberia)	6 months	\$403 M (US: \$108 M)



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That’s what the President asked for in ‘06. That’s a hundred million of a conflict response fund. A contingency fund to pay for programs up front. And then about \$24 million to run the office, build the core staff, participate in exercises, develop training programs and provide them that kind of stuff. The Senate has voted— initially out of the committee it was \$74 million out of a hundred conflict response fund. They then cut that to \$24 million because they wanted to move \$50 million to Sudan. We understand that they understand the way they moved the money doesn’t allow them to use

the money where they want. So we expect that the Senate position going to the conference will be it should be \$74 million for the conflict response fund. The House level is zero. Appropriators have a hard time putting up contingency money. We've got some in some places the humanitarian fund is the best example. But the idea of saying here's money, appropriate it to us and let us to decide how to spend it when needs arise, they have a real problem with. So I think we're making some progress. President himself and others have gone out calling for this. At the end of the day, I don't know. I'd be happy if we even got 20 to start because we will have established the concept that you need some upfront money. When we go into any of these places we end up spending hundreds of millions if not billions. But getting people on the ground fast means you need to not have the argument to go on for months. And they take months. People say they shouldn't, but they do, and they always will, to figure out where we're going to scrape together the money from. Not because we don't know what we're doing, but if you put money into this crisis, it means the money that you appropriated for some very worthy program in some other country you now have to reprogram. And you have to tell about 50 people that you're reprogramming that money. And it takes it long time to do it even once you get the agreement on what you're going to reprogram. On the \$24 million for the office, Senate voted the full amount. House voted 7. You know, if they added up and divided by 2 that would be 15 or 16 million. And that would be enough to, I think, implement some of this vision. In a lot of respects it's relatively modest. It's getting to a core staff of 80 people. It's doing, I think, two major military exercises and three medium ones a year. These are relatively modest goals. And when you look at, as that slide I mentioned on page 16, what we spend to be deployed in Afghanistan or Iraq or what we spend to participate in a typical UN peacekeeping operation, it really is, I think, a smart investment. The argument we've gotten on the House side is essentially, we understand what you are doing and we think it makes sense. But take it from your existing recourses. And, you know, there's always some place you can cut a little bit. But at the end of the day it's not really a way forward, so, you know, we from the Executive branch can't lobby, but if you have any friends on the hill ...

Question:

Here's what may sound like an indiscrete question, but it isn't really. It's just for a point of clarification. The former Director of OFDA, if I look at what you are talking about in the ACT teams, I'm saying my office does all of that routinely and our disaster assistance response team. So what are you telling me that really adds to my ability to respond that you haven't already indicated in the slides?

Answer:

Well, I think the main thing is that you bring into it some capabilities in areas where AID is not allowed to operate in terms of security reform and policing and some things like that. There is theoretically the ability to take a disaster assistance response team, a DART team and expand it. And we've done that in Iraq and other places. I think what's different is to say, let's not make this all a kind of add hoc on the backs of the DART team organization as our best case. Rather let's say, shouldn't we say from day one we're going to have these various agencies there. They're going to have a prescribed way of integrating, communicating back and particularly in that are not disaster assistance or humanitarian crisis oriented. This is a structure that we think brings more interagency resources to bear at better sense of integration and of tying back into the policy process. I think the typical scenario is going to be that the DART team was there first. Whether you look at Afghanistan or you look at Bosnia, those are the people who get out there first. But as the think grows, you may very well need to integrate them into a larger structure and you put the head of the DART team on that ACT. And in some cases you may say to the head of the DART team, we want you to be the coordinator for the whole thing. But you need to look at those sort of case by case. So I hope that helps. That was not at all indiscreet.

Any other questions? OK. Thanks very much.



USMC WAR COLLEGE

Peacekeeping and Security Operations Curricula

I think the purpose of our briefing is to give you an idea what we do. Not to tell you that we are heavily committed in time or energy to this important subject because, in fact, it's a small part of the Marine Corps War College curriculum. And what I'm looking for is how to incorporate it on a day to day basis in the Joint war fighting, which is what I'm in charge of. I'll quickly run through this. With me is a rep from the Command and Staff College and the expeditionary war fighting school which some of you may remember as the Amphibious Warfare School. And then I will wind up talking about general office training in the Marine Corps.

It's interesting that there are so many Marines here from Quantico but I don't know any of them. It tells you how distant we are even though we are on the same base. It's a big base and they are going to put 3000 more people there. This is the mission of the Marine Corps War College. It's joint, it's strategic, and it's pretty much the same as the senior level schools. If you read through this quickly, you'll find that we do basically what every senior level school does. And we'll tell you that we do it with 16 students and four instructors and a Marine Director. So we are hitting, just barely, the JPME student/teacher ratio. And we do this in a much different way than the other war colleges. That's why it's important to us to have items that we can build into the course throughout because there are no electives in this course.



Mission

- The mission of the Marine Corps War College is to educate selected senior officers and civilians for decision-making during war and military operations other than war in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. Marine Corps War College graduates are prepared to assume senior leadership positions of increasing complexity through the study of national military strategy, theater strategy and plans, and military support to those strategies within the context of national security policies, decision-making, objectives, and resources.



War Policy and Strategy

- The War, Policy and Strategy course is about critical analysis and judgment primarily at the strategic level of war. It emphasizes the relationship between moral and physical dynamics of war, and between national military power and other elements of national power, as factors contributing to national success or failure in war.
- War, Policy and Strategy emphasizes that successful national strategies in all types of conflicts - including conventional war - are made up of a political and a military component tailored to enemy and friendly strengths and weaknesses.
- WPS' use of counter-insurgency examples allows broad discussion of the areas addressed by Peacekeeping and Security Operations.

War policy and strategy is the basic academic course of the Marine Corps War College. It's taught by a Dr. Joe Strange, who is widely written in the areas of center of gravity, critical capabilities and critically vulnerabilities analysis. He uses a history based course to teach war policy and strategy basically starting from the 1700s up through Viet Nam and into the early 80s. He does not go farther than that. He's a great resource on critical vulnerability, capabilities and center of gravity analysis.



National Security and Joint Warfighting

- The National Security and Joint Warfare (NSJW) Course is designed to provide students with an in-depth understanding of both national security affairs (focusing on the national security decision-making process) and joint warfare (focusing on the role of the military in national security). The NSJW course examines the relationship between the National Security Strategy and national military objectives and strategy as delineated in the National Military Strategy. In doing so, NSJW explores the context within which military advice is rendered, policy and strategy decisions are made, and military operations are carried out.

National security and joint war fighting, I co-direct with COL David Hudson, who is an Air Force Colonel. So the primary war fighting and national security instruction done at the Marine Corps War College is done by an Air Force guy and an Army guy. Having said that, we do not instruct primarily. We bring in experts of many areas to discuss subjects with the students. We provide opportunities at our War College. We have the one academic course and then we have this course which provides a series of opportunities. We start off our first speaker is Dr. Lawrence Coor, followed by Eliot Cohen, followed by, this year we were fortunate to have Terry Dival from the National War College, teach us a National Security class. We see every Chief of Staff of every service. Every Chief of Service, we go to their

conference room, get briefed by them and spend an hour and a half with each Chief, including the Commandant of the Coast Guard. We visit the CIA, the NRO, the DIA, the NSC. We sit down with staffers at the NSC. We go to congress and sit down with staffers and talk to congressional liaisons. We travel to the Cincdoms: STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, TRANSCOM, CENTCOM, SOCOM, SOUTHCOM. And the students travel overseas as well both to Asia and to Europe.



NSJW Classes

- 8404F Security and Stability Operations
 - GEN (R) Anthony Zinni
- 8404G Peace Operations
 - Mr. Adam Grissom, Rand Corporation
- 8404H Humanitarian Operations
 - Mr. H. Roy Williams, MCFU Humanitarian Chair

These are the classes within the National Security and Joint War Fighting curriculum for which I'm responsible with David Hudson, that specifically address the areas that we're talking about today. And the way we teach them you can see right here. General Zinni comes down and spends a half a day, four hours, with our seminar. He talks about his experiences MOOTW which is now become a security and stability operations. And his experiences are later described as a commander in chief in Joe Strange's War Policy and Strategy course. Peace operations we bring in a Rand Corporation individual, Ed Grissom did a great job for us last year, and Humanitarian Operations, we have Roy Williams who is, in another hat, I think, still the Humanitarian Chair. So this guy wears more hats in the room than anybody I've run into recently. Now, I'm going to have to stop here and

say that somehow because somebody told me and I'm an Army Colonel, and when I was a Major I could do PowerPoint, and when I was Lieutenant Colonel I started to lose the skill. And when I became a Colonel and Mike said do a PowerPoint presentation, I left out a chart. A full quarter of our class is not represented in a chart here and it's called Regional Studies. And during Regional Studies we have a senior Foreign Service officer, this year it's Greg Parrett, who teaches four regions of the world. He brings in cultural experts particularly about Islam and the Middle East. But also teaches cultural aspects of Europe and South America and Asia. And then he leads a trip to Asia, which they go to Korea and sit down with US Forces Korea and talk operational strategic issues. And then do a counterpart visit in China and Beijing where they go to their National Defense University. They also travel to Europe where they visit NATO and talk NATO issues and then travel to another country. Last year it was France. This year they are looking to go to one of the new Europe countries, Bulgaria is what's on the list as far as I know. I don't run that operation. But it's the jell that puts the whole thing together. Without a regional studies program, and why it doesn't have a chart here I don't know, but it's my fault whatever it is. And that puts our whole course together. There are no electives. So as you can see, it's important to us to have a body of knowledge out there, for me in particular, that experts come to us with, and bring to these students, and expose them to it. Because our course outside of war policy strategy is a course of exposure and opportunity for these students.



PKSO Weaknesses

- JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for MOOTW, 16 June 1995
- JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 30 April 2004

Now somebody said we're supposed to talk about weakness in this instructional area. I put up here two joint publications that [JFCOM] may be working on. Joint doctrine from MOOTW, 16 June 1995 Joint Tactics, Techniques And Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense in April 2004. The reason they are up there isn't to talk about them as doctrinal manuals or whether the doctrine is good or bad, it's just that I'm not even sure the terms make sense. And so, since Mike said I had to put something up there and I'm the one that thinks for myself, I'm going, what's the hardest thing for me to do when I need something that's pulled across a spectrum to build into a course, not for an elective, not for a one-day course, but throughout the course so that we have a consistent understanding in its terms. MOOTW doesn't seem to be the term we want. When I looked at the Foreign Internal Defense and started reading the X sum of the manual, I'm not really sure in April 2004 we're looking at this. Or that we find that this applies to what we are doing today. So, that doesn't mean that this is bad doctrine, it means that when a dumb-ass tanker doesn't really understand the terms, he has a hard time coordinating education for guys who are smarter than him.

Question:

Can I address your first one?

Speaker:

Sure.

Comment:

307 is being canceled. It's being incorporated into joint pub 30 which is in final coordination right now. There's a working group that's all the pertinent parts of 307 have been taken into 30. The term MOOTW is being disestablished.

Speaker:

I heard you say that and I decided to go with my first bullet anyway knowing that you were going to shoot me down. And now I'll turn it over to the rep from Command and Staff.



USMC Command and Staff College (CSC)

Peacekeeping and
Security Operations
Curricula



I want to talk about change.



CSC Mission



Informed by the study of history, language and culture, CSC educates and trains its joint, multinational, and interagency professionals in order to produce skilled warfighting leaders able to overcome diverse 21st century security challenges.

I want to show you what our mission is a little bit. I'm going to use one of these high tech pointers. We have changed our mission statement a little bit this year. And if you notice the things that really jump out, history was there before, but now we have language and culture and joint international, multi-national interagency. These terms are not just put in the mission statement but they've been put into the curriculum. In a way it's kind of a back to the future-ish for the Marine Corps because the Marine Corps has been involved in these kind of operations for many decades.



Curriculum Lines of Operation

- Warfighting . . . from the Sea (WFTS)
- Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO)
- Operational Art (Op-Art)
- Arabic Language Study (non-credit)

OK. What we had before was a curriculum that had basically existed in Quantico for about 14 years and changed incrementally over the years. What we're doing this year is changing it rather dramatically. And one of the central issues you have in PME, I believe is finding the proper balance between academic rigor and professional relevance. And we have a civilian faculty that provides the academic rigor. We have a group of military officers, principally the director, who's given us a new direction on where to go for the curriculum.



CSC Curriculum Enhancement Intent


- Develop highly proficient military planners.
- Impart greater understanding of campaign design, to include “soft” elements of national power.
- Expand the examination of traditional and irregular warfare cultures to include: 4GW, Small Wars, and Stability and Security Operations.
- Enhance the study of culture, language, and the interagency process.

His intent to provide highly professional military planners to impart greater understanding of campaign design, and getting back to softer elements of national power. The things we’re talking about this week, the State Department, NGOs, various other organizations we’ve talked about. Principally, doing this through changing the curriculum, dropping parts of the whole curriculum out that dealt primarily with conventional warfare. Not really dropping them out, but really re-emphasizing them. The old curriculum was based a lot on formal presentations given in a lecture room like this. And we’re de-emphasizing that and shifting more toward seminar based and enhancing culture, language and interagency process.

The old curriculum was based on a modular system. We started with the theoretical theory and nature of war. Went on to strategy and policy. Went on to operational level of war. Went on to war fighting. So that each module was completed at a specific time and then we moved onto the next. The new curriculum was more like a civilian graduate school where we do them together. We do lines of operations including operational art which incorporated a lot of the material from the old curriculum. Military history type material. We still do staff rides. We still do theory Clausewitz, Jomany Sun Tzu, Thucydides, those sorts of things. And those are incorporated in that particular course. The new course, the one that’s more interesting from



AY06 Schedule



The Masters of Military Studies Program is embedded within the Operational Art Curriculum. There are also two electives available. One is part of the Operational Arts course and the other is in the Culture & Interagency course.

our perspective from this conference, is culture and interagency operations. The faculty who handles this course are primarily political scientists, international relations people, national security people. This deals not only with American policy as it was done in the past, it incorporates a great deal more about culture. Cultural anthropologists have spoken to us in the past including Montgomery and Egg. In fact we gave very serious consideration to hiring a cultural anthropologist for our faculty for this and we probably will in the future. A big part of it, too, is interagency. Being able to do with the other agencies. For example, one of the things that is very different about this if you look at the curriculum at the end here, we're going to have what was originally called an internship that has been morphed to call it an emersion program. The idea is that individuals will take a sub-course with an elective within that and at the end of the program, they will go off to these agencies that they've been studying and spend a week as defined right now, but that might change. Spend a week in that agency, developing points of contact, getting a certain degree of expertise about that agency, and being able to work with it.

Warfighting . . . from the Sea (WFTS)



- Joint Warfighting emphasis
- Operational design and planning focus
- Practical Exercises
- 9 Innings – Peacekeeping and Stability Operations in Iraq

Another leg of change is the war fighting component of the course used to begin effectively in January and the COL believed, I think quite correctly, that if you're teaching people to be operational planners, you're going to have to start that right away and put more emphasis on actually forming OPTs and doing exercises. So the war fighting course begins literally at the start of the program. We've also incorporated into the war fighting emphasis on leadership and command and control. C2IM is Command And Control Information Management. You got another acronym. The emphasis has changed quite a bit for the war fighting. As you might expect in a Marine Corps institution it's to be expected that they are going to have a strong emphasis on that. But the primary thing that's changed, we have more practical exercises. They are more frequent. They are earlier in the curriculum. And this one is very interesting. When the Colonel checked the board, COL John Tulin is our Director, when he checked the board he literally came straight from Iraq. When he got there, he got there in October, he said virtually not a word until January. Just kind of seeing what was going on. In January we had a "come to Jesus" meeting. And he said that the final exercise that had been traditionally dealing with the Straights of Hormuse, and conventional operations was going to be changed. It was called Nine Innings. Nine Innings is from beginning to end peace keeping and stability operations in Iraq. Real time, using open sources. Students are required to take the real world situation, the real world orders, the real

world constraints into the exercise, follow it through. And they were given a responsibility for developing orders, lines of operations dealing with governments, engineering, all those sorts of things and produce an order at the end of that. The intent was at the very least, the very minimal, to give the students a familiarity with the issues, with the geography of the area, with the players that are in that region. That gets back to what I was saying before about that balance between academic rigor and professional relevance. Because the Director and many of the faculty are coming straight from the operating forces and into the curriculum, they are able to change it very quickly. Our school is small, too. I don't know what the size of the commanding general staff college is. How big is that?

Comment:

We have 800 in the August course of Army officers with 250 multi-service and IOs. And then we're going to have 250 plus another 50 officers this February.

Speaker:

Yeah, see, we just have 195. It's relatively small, so it's relatively easy to change this very quickly. So we're able to change the emphasis there.

Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO)



- Mid-East and Asia/Pacific emphasis
- USG, Supranational, and NGO
- Emphasis on Irregular Warfare, War Termination, Occupation, and Peacekeeping Operations
- Historical Case Studies

The kind of capstone course, or the premier course, associated with this curriculum is called CIAO, a little bit of levity there, culture and interagency operations. The intent is to shift focus from a Euro-centric conventional war focus that has been dominated within the curriculum in the past, shifted regionally to Middle East to the Asia Pacific region and also to study other elements that we've already talked about, dealing with other parts of the government and non-governmental organizations. The emphasis is the regular warfare, war termination, occupation, peace keeping operations. For example, in many cases the curriculum wasn't changed that much. We still do the Pacific war in World War II for example, but only a small part of it deals with the war. A little bit more of it deals with the planning going up to the war. Most of it has to do with war termination strategy both from the part of the United States and the Japanese and the occupation by the United States afterwards. So much of the material stays the same but the emphasis has changed quite significantly.

Operational Art (Op-art)



- Historical Case Studies
- Campaign Design Analysis
- Theory – Marine Corps Small Wars Manual

The operational art course is the one that's derived from the old theory and nature workhorse, this is the one that's changed the least? This is the course that deals with the military classic theorists. They are almost a requirement for every military school. They deal a great deal with the Marine Corps, as I said before back to the future, the Marine Corps' experience in small wars, particularly in the 1920s and the 1930s period where the Marine Corps was as it is now wrestling with the issue of whether you are dealing with irregular warfare or large scale warfare.

Arabic Language Study (non-credit)



- AY 05-06: Arabic
- AY 06-07: Chinese?

One of the things that's changed very significantly in the curriculum, this is another thing the Director emphasized, was a language. And he's not so much interested in the language per se. I mean we're not going to teach people language in the short time that they're there. But exposing them to it; giving them a working knowledge of day to day on the street conversational Arabic. And that's just the one that's more relevant today. So what we have done for this year, all of our students will be taking Arabic with the exception of the international students who come from Arabic countries. They're going to be used as mentors for the students. And this gets to an issue of why study some of these things that may not be applicable.

You know, five years, ten years down the road this may not be as applicable as it is today. It's just a study in culture. It's not as necessary to understand all languages or all cultures, but the very aspect of studying one in a way. The analogy that we frequently use is when we bring a Lieutenant into the Marine Corps, we send him to The Basic School and teach him how to read map. And he learns grid coordinates and declination diagrams and legends and those sorts of things, but he doesn't look at every map while he's going through The Basic School. But he then has the ability to go to other parts of the world and read maps in those places. So the intent is to start with Arabic, do that for this year, probably continue it next year, but also add other languages. The long term intent is that we have several programs available to students to take as needed.

CSC Distance Education Program (CSCDEP)



- Administered by the College of Continuing Education (CCE)
- 8809 Course *Operations Other Than War*
- Theory of Unconventional Warfare
- Case Studies: Somalia, Bosnia, & Algeria
- Humanitarian Operations
- Peace Operations

Eighty percent of Marine Corps officers never show up to Quantico to go school. And we don't have the money and we don't have the people to send them there. So they have to go through the Distance Education Program. The Distance Education Program, many of the students are only taking a box of books, quite literally they get delivered to them in the mail, and they have to go through it. That program has been enhanced dramatically since

about 1997. About 40% of those Distance Educations go through seminars at Marine Corps bases around the world. The intent now is that those students who don't have that available to them will have options. And technology is being applied against that. Computerized courses, either IMI, Interactive Multimedia Instruction courses, asynchronous computer web based courses, where you have an actual instructor but they don't necessarily do it at the same time. The course right now, and one of the real challenges of distance education as I'm sure it is in any application, is currency. And the way the course is written right now based on the box of books, it is at the very least several months old. And it is generally much older than that, up to seven years old in some cases. So that the problem in dealing with these courses is being able to update information as quickly as you do in the resident course. And we are working on it. As it stands right now, they do have case studies on Somalia, Bosnia and Algeria.

School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW)



- Part of Command and Staff College
- Second Year Program similar to SAMS
- Peace Operations, Post Conflict, and Interagency is integrated through curriculum
- World War II, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan Case Studies
- Focus: Culture and Planning

A very small number of students including the resident course either in Quantico or one of the other sister service residence intermediate level course or even through the distance education course, they have an opportunity to go on to the School of Advanced War Fighting. which is also in Quantico. It's co-located with Command and Staff College, in fact it is

part of Command and Staff College. They do study peace operations, post-conflict. Just as our curriculum has changed, their curriculum has changed as well. I'm obviously not as familiar with that because I don't work there, but there is much more emphasis on post-conflict termination, occupation, stability operations, those sorts of things that we do here, and also a renewed focus on culture and planning.



USMC Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)

Peacekeeping and
Security Operations
Curricula

We have another school in Quantico of the fellow who was going to brief this didn't show up, or wasn't able to come, so I'll brief this very quickly, because I don't it very well.

The Expeditionary Warfare School is a school for Captains. For those of you who are not familiar with the Marine Corps, this used to be called the Amphibious Warfare School. And it was changed relatively recently, I think about three years ago. About three years ago they changed it to Expeditionary Warfare School.

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)



GOALS FOR THE GRADUATE: COMMAND IN THE MOS, SERVE AS A PRIMARY STAFF OFFICER IN THE MOS AS A STAFF OFFICER, INTEGRATE CAPABILITIES W/IN THE ELEMENT AS A JUNIOR MAJOR, INTEGRATE THE ELEMENT W/IN THE MAGTF UNDERSTAND FUNCTIONALITY OF OTHER ELEMENTS AND HOW THEY INTEGRATE IN THE MAGTF EARN THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OFFICER ADDITIONAL MOS

EWS MISSION:



EWS provides Marine captains career-level professional military education and oversees their professional military training in command and control, MAGTF operations ashore, and naval expeditionary operations in order to enable them to command or serve as primary staff officers in their MOS, to integrate resident capabilities within their element of the MAGTF, to integrate their element within the MAGTF, and to understand the functioning of the other elements of the MAGTF.

This school has far less emphasis on this. In fact in a way I take some pride in fact that at the Command and Staff College represents a real transitions for Marine Officers. Marine Officers up to this point, Lieutenant, when their Captains, when they're junior Majors, are dealing primarily with a tactical world, with tactical problems and tactical solutions, and relatively little ambiguity and complexity compared to what their going to have in the future.

EWS Expeditionary Operations MOOTW



- Focus on Peacekeeping through a study of current operations
- Emphasis on support for counterinsurgencies
- Role of Diplomacy United Nations Operations
Peace Operations Humanitarian Operations
Terrorism Rules of Engagement Stability and
Security Operations

They do get some exposure to these types of things that we're talking about today in Expeditionary Warfare School, but primarily at a tactical level. When they get up to the Command and Staff College, this is, I think, when they are introduced for the very first time in a meaningful way to the operational level of war, to the complexities, to the ambiguities and the kind of questions that are very hard to deal with associated with these issues of cultural operations.



General Officer Education

- USMC is predominantly a customer of General Officer level education.
- Of 21 utilized courses, 18 are external to Marine Corps.
- 3 internal programs
 - Brigadier General Select Orientation Course
 - General Officer Warfighting Program
 - Strategic Leader Seminar
- BGSOC has no PK/SOI influence.

Then it becomes my turn again, I guess I'm good at Colonels and Generals today. General Officer education in the Marine Corps is primarily a contract event, to be honest. They have three courses: Brigadier General Select Orientation course, General Officer War Fighting Program and Strategic Leader Seminars. They also use 18 other courses which are available external to the Marine Corps. Their Brigadier General Select Orientation course has no peace keeping and stability ops. I would have found a way to say they had some, but I didn't make the slide. Because you know they've got to discuss it in that course. And I'm sure they do.

The General Office War Fighting program is seminar based and focused on command and control in decision making. It does talk about peace keeping and stability operations. And then they go into their strategic leader seminar which occurs during their general officer symposium. This September they are focusing on PKSOI with Robert Kaplan as a speaker.



General Officer Education

(Con't)

- General Officer Warfighting Program is seminar based with focus on C² and decision-making. Limited PK/SOI topics.
- Strategic Leader Seminar occurs during annual General Officer Symposium with changing topics.
 - Sept 2005 seminar will focus on PK/SOI, with Robert D. Kaplan as guest speaker [*Imperial Grunts*]



General Officer External Courses

Warfighting Focus

Capstone (JS/NDU)
JFOWC (USAF)
JFACC/CFACC (USAF)
JFLCC (USA)
JFMCC (USN)
SIWAC (USAF)
Pinnacle (JS/NDU)

Other Courses

SEINS (JFK Sch of Govt)
Executive Business Crs (USN)
Leadership at the Peak (CCL)
US-USSR Sec Prgm
Black Sea Sec Prgm
LOGTECK (IDB/DOA)
NSLC (Syracuse Univ)
NSDMS (Syracuse Univ)

The other courses that they attend throughout are here. So basically when you hit the Joint GO courses, the senior level courses for the Joint World, you hit the Marine Corps General Officer population.



Questions?

Now, we get to our last chart. Questions?

Question:

I've got one for you. On your Distance Education, have you thought about going towards web based rather than the box of books?

Answer:

Yeah, that's part of it. The box of books is the absolute base line. So somebody without electricity living in, you know, Appalachia, they can have that. And there're gradations up there. Several of the courses exist already in interactive multimedia instructions, so they can get a CD and work with course. Those specific courses are designed for that. And then be used in a web base. And the big advantage there is you can update it very quickly. The next step is, what they call, son of seminar, I don't think that's a good

idea. But the idea is that everybody no matter where they are, no matter what their situation, if they have a phone and a computer with some sort of way to connect, that they will have some option available to them. The real emphasis in recent years has been satellite campuses. In LeJeune, in Pendleton, Hawaii, Okinawa, where we hire adjunct faculty and they come in the evening and it is meant to be analogous to the course in Quantico. We are dealing with a lot of issues with that right now. And we're trying to ensure a high quality adjunct faculty and a dynamic faculty development program for them to bring them up to date so that if the actual material is out of date, they can tell the students that.

Question:

May I just throw that out there because DDE is probably one of the exportable assets we can provide to the other folks who are out there looking to develop course material. The DDE pieces can be easily exportable piece. You have particular lesson blocks that are very good about us. It would be good that other organizations who want to use a particular lesson blocks where you want to get their other organizations input into it. Again from a web base is a way that you can reach out to them and they can influence that way because you do influence a wide audience. So think about that as a very exportable training resource and we can get some real synergy going through DDE. Just throw that out there for some thought.

Question:

In your culture interagency operations course, is there any focus on Africa at all? You mentioned two regional areas and we've got all of Africa. I was just curious because there's a lot of Marines in Africa.

Answer:

I can tell you that in the War College there is no focus on Africa at this particular moment. I think that's a weakness. I thought at the National War College before I came down to Marine Corps War College. It's a weakness in a lot of places because it's difficult. National does teach in Africa a portion of their regional study, but we do not. And we have a limited number of classroom hours and a limited ability to do it. And that's weakness we've accepted.

Answer:

We do do a piece on the French experience in Algeria, and there is very serious discussion to having a practical exercise, maybe even this year on the Horn of Africa and the Marine Corps experience there. The former Director of Command and Staff College, Col Hudleston, was going to retire, but he decided not to, probably to the chagrin of his wife, and then took on the job as the Chief of Staff for the task force Horn of Africa. So he's been back and there's a very real possibility that will be incorporated into a practical exercise, if not this year, perhaps next year.

Question:

I want to ask about case studies. Why you are using the case study methodology, what the case studies you use are and what the students are intended to get out of these case studies?

Answer:

I think it probably goes back to the analogy I was making about the map. The intent is that if we're doing a case study, for example on the occupation of Japan, not that anything we're going to do today is not necessarily analogous to the occupation of Japan, but they will be exposed to the issues. The same issues that commanders were dealing with at that time. Issues of governance and rebuilding the infrastructure and school systems, changing the political system, giving women the right to vote, changing the economic system, breaking down industrial monopolies in Japan. Again, to give the students a rigorous academic tool that they may be able to apply in some places we don't know yet. We don't know where they are going to be in five or ten years. Getting back to the issue, there's only so many hours in the year. It's always a real issue as to which case studies to pick. The thing that's really changed this year is that we use several of the existing case studies but the emphasis has changed almost entirely. I mean when we do World War II, we do Europe and Japan, but we do almost nothing on the war itself. That's what the History channel is for. We deal with the aftermath, war termination strategy and occupation. So, does that answer your question?

Question:

Yeah. You mentioned the French and Algeria and you mentioned Japan. What other case studies are you using this year, if you can think of them off the top of your head?

Answer:

Well, we do Europe in World War II. We do the Philippines twice; we do the insurrection and after the Spanish American War, and we do the HUK Rebellion after World War II. We do Malaya. We do Indonesia. And again the only emphasis is kind of shifting to the Pacific. We do Iraq, not what's today, but the British experience in Iraq. We do segments on Middle East in the post World War I era; and the intent there is to give the students some insight into how the borders were drawn and some of the lasting enmities in the Middle East, a by-product of the colonial system after World War I.

The War College concentrates on the history based curriculum in our War Policy and strategy, in which case they would get the Napoleonic Wars. They would get the Civil War, World War I. They look at Malaysia. They look at World War II. Once again, they concentrate on specific aspects of it and have not shifted so heavily at PS&RO. They look at Viet Nam heavily — gets into the kinds of discussions that you have to talk about when you talk about stability operations in other irregular kinds of conflicts. And then we talk about Iraq. But it's an analysis based on critical centers of gravity and critical vulnerability. It's history.

Question:

Sir, I know you are not here to speak for them, but concerning EWS and TBS, do you know if there are any plans to mirror your cultural immersion plan and language plan at those levels. Because it would seem actually more important for platoon commanders and company commanders going out who are doing the tactical operations on the ground to have those skills than it is for [unclear]

Answer:

Yeah, I couldn't agree with you more. I think you need to start at that level. That being said, I can't answer your question. I do know that EWS is shifting in that direction. One of the things —

Question:

Acronym alert — I don't even know what it is. And I'm in the military. So ...

Answer:

TBS is the basic school. That's the school Lieutenants go through. And EWS is Expeditionary Warfare School. I can't answer that very well. I know EWS is going to have more emphasis on that and part of that is going to be, as we do practical exercises, the orders and the products of our practical exercises are going to be fed down to them. For The Basic School, I have no idea. The Basic School is no longer part of the Marine Corps University; they are part of TECOM (Training and Education Command) so we have almost no contact with them. The intent, though, for a lot of these programs, for example we have a program called Quality Enhancement of Land which is based on the degree granting authority of Marine Corps University. It's going to deal with communications. Primarily English, but also foreign languages eventually. And if those capabilities, even though they are organic to the University, are going to migrate to others, like the Staff Academy and The Basic School. Probably not OCS but some of the other institutions at Quantico. And then you would be able to build a curriculum, not across the school, but across a career. So if an individual is, for example, doing language training at The Basic School, getting reinforcement at EWS, getting more reinforcement here. And like any good PME Program, the instruction he is getting at that level is appropriate to the next job that he's going into.

Fourth Presentation, National War College

PKSOI:

We'll get to other questions later on. We are now about to witness one of the most death defying presentations I've personally ever seen. The National War College rep is going to give a presentation without benefit of slides.

Speaker:

I did actually do some research to justify my TDY here. There is a four page handout between the beige insert and the green insert at Tab 6 (in the conference book). But in any case, I'm delighted to be here. When you are talking about stability ops subjects and education in the same sentence, organizationally, what you're talking about is institutionalization. And that is certainly music to my ears. From early in 2001 to 2004, the summer of '04, I was the DASST, The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability OPS. I spent three years jawboning people about the importance of peace keeping, humanitarian assistance, stabilization and reconstruction. I lived to see the Secretary of Defense go from being a charter member of the "US military shouldn't do windows club," to being the Department's leading advocate for stability ops. And at that point I declared victory and left for academia. I'm going to talk about three things today. First is the National War College. Second is a bit about best practices and what I think about that. And the third is futures. And there I'm going to be wearing my hat as a consultant to the folks back at the Pentagon which is something I'm still doing and there's a warning in there for everybody who is putting pen to paper right now about stability ops.

First off, National War College is one of three teaching colleges at the National Defense University. We also have ICAF (Industrial College of the Armed Forces) who is represented here. We have IRMSE which is about information resource management and that sort of thing. We also have regional institutes who teach foreign students — very challenging by the way, to go in front of room full of fellows from the Middle East and South Asia and try and talk to these folks about stability ops or insurgency or whatever. And interestingly enough, although the Marine Corps War College doesn't do Africa, we have an Africa Institute which is commanded by a retired Marine Four Star, Carl Fulford. And when I go back I'm going to tell him that he needs to call Quantico.

Three key things at National War College shay bar approach to just about everything. The first is the mission given to us by the folks at J7 and whatever. Our focus is national security strategy, not national military strategy, not operational art. We have a very small student body with a very nice student to faculty ratio, 208 students. Only 128 of the 208 are US military. We also have 31 international fellows and 49 US civilians. And so we are very easy to fall into the interagency mode and very friendly towards stability ops in general. Thirdly, our faculty, we have 23 civilian professors, many of whom, like myself are former government officials. We have 10 government civilian or FSOs, 5 of whom are former ambassadors. We also have 25 military officers which makes our faculty about 57% civilian, 43% military. Our curriculum: 75% of our curriculum is in the core curriculum and in terms of stability operations, and you can read the details in my pitch there, about 35% of the core concern stability ops relevant subjects. A third of our electives are focused on stability ops. At the end of our course, all students do international travel. Nearly half of National War College students travel to the developing world or areas where failed states or societal conflicts are big issues. And every year we have incredible stories of people being kidnapped and folks who are, we had one of our officers who years prior had been PNG'd (persona non grata) from Russia and he was seized by the Kazakhstan secret police in the middle of the night. And it goes on and on. So it's a great training ground and it's a seedbed for war stories actually.

Best practices, and these are things that we do at National, small group learning, learning by discussion, communicating, writing, those things are fairly standard. What's not fairly standard for even the best of graduate schools is to have a national war gaming center in direct support of your curriculum. When we want to run simulations, we walk across to the good major's outfit on the other side of the alleyway, there, and we say design us a game that will do so and so and such and such. And they are absolute wizards there in coming up with fantastic simulations. The University itself has started a new thing called the communities of practice. This is a brain child of GEN Dunn himself. And the communities of practice exist in just about every area. There is a separate one for insurgency and counter insurgency. There's one for terrorism. There is also another one for post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. And their first internet discussion is about whether or not their name is the right name. If you would like to

sign up with any of them, please see me and I will make sure as soon as I get back that you get on the list. And essentially the focal point there is to unite people who are at West Point, the Naval Academy, the War Colleges, the Command and General Staff Colleges who are interested in one single area into an internet email discussion. Right now, we are in fact using email and there is all sorts of talk about going to different technologies.

In terms of experts at the National War College, we are particular strong on people who know the theory of war and we are particularly strong on regional experts. And increasingly, our regional experts at the National War College are people who were born, lived and raised in those regions, which is an outstanding exploitation of the changing ethnic makeup of the United States, I have to say.

Now, let me change direction here on you and talk about the future for stability operations. And here I'm wearing my hat as a consultant to people I used to work with. And it's actually very nice to do it this way because I get to work on all the big issues and I don't have to attend all the boring meetings. Futures. Beware. Lots of changes are afoot. Those changes will come in the DOD Directive. They will also come as a result of the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review). Now, the bottom line here is January 2006. This will in all likelihood be sorted out by January of 2006. So be flexible in terms of setting curriculums and writing doctrines and whatever.

A couple of issues; first off priority. The priority of stability operations is likely to be put up there with combat operations. And one of the issues associated with that which is not settled is the interagency division of labor. And I'll come back to that in a second.

Four organizational issues. First, no surprise to anybody here, we are not likely to form stability operations units. There's enough flux going on in the Army, in particular, that's diverting folks from that. There are some interesting conversations as to where the focal point for stability operations ought to be. There is a coterie of people for reasons I don't understand who think that SOCOM is the place where it ought to be. And I think that is totally wrong. SOCOM for various reasons is not a command that reaches out to all actors all over the world. They are, after all, special ops people. JFCOM is the place where this needs to be in the COCOM world.

A second organizational issue. There's likely to be a Defense agency or a standing joint task force to manage the interaction with state and other interagency partners and for planning and doctrine development work. DOD

very much wants SCRS to succeed. The Secretary was a big supporter of it. I personally feel like I have a stake in that because I was part of not only the Lugar-Byden Study Group, but also the small NSC team that put together the final briefings for the principals. But there is lots of concern in the Pentagon that SCRS is being shortchanged within the Department. And that it still hasn't been able to achieve the kind of significant budgetary resources that will enable it to be a player in a major stability operations. In any case, the philosophy here, and that's about all it is right now, what people agree on is that in stability operations particularly post conflict stabilization and reconstruction, State Department should lead. And State Department should be given the resources. However, there is also a nagging concern that if you don't get the wingtips on the ground, then the boots are going to have to do it. And that in effect is what's going on in Iraq today. And people are very concerned that this doesn't happen again. Of course, there are also some people who say, listen, it's going to happen again, so you have to prepare for it. So there's a lot of ferment and that's probably about all I can say about it for sure.

Finally, it is NOT likely that any single service will become the executive agent for stability operations. And I say that in the privacy of this room and non-attribution. The final directive briefing went to the Secretary and it failed on the issue of executive agency, and the Secretary apparently doesn't want any service to be the executive agent. Now, there is still this nagging question of where inside the Department of Defense will be the focal point for stability operations? But the current draft that's floating around which was actually in July this year, has the Army as the Executive Agent and there is no new draft yet because nobody knows what to write in that space after they cut that paragraph out. But in any case, each combatant command will be pressured to devote a lot of time and expertise to planning for stability ops. And that's in addition to whatever standing joint task force or defense agency arrangement comes up. There is not going to be a situation where we are going to invent a one stop shop for stability operations so that EUCOM is not going to have to worry about stability operations in Africa or anywhere else. They are in fact going to have to be doing it. So anybody who's in the business of teaching Majors and Lt. Colonels and Colonels about stability ops, that's a good investment.

And one final caution, stability ops is a fast moving, high priority train. And I saw this happen with transformation. And once transformation became the buzz word of the day, hundreds of things tried to line up and say

we are part of the transformation phalanx. And that same thing is going to go on here. Beware of the wolves in sheep's clothing here because a lot of people are going to line up at the stability ops trough when all is said and done. And it's going to be very important to make sure that the key things get serviced and that things that ought to fall by the wayside are probably there. I'm going to stop right there and pass it back to the chair.

Fifth Presentation: National Defense University Report on Interagency Education Conference, 26/27 July 05:



Interagency Education Conference 26-27 July 2005

Co-sponsors:

**NDU's Interagency Transformation, Education and
After Action Review (ITEA) Program**

Army War College's National Security Policy Program



The major thing that I wanted you all to have is the agenda which I also had printed to put into your books.



Interagency Education

- **Need**
- **Benefits**
- **Challenges**
- **Participants**
- **Agenda**
- **Next Steps**

These are the main things that I'm going to touch on. But basically anybody who has questions or wants to talk further about the conference, several of the people who are here in this room actually attended our conference, so if anyone wants to talk further about it, I'm here all three days. And certainly we can go from there on any specific interests.



Need for Interagency Education

- Interagency process is largely *ad hoc*
- Interagency coordination can make or break an operation
- High turnover in personnel
- No mechanism for passing on lessons learned or proven tools
- No practice of “exercising” critical functions

I probably don't have to elaborate much on why there's a need to talk about educating people to work in the interagency environment. It's out there. There's no specified process. We don't have doctrine on it. Different people are working different things and then move on very quickly so it's hard to get a static here's how we're going to work among different agencies to get things done. What we wanted to do was bring people together who are in the business of educating either military personnel, civilian personnel, people at universities, etc. Anyone who is in the business of educating people on working in an interagency environment.



Interagency Education Conference 26-27 July 2005

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After Action Review (ITEA) Program**

Army War College's National Security Policy Program



I think the benefits of educating people are pretty straight forward. Again, this is not rocket science. What my organization is trying to do is just bring together people and we're acting as a unofficial clearing house to try to put information out there and have it available on our web site so that people have jumping off point to at least begin collaborating with people. Talking to people who work parallel issues in different organizations and certainly sharing curriculum elements, talking about the things that are being taught in different places and how that can be adapted to someone

who is just trying to get off the ground with interagency education. And that's what this conference did. With everyone kind of understanding these benefits already bringing together people to simply talk throughout those two days; not about what they do and here's how my program goes and here's what we do for two hours, four hours, four hours, but how did you get started? Why did you notice that the need was there to do interagency education at your institution? What were the road blocks you ran into as you put together those programs? And what are the things that we can take away in this audience so that you help someone else who's just starting down that road.



Educational Challenges

- How to achieve common baseline of knowledge
- Timing of educational opportunities
- Selecting most effective delivery method
- Balancing delivery methods (lecture, discussion, exercise) to ensure engagement of all participants and maintain a balance of interest among all levels and cultures of participants
- How to include the many expanded interagency initiatives
- Metrics to track the effectiveness of education

Again, you have these slides, so I won't read anything to you. And I don't think any of it requires a lot of discussion because it's just what's right out there. It's the elephant on the coffee table. There isn't anyone that is charged with putting all of this together. Maybe I should go back and introduce a little bit. I do work at the National Strategic Gaming Center, which is under the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. So we are a staff organization that's under a Think Tank, and primarily our mission is to do war gaming for the colleges, for different institutions. We work with

just about everyone. We do outreach. Just yesterday we did a big event for a CSIS New York Roundtable. So we're working everywhere from the senior PME colleges down to some local high schools. We just did an event for St. Alban's High School in DC this summer. So we really are all over the map in terms of who we provide gaming for. But it's always strategic and it's always for policy decision making environments. It's not computerized. It's not done at the tactical level. It's always big issues and a lot of it is discussion roundtables. Within that, my boss, Erik Kjonerrad, who was mentioned earlier this morning, is the Director for the ITEAA Program, which is Interagency Transformation Education and After Action review. So within that, we're just trying to be a clearing house for interagency education. And one of the things that we are primarily charged with is providing education programs to the joint interagency coordination groups out at the combatant commands. So that's our main work, but we're in a little bit of everything. And anyone who knows Erik knows that. He's got friends and colleagues all over Washington and certainly out around the combatant commands and in many different organizations. And we're just always trying to bring people together. And we try to capture any materials that people would like to share on our web site, so that we can just act as a go-between to get people together, get them talking, get them helping each other.



65 Participants

- Military
 - Service Academy - Senior Colleges - all levels JMPE
 - OSD policy organizations: Training Transformation Program, Networks and Information Integration Office, Quadrennial Defense Review
- Government Agencies: Intelligence community, State Dept Foreign Service Institute, FBI Academy, Department of Homeland Security
- Civilian Institutions
 - Academic: George Mason, Georgetown and Tufts Universities
 - Think Tanks: United States Institute of Peace, U.S. Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution

Specifically about our conference, this is kind of a breakdown of the 65 people who attended. And like I said, it wasn't a here's what my program does introduction to the different programs that are out there. What we ask people to do is send that information in ahead of time, so we could post it on the web site and then we could just talk about the challenges and the lessons learned as we were at the conference. We thought it was a great collaborative and information sharing environment. You can see from the agenda the different groupings of people that talked. And basically throughout, the format was to have a panel of like institutions. They would each talk for ten or fifteen minutes and then we would do a panel discussion with those four or five people. And we ran it that way to keep the communities of interest together and then also to be able to discuss like issues among institutions that are teaching in a similar fashion.

Again, the agenda is in your binder.



Next Steps

- Workings Groups/Communities of Interest
 - Curriculum Development (AWC-NSPP)
 - Negotiation (AF General Counsel's Office)
 - CIE/networks (Army CGSC)
 - Peacekeeping and Stability Operations (PKSOI)
- Monitor Discussion and Initiatives
 - Quadrennial Defense Review
 - Training Transformation
 - Beyond Goldwater-Nichols

And one thing that we really wanted to come out of our conference, and we had just met with COL Agoglia right before our conference, so there's a real similar format here, was that we had people volunteer to run some collaborations with working groups in communities of interest from the conference on. And then we hope to, in the future, continue to build on things. This conference is a more specific topic, but the same type of thing, where people are gathering together to talk about things that are germane to their business. And maybe in smaller groups they can share ideas and start to work the challenges that are inherit in the things that they're trying to do. You can see the working groups that we've formed at the conference. And I can just tell you that within, for example, the negotiation of working group, there are people who are very interest in that and it was being led by Deputy General Counsel in the Air Force, General Counsel's Office. And they've just had a memo signed out by the Acting Secretary which establishes the center of excellence down at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama where they are going to be trying to put together a good clearing house for negotiation excellence. And part of that comes out of their initiative to begin training all their supervisors on negotiation and conflict resolution as part of the rollout for the new National Personnel System. And so that training is going to be mandatory within the Air Force. They are going to take that and roll it into the Center of Excellence so that the Air Force is kind of leading the way on conflict resolution among personnel. And although it has kind of an office setting in the training mandate, the topic obviously is woven throughout operations everywhere. And so many people in here talked about being of a conflict resolution or conflict transformation efforts. And CGSC took on the collaborative information environment and networks subject. And they are also working really right now exploring technologies and trying to put together ideas for what the best places to meet in a distance environment. To come together and hold meetings and collaborate together, not just in these working groups but across the services, across different institutions, etc.

The last bullet on there. Obviously these things, and there are people in the room here who are involved in them. These things are going to have an impact on the way that we do business in the future. The way that we plan to business in the future. And we're always trying to stay informed on those and be anticipating the things that are going to impact us. Again, I've got business cards which I'll pass out to everyone. But our clearinghouse effort on the web is at ndu.edu/itea for our program. And I'm glad to talk to anyone afterwards about anything that interests you from this.

PKSOI:

One of the reasons we asked Erik and Tammi to be part of the conference was, as they said, I went down there and had a talk with them. And we found out that they were doing an education conference on interagency education and inviting some of the very same folks who we were inviting. And very narrowly focused was the scope of their conference. Found out that we had folks from the Army War College participating in it and we didn't know about it. And we're only about 1000 meters apart from one another, so we've got that connection built on up and talking. Everyone's trying to do good things, going in lots of direction. But again, that is a key slide for the work groups to be thinking about is here are some educational challenges and that was, what was identified as some of the key educational challenges from a group of 65 different participants. And you saw the makeup of those participants. I don't think we ought to spend a lot of time over the next two days identifying what the challenges are, okay? So I just throw that out there. We ought to spend the time figuring out the hell we solve the challenges, not what the challenges are. There's been a lot of work done in defining them. Now, what does that mean? And how can we tackle those challenges? And that's why I asked Tammi to come up here, because 65 folks, this is what they came up as the big issues. That's a pretty good start point. We'll probably come up with a few more. And we've probably heard a few more in the other presentations. Chris did a good job. Trey Brown did a good job. The Marines a good job identifying. Joe Collins identified some good ones as well. So with that in mind, I'd just like to end that. There is a good way to end for today before we go to lunch. And ask you as you look at those education challenges to think about why you came to the conference. What do you want to get out of the conference? Did you come to the conference because we invited you? Did you come to the conference because of sheer curiosity? Did you come to conference because you had something more important to do and you could tie those two and do it? Don't know. But again, what did you and why did you come to this conference? The key pieces there is why you came and what you're going to get out of it. And also what you are going to contribute to it. So keep that in mind, why you came. And we'll talk a little bit more about that when you get into your small groups.

Comment:

I was wondering if maybe you could print this particular slide out and we could use it as a base document for the working groups? That would be really helpful.

PKSOI:

We'll copy that. So again, just keep that in mind why you came to the conference and that will help you to define what you want to get out of it. Help you define how you talk and discuss and share information in the work groups. And hopefully you came here to improve what you're doing and help us improve what we're doing. And we'll talk later about some great opportunities. Thank you very much. Let's go to lunch.

**Sixth Presentation, Fund for Peace
“Conflict Assessment System Tool:”**

**PKSOI
Peacekeeping and Stability
Education Workshop**

September 2005

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When I first looked at the agenda I was in the unenviable position of going right before lunch. Now I'm in the slightly less enviable position of coming right after lunch. So hopefully you got used to taste of chocolate on your meal so you have a little bit of a pick-me-up. I'm with the Funds for Peace and we're an NGO in Washington, DC. We've been around since 1957. Since 1996 we've been focused, however, on the issue of weak or failing states and various aspects of how to prevent respond to and reconstruct after these types of crises.

Presentation

1. **CAST methodology**
2. **Tool for practitioners and analysts**
3. **CAST-enhanced curriculum**



What I'll talk about today is our CAST methodology, the conflict assessment system tool, and talk to you about the elements of it, how it was developed, how it's been employed by both practitioners and analysts, and then lastly, how it can enhance curriculum for stability operations.

Conflict Assessment System Tool

CAST diagnoses the symptoms or indicators of state pathology to provide:

- Assessment of susceptibility to state collapse & internal conflict
- Evaluation of stabilization efforts

Premise: Internal conflict is a pathology of the state. State collapse can lead to violent conflict.

Goal: Sustainable Security refers to the ability of a society to solve its own problems peacefully without an external military or administrative presence.

Action: To achieve Sustainable Security, stability operations should focus on reducing conflict drivers and building state institutional capacity.



CAST was created on the premise of a medical analogy. And that is a certain auto-immune disease that there is not a single test which can say yes or no if a patient has that disease. Rather doctors have—Lupus would be an example of this. Doctors have said if the patient demonstrates a set of symptoms, four out of eleven, or five out of seven symptoms, then that patient is then said to have the disease. And the same way CAST approaches states and weak and failing states through whether or not they have or do not have certain symptoms or indicators of what we call a state pathology, which is the inability to address their own civil and economic and social problems. As a result of this, CAST has been employed first as an early warning and conflict prevention tool to be able to identify conflict drivers as they're increasing in how to target a response. We've also acknowledged that it can be used as a metric's tool and a tool for evaluating ongoing stabilization efforts. As I said, the premise that it's based on internal conflict being a pathology of the state, and that it's the class of institutions that cause by a conflict as opposed to the other way around. The goal, then, the political goal or an exit strategy, one may say, would be to achieve sustainable security. And is not simply when you can pull the military assets out, but when you can also pull the administrative assets out. And so to achieve stable security,

and this is a final point that is agreed upon by many including our folks at CSIS and USIP, that you have to do two things when you are trying to attain sustainable security. You have to both reduce the drivers of conflict but also at the time build state capacity to address internal problems.

Extensive Validation and Testing

- **First version published in *Parameters*, Spring 1996**
- **Manual for Practitioners published in 1999**
- **Software version of CAST first developed in 2001**
- **The first annual Failed States Index in *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2005**

Reviewed and Evaluated with:

- Various Universities
- US Army PKSOI
- Clingendael Institute
- Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- African Union
- NATO
- U.S. State Department (INR)
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Various Departments of the U.N.
- National Defense University
- DARPA
- Multinational Corporations
- United States Institute of Peace
- The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization



CAST was introduced in 1996 and has been reviewed and evaluated at various institutions, governmental, non-governmental, and military. We also have multinational corporations that have used it to look at risk assessment. What I put on the table outside is the July-August part of that issue of foreign policy where we came out with the first annual failed state index. So if you haven't picked that up, I would recommend that you do. And we would welcome any feedback. It is, as I said, the first one and we would incorporate any suggestions or ideas into its future forums.

CAST is based four steps or elements. The first is looking at the conflict indicators or what some would call drivers of conflict. And we divide those into social, economic and political and military. Take a second to look at these. I'm sure you have seen various models and attempts to slice up this pie. It many look a little different. But this has been over the last ten years refined so that many of the things are captured there in some form or another.

And an attempt to really have a fixed set of indicators to look at. When we use these indicators to assess and evaluate countries or geographic spaces, those are made up of each about several dozen measures, which are more flexible and can be refined to address regional and cultural particularities.

Twelve Conflict Indicators

Quantitative and qualitative indicators are rated on a scale of 0-10.

Social Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

Political/Military Indicators

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
9. Suspension/Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law & Widespread Violation of Human Rights
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors



Core Five

The core five assessment evaluates the capacity of key state institutions, including national leadership, to solve the country's internal problems peacefully.

1. Police force and corrections system
2. Civil service or professional bureaucracy
3. Judicial system
4. Military
5. Leadership (executive & legislative)

Institutions must be:

- Legitimate: accepted or perceived by local populations as serving their interests
- National in character: not dominated by any single group
- Professional: competent to fulfill their functions



Second aspect of CAST is what we call the Core Five. And those are institutions which are necessary for states to be able to address their own internal problems. And those are a police force and correction system, a civil service, a judicial system, military and the aspects of leadership for executive and legislation. When we assess those five institutions, we're looking at several things. We're looking at [unclear] seen as legitimate. Or if they're seen as the national character and then also their professionalism or competencies. And there's a lot of great work coming out looking at how to assess the competencies of police and the military. And I think this something that is constantly helping to the discussions to figure out what makes for a good police service. What makes for a good national security sector.

STINGS

STINGS are the surprises and idiosyncratic factors that accelerate or decelerate the risk of conflict, or which can create a disproportionate impact on the operational environment.

- **Surprises (e.g., commodity price collapse)**
- **Triggers (e.g., assassinations, coup d'état, rigged elections)**
- **Idiosyncrasies (e.g., non-contiguous geographical territory)**
- **National Temperaments (e.g., cultural or religious perspectives)**
- **Spoilers (e.g., disgruntled followers, excluded parties)**



The third area are what we call stings. And this was the result of diplomats and practitioners we worked with that have said, there's no way that a model can take into consideration those cultural rules aspects that don't fit into your attempt to measure. But also things that are just surprises. And so they would get picked up in the indicators, but they would lack the disproportionate impact that experts have said that they include.

STINGS


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- **National Temperaments** (e.g., cultural or religious perspectives)
- **Spoilers** (e.g., disgruntled followers, excluded parties)



Lastly, this is a cognitive tool that we find that the analyst and the practitioners have used to map out the life cycle of a conflict. It's a recognition that we're looking at non-linear phenomenon and that they can backslide. As you move from left to right, you see the various stages which is one use of wording to understand the life cycle of a conflict as it moves toward the top of the screen, it's getting more into conflict and state failure. And towards the lower, you get more to a stable security.

CAST - Automated



So with those four steps in 2001 we began to look at the use of information technology to strengthen the analytical and computational aspects of CAST. And so we have created a software that uses Compson's Dialog to download about 11,000 sources of news media — anything that can be digitized. Right now we're using only English language sources because the measure in the Boolean phrases we use and lexical tools we use are in English. But as we move forward we're looking to translate those into other languages to expand the resources we can use. But it's, as I said, 11,000 news sources, and that also includes governmental reports, corporate reports, anything that can be digitized. The processes used Boolean phrase analysis to index and scan the data and then to rate the measures and provide value for the indicators in the Core Fives, producing various products that come out of the methodology.

PKSOI:

Can I just step in for one second. An opportunity to share resources. If your organization thinks, as you listen to this briefing, you think this is a valuable tool, one of the key things he just talked about is he doesn't have the money, what their organization doesn't have the funding right now to

get those 600 Boolean searches translated into culturally specific terms so they can do Boolean searches in different languages. So a thought—I saw Jason give this presentation at the National R&D and a thought that comes to mind is, folks like West Point, NDU, Naval Post Graduate School level, language instruction is part their institutions, if they could potentially talk with instructors in those programs and look at getting instructors to do some of that translation and/or the students doing it for the instructors, it would be a means that we could start getting it. If we could only get 15 more languages and the power of this to be able to research not just the English language papers, but the French, the German, the Chinese, the Arabic. We can go through it. Just a thought out there. So I'd ask that folks who have people who work for them who are teaching language to think about could they contribute and maybe translate this into a couple of languages for them. And it's a tool that is out there that we could all utilize and grab onto. And there not just looking for the little translations, they're looking for the cultural piece of it. So this phrase is something that has a cultural specific meaning to us in English language, how do you get at that in Chinese or in Arabic and different dialects of Arabic. That's the other piece. In the Kuwaiti's use of Arabic and the Saudi's use of Arabic. So just again a thought out there and then are multiple schools. I said NPS, West Point, NDU are just three that pop up. But we have folks who are very closely literate and it would be second nature to them to that translation. It's a good partnering between private and government to get at something that we can all benefit from. It's a way of using our resources to benefit one another. Sorry.

Speaker:

The next slide gives an example, just a fraction of the measures that would go into the indicator number 9, which is the suspension or arbitrator application of the rule of law. And so it's just an example of how we capture the various ways in which the data would report on developments in this particular indicator.

The Measures

Civil Rights			"kangaroo court" or "kangaroo courts" or "potemkin court" or "potemkin courts" or "denied due process" or "mob rule" or "mob justice" or "denial of legal rights" or "secret courts" or "private courts" or "indefinite detention" or "denial of a fair and public trial"
Civil Rights			or "slavery exists" or "existence of indentured servants" or "trade union banned" or "forced labor practice" or "forced labour practice"
Labor Rights	9	False	"labor reforms" or "labor reform" or "labour reforms" or "labour reform" or "prohibition of forced labor" or "prohibition of forced labour" or "trade union"
Labor Rights	9	True	"kangaroo court" or "kangaroo courts" or "potemkin court" or "potemkin courts" or "denied due process" or "mob rule" or "mob justice" or "denial of
Legal Rights	9	False	"enforcement of the rule of law" or "independent judiciary" or "presumption of innocence" or "right to appeal is protected" or "right to counsel" or "right
Legal Rights	9	True	"violence against women on the rise" or "ethnic persecution" or "religious persecution" or "system of racial discrimination"
Minority Rights	9	False	"minorities are protected" or "legal protection of racial equality" or "racial
Minority Rights	9	True	"road blocks" or "police checkpoints" or "interference with the right to travel" or "restricted movement" or "influx control"
Freedom of Movement	9	False	"lifting visa restriction" or "ending checkpoints" or "opening roadblocks" or
Freedom of Movement	9	True	"increase in the right to travel" or "freedom of movement" or "allowing people to travel" or "allows citizens to travel"

Next Steps

- **Develop a neural network using clustering and back propagation of historical cases for weighting of indicators and their measures**
- **Upgrade the lexical component for improved language capabilities**
- **Develop mitigating options list based on user input**
- **Calculate probability of change in measures, indicators, and core five ratings based on historical case-study analysis**

As I said, one of the next steps is to upgrade the lexical components. And we're constantly refining these Boolean phrases to capture them with more nuance as a data. We're also looking to create a neural network. The more and more cases we have and the more and more we can conceivably shift between particular measures and particular indicators, then we can start to really grasp the dynamics that exist in the relationship between these drivers of conflict. Once we have larger and larger numbers of cases in our computer, we're going to start to really look at the waiting if necessary to understand and to create our algorithms which understand those dynamics. And then once you've moved to that point, then you get into tackling probability of change. And so you can say, if there's a list of particular inputs or types of intervention, what is the probability of that action having a positive or negative effect on the drivers of conflict. And then this is something that you move forward and you get into a simulation which has the detail and the level of nuance that we think the amount of data we bring to the table had. And then you start to really create a simulation with a lot of potential. So that's where we're going in the next year and next few years.

Thus far CAST has been used by both practitioners and analysts and these are, again, I think you'll see from this morning's discussion, these are the types of issues we're trying to get at. We're trying to get at a strategic level insight. We're trying to have some commonalities with our approaches. We're trying to get across the different sectors, economic and social and anthropological. We're looking at all of these issues so

that we can come to a table and argue about what we see as the best ways forward. And have some types of clear and measurable background that we use to make these arguments. So we see that CAST has role in that.

A Tool for Practitioners and Analysts




- **Provides both strategic and operational-level insights**
- **Establishes common vocabulary and analytical framework**
- **Provides a cross-cutting, multi-sectoral approach**
- **Identifies, and allows for revision of, mission priorities**
- **Promotes collaboration, communication, consensus and coordination**
- **Provides transparent, objective and measurable standards of analysis**
- **Integrates area expertise and cultural understanding**

This is one example. We had a senior fellow who at the time of the genocide in Rwanda was the DCM in the Embassy. And she was working with the political elite leading up to the crises. And really just couldn't understand what went wrong and why there was such a collapse. And so she applied the methodology. She looked at the conflict drivers over time with trend lines. And come up with some answers to her key questions with this case study of really what went wrong. And looking at in particular the indicators of history of grievance and how you look at the hate speech and that. So it was used in that one case.


A second example is what the Fund for Peace itself is doing. And this is for the past two years has been using CAST to assess the intervention in Iraq. This came out last month. This is the high fraction of the aggregate trend line. And it shows some interesting, I think, counter intuitive findings. And in particular that when you saw the bolded date events. You see the actual spike in the level of instability in the country. And so something that was seen by some as a political victory, or achieving political goals actually serve to heighten instability. And so it is those findings which are counter intuitive are also a product of this tool.

Case Study: RWANDA

Indicators	Date	Jan-69	Oct-69	Oct-91	Jan-92	June-92	July-92	Jan-93	Feb-93	Aug-93	Nov-93	Feb-94	Apr-94
1. Mounting Demographic Pressures		5	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons		6	6	6	5	5	5	5	7	7	9	8	8
3. League of Refugees-Seeking Group		6	6	6	7	7	7	8	9	10	8	10	10
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight		1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
5. Unseen Economic Development Along		7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline		0	0	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimation of the State		6	8	7	5	4	7	4	8	5	7	9	10
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services		6	6	6	3	3	5	6	7	8	7	7	10
9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of Rule of Law and Human Rights		7	7	8	4	4	6	6	9	8	5	8	10
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State within a State"		5	6	7	4	4	4	4	7	9	9	10	10
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites		5	5	6	5	5	5	5	7	8	8	10	10
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors		0	0	5	4	4	4	5	7	6	7	7	10
Totential Point Totals:		56	53	57	54	56	58	64	57	68	81	76	85
		57	54	58	56	58	64	67	68	81	76	85	89



Key Events in Iraq (pre-war through April 2005)* Indicator Trend Line (aggregate)



*This graph is an enlargement of Iraq Indicator Totals (Pre-war through April 2005)

And early on in the Irregular Challenges presentation he mentioned that only those weak and failing states that have 50 particular criteria and access to the materials of weapons of mass destruction was one terrorism, national crime, but I think as we all know that any country that is falling apart can be a sanctuary for these types of activities. So we really need to understand how to adjust that problem.

Question:

Before you change that slide, could you say what the key means, because it's really not easy to read.

Answer:


Sure. We did this in combination with Foreign Policy Magazine. They had us do 60 countries and to split the 60 countries into thirds. The top 20 most unstable countries received a red, the middle 20 the other color, and then the bottom 20. So that is actually a coloring system that we worked with in collaboration with Foreign Policy. It doesn't have an inherent meaning other than where they fall that, vis. a vis. the other countries.

CAST-enhanced Curriculum


For Stability Operations education and training to be relevant, military and civilian students, at all levels, must be taught an understanding of the complex strategic environment in which they operate and the non-linear aspects of reaching Sustainable Security. This includes:

- **An expanded cognitive framework that includes kinetic and non-kinetic elements**
- **Long-term view of the lifecycle of a conflict**
- **Understanding of the drivers of conflict**
- **How to assess what is on the ground to work with**
- **How to assess second-order effects (outputs vs. outcomes)**
- **Appreciation for unintended consequences**
- **Understanding of regional, trans-border and sub-national dynamics and spill-over effects**

Comparative Case Studies




Lastly to talk about how CAST can fit into a curriculum. One thing that's been acknowledged this morning is that all of the agents on the ground need to have a strategic level understanding of their environment. It's not simply to hire officers. It's the mid level officers who need to be able to understand what the dynamics in the particular geographical state that their working in. So we think that CAST as a tool can bring these issues to that type of a training and education. And that would be a framework that includes both kinetic and non-kinetic, an understanding of the life term of conflict. And I won't read these all. But I think two that are key is how to assess what is on the ground to work with. These are, by their nature, operations that require a close relationship with the local agents. And you have to know what's there in order to really have good policy about to work with them. And then also a debate that I think has been going very much in Washington is the difference between measuring output and measuring outcome. And how do you decide which you've achieved. Is it the number of things you've done, or is it a more subjective assessment of the impact and the perceptions of the populations on the ground.




Two examples that I'm going to talk about briefly. One is a simple comparative case study analysis. And I have slide pictures that show four interventions and the bars that show before an intervention and a year after the intervention. And split up by the 12 indicators. Whether or not there is an improvement or a worsening.

Comparative Case Studies



This is an example. If it's a positive amount of change that's actually a worsening because the rating has gone up. Negative is better because it's a reduction in the conflict drivers. And you can have students or have those in the course start breaking down by which particular interventions or stability ops were they successful and why. And what were the drivers of conflict that works in tandem if you wanted to change the overall picture. So that's something by having a comparative case study approach that tries to go into the depth. But also at the same time gives a framework so that you can, you are not simply reading a two or three hundred page case study or book.

Next, this is a screen shot from the CAST software which shows how it is going though the process of rating a particular country. In this case is Afghanistan. Going through the 11,000 articles and working through the various measures and Boolean phrases.



As the student is working with it, they can see where the indicator ratings fell. But then they can go and look at the articles and go through those articles as they're divided by the particular indicators and by the measures, and really drill down to see what caused the change. And as I was saying earlier, with this level of detail, as we get more cases into our brain, into our computer, then we can really start to look at trends and look at the dynamics at work. So it is something that we look forward to in the next few years. And we would appreciate any feedback or any comments about what is useful to you because these are just two examples, but I think the reason that John had Fund for Peace here that we're one of those organizations that are trying to create tools that are useful in this context. And we're joined by USIP and CSIS and others. But this is an example of how our mission is to make what you do better. And so we appreciate any input.

Questions:

The system CAST seems to rely on reportage. Right? I mean you have to have people reporting stuff. So what about the cases in countries or micro regions in countries where you may very well have things that would count as indicators, but there's no journalist there. And the second thing is, it's also relying on the accuracy of the reportings. And the problem with that is, you know, do you really trust what's being published in the Indian Times or many other newspapers that essentially propaganda organs. So how do you account for what gets reported and the way it's reported?

Answer:

CAST has a way of assessing the creditability of particular source. So you could go in and say these sets of news sources we feel have a less creditability than others. I think the other issue — one thing that's kind of a unspoken assumption in the work is that perception matters nearly as much as the facts on the ground. So if they are local news source and local new sources are captured by reporting a particular crises or a particular economic decline, then that is going have an effect on the population. So we're capturing that as well. I think that when you are dealing with thousands of articles, some of the less accurate are going to get kind of lost in the numbers. But this is a question that is, each time we apply at the forefront of our minds, that we are trying to constantly refine it. And so it's something that we will never be perfect, but we take small steps towards getting closer and closer to it.

Question:

What about the lack of reporting?

Answer:

We're not finding that. Given that we have 11,000 sources and given that they are also local, we're finding that we're getting enough articles from countries. I mean the difference between Togo and Iraq you're going to see, but it may require you to take a longer period of time to look at three months or two months in Togo as opposed to the number of stories you get in Iraq in a week. Conversely, just because a country is written about a lot doesn't mean it gets a high rating. We have formulas that allow for the number of stories about a country, not to affect it. It's the relationship between positive and negative measures and those phrases.

Question:

Are we to assume that in large scale environmental impacts is subsumed under your indicators and/or your social conditions?

Answer:

Yes, that would be in the mounting demographic pressures indicators, yes.

Question:

Although these are numbers and things that are crunched, do you do like subject this to a team of experts, so to say, to review the outputs and give some sort of validation to the reporting?

Answer:

Yes. We employ and utilize area experts given that the filter index was a global project. We had a few area experts but also global experts on the issues of weak and failing states. As we are asked to do more targeted projects, for example look at a particular region, then we use those. So it has that expert feedback interaction that allows for if an expert sees numbers and they disagree with, then they would be able to zero down and say well, this is incorrect. You've missed this. The way that you've worded this is wrong. And so we try to have that feedback to refine the tool.

Question:

I love the slide you were talking back here on one of these. I do command and control for information technology whether it be for stability and reconstruction and also has to do with humanitarian assistance in different places like that. Those are two different offices but what we call an austere environment is the same thing. We looked at your slide on 12 conflict indicators. How many of those apply right now in New Orleans?

Answer:

As someone who was born in New Orleans and have family that are refugees now, that's something that's kept me up at night.

Question:

For us it like, look it's communications and civil/military coordination. And I don't care whether the austere environment was created by a hurricane or bomb, the situation for coordination is there.

Question:

I was wondering, does the system have the capability to look at interstate relationships so that if you had a country of concern next to a country of concern that a cross analysis of the relationship to each other and your discussions. Even those relationships between a powerful country against a troubled country, for instance Pakistan. What's going on in Pakistan as it relates to Afghanistan?

Answer:

The issue of relationships between states we don't focus on as much. But the example of border trans-border regions in the sense that have their own unique dynamics — we began to try to capture those. So a particular border region that has completely different dynamics than the country as a whole on either side, is something that CAST can, because you just have to look at different geographical space. So it's not limited by state borders. It can be something that can be broken down to look at provincial level or the small level, but also to sub-regions, for example West Africa.

Question:

But it would measure the level of interaction between two countries concerned. For instance right now Zimbabwe and Cuba ongoing relation?

Answer:

It's not its main purpose. And I think it would be a stretch. It is looking at, because of the way the indicators are crafted; it's looking at those drivers of internal instability. So I think it would miss.

Question:

Wouldn't it be an indicator of internal stability when you have two failed or failing countries of concern cooperating or having a little activity and news reports that indicate that [unclear]

Answer:

I see your point. I think it could be factored in. Thus far in our research we haven't seen it as a primary driver of conflict. So it hasn't been noted. But I think it is something that could be looked into in the future.

Presentation Closing Comments:**PKSOI:**

First of all I want to thank all the presenters; I thought they gave us some very good presentations that will hopefully stimulate our thought. Again we wrestled with what will we put out in front of you to start you thinking the first day. And there was a whole range of folks to put out there. I want to comment a little bit particularly on this last one. Threw that one out there because here's a database being done by a non-government organization that has tremendous, I think interest in a lot of what we're trying to do. Wrestling with the same issues we're trying to wrestle with and another sector out there who is involved in that. And it's something we potentially support and get some real benefit out of. But there are so many similar efforts. I know Montgomery McFate and Jake Kipp work on cultural awareness. I know the Marine Corps stood up a cultural awareness piece. You know the essence of cultural awareness; the essence of indicators of instability and having the intelligence and the information. Both intelligence and information; and they are different. But having that at your fingertips when you are a planner getting ready to do a plan. Our level of knowledge on 9/12 in CENTCOM

about Afghanistan was minuscule. Our level of knowledge about Afghanistan by about 10/15 when we started dropping bombs was improved, but not to the level it should have been. And we executed on a kind of a wing and a prayer on that one going in. And the plan wasn't complete. We weren't sure where we were going but we were executing that plan because there was tremendous pressure. The information we had about Iraq before we went in obviously wasn't to the standard we needed. The information that was shared among the government, between countries, wasn't again at the level it needed to be at. And if you are going to do a reconstruction piece and be affective, you have to know what the hell you're walking in to. Just something like this that can help you get that information; anything that can give you this level of information. I can find a million reasons why it might be broken or why it might not be perfect, but sitting down at CENTCOM I'd have taken that in a heartbeat. With all your concerns you had about it, I would have taken that in a heartbeat to have something that could have given me that level of data, that level of information that would have allowed me to formulate the plan.

Question:

Now since we're talking about stability and reconstruction let's just to take it a little further. How much imagery do we have of Afghanistan today? The Minister of Finance there will say it's probably the second most photographed country in the world yet that imagery cannot get to the NGOs or the private sector because it's all classified.

PKSOI:

Right. And so again, those are the sort of things we will tackle those issue. I mean a good point. But that's again another thought about an asset that's out there, a resource that's out there. How can we use that asset? Not only for the operational piece, but how can we use it in the education piece? How can we create that mindset that's needed? That educational broadening of a horizon so that when we're faced with a difficult situation that we don't fall back to a check list mentality, but we do as we think back and go okay this is similar to something XYZ, here's the sort of things that we need to think about considering. And then you start bringing in the experts and start hanging the details on a skeleton that you've put or been developed based on your educational process. And how can we in this conference focus on helping to shape the education, prepare our leaders and our executives and

the folks we know that are going to be participating from the tactical level to the policy level to better prepare them to handle the unknown that we can't predict. That's what we are talking about here. How can we work together to improve that curriculum and improve their ability to think their way through an issue that they're going to run into. And when they run into it, they'll think it's the first time it's ever happened because it's the first time it's ever happened to them. And we've failed them if they walk in there thinking it's the first time it's ever happened because we haven't exposed them to an education that told them that, no, there's nothing new that's going to happen to you in your lifetime that hasn't happened to somebody else in the last couple of thousand years. It's just a matter of are you aware of it and can you draw upon some lessons learned from it?

So again, we go back — three objectives of the workshop. What has worked? What are the gaps in the various approaches? Identify programs, subject matter experts and initiatives in the field of peace and stability operations in education and establish a collaborative relationship among all participants that can form the basis for continuing dialog. To me the most important one is the continuing dialog. Because we're not going to get it right today, tomorrow or the next day, or the next month or next year. But if we can get a process in place and can continue to have this dialog, we'll get better at it each and every month, each and every year. And that's what we're after is a dialog we can share. You can break into groups. You have two PKSOI faculty folks as your facilitators but the group will need to assign a leader and each will appoint a recorder. And you will need to have somebody who will act as the brief filter. You will have questions provided in the facilitators guide and the facilitators will give you those questions or share those questions with you to help frame the discussion. Today we are going to have six groups and we're going to focus on two key questions. Three groups will focus on how we integrate stability, reconstruction operations into the current curriculum. Another three groups will focus on the preparation development of educators and instructors and brief out their recommendations. All will brief out your recommendations tomorrow morning. And tomorrow afternoon we'll focus on specific aspects of resources that are required available and to best utilize them. And, again, that's why we've had this briefing in here because here's a research that's available. I can utilize it. I can use that in educational environment. I know I can use it in operational environment and I use it in an educational environment. The briefs will be the basis for a conference report so I'd

like to take those briefs, pull them on out and then synthesize them into a detailed report. And from that charter out a way ahead from the briefs that you have, and we'll talk about some use of technology tomorrow on how we can possibly capitalize on technology to continue moving forward and not have to spend every three months getting together with 85 people in the same room, but how we can use some web based technology, continue sharing ideas, continue the discussion, continue moving the ball forward.

Just some key points I caught out of the briefs:

What indeed is exportable? What can we use? Case studies database. There're military case studies. There're interagency case studies. There're international organizations' case studies. There're non-governmental organization case studies. There're academic case studies. Do we have a database of case studies? Can we build it? Would that be value added? There's goodness in using case studies and there's badness in using case studies. What are they? Could we develop something like that? Would that be a value added?

Subject matter experts we talked about, who are they? Do you have subject experts available? Do you need subject matter experts? Could you loan some of your expertise to other organizations? Will you want to borrow some from somebody?

What theorists do you study, and why? We all study the classical ones and we study other ones. There are a lot of folks we ought to study; other points of view we ought to be exposed to. Who are they? In the military we kind of lay out who our classical theorists are. But who are the theorists we ought to be looking at?

Simulations and games. What's the role? How can we capitalize on it? What's the goodness of the simulation game? What's the badness of it? How can we use simulation gaming? Does simulation gaming have to consist of computer games? I ran eight war games for the Iraq war plan, I never used a computer once. I had upwards of 120 people sitting in the room; I was the emcee pushing them through it and we got through some detailed discussions that were able to frame some key issues. But do you need simulations to run a scenario based exercise? No. But can you use simulation to do that? Yes. But the principles of gaming. How can I use those principles of gaming? Are there organizations here that kind of focus in on that and might have some thoughts they can share on how to use that in their case studies or tied to a case study?

And then communities of practice. Again, use of the web, use of communities of practice. Or as you mentioned the NDU setting that on up. How can we capitalize on that? And then sharing a database. What databases can we share? What databases are out there in the first place that we might even be interested in sharing? Let's identify that first and then let's figure out who can share it and what we can push out to whom, when, and how.

But those are ideas that I have sitting here; I've just made my list this morning. Those are the sort of things I'd like to see come back. I think we'd all benefit from them if we see them come back out of the working groups over the next couple of days. And really get some concrete pieces that we can act on. For example, do you think this CAST system is worthwhile to have somebody step up to the plate and say, "Look, I can translate that in French or German or Arabic or Spanish." That would be fantastic. Help advance the ball in that situation. So those are the sort of things we're looking for. Appreciate your time. And, facilitators, you've got the ball. The Secretary of the Army will probably pop in for a little bit. Don't worry about him — just ignore him — just continue doing your work. He will pop in to see what's going on. General Huntoon is more than able to explain to him what's happening so he won't need you to stop unless he asks. But again, we'll see you tonight at the dinner. I appreciate your efforts so far. Thank you.

Chapter 3

Working Group Presentations: Tuesday, 13 September, 1300-1630

Second Day Opening Comments:

PKSOI:

A couple of quick points. One, on the critique form: we're not looking for, "Hey, great job." I could care less about that sort of critique. We're looking for some real substantive points. For example a point was raised yesterday was that some folks felt that the questions kind of DOD-centric. And I said, "Huh. I didn't think that, but I'm from DOD and we wrote them, so imagine that!" So again those sorts of points, to say, "Hey the questions are DOD-centric" is one thing. To say, "Hey, if you wrote the question this way, then it wouldn't quite be DOD-centric." That would be helpful. That's the sort of feedback we're looking for, because it wasn't intended to be DOD-centric questions. They were intended to be questions that were university applicable to educators and to trainers and to help us get at how we can, as educators and trainers, improve what we are doing. So obviously that isn't what we want to communicate. That is what communicated to select individuals or to a large group of folks, because I got that from numerous places. So give us some thoughts on how we re-craft that, so that we can learn to get it out there in a way that's meaningful for you and you don't see it as DOD trying to come in and ask for feedback that we're not going to be sharing. So that's the sort of stuff that we're looking for on the critique form. What can we focus in on? Did we focus in on the right topics? If you wrote the question this way, those are the sort of things.

On the reference material, again, a lot of good ideas I'm sure are going back and forth. And what we'd like to do is to get those to Mike. If you can get it to Mike by about Tuesday of next week, and then that way we can start mailing the CDs out by Friday of the following week. Any additional reference materials that you think are of value added; links to web sites, those sorts of things. Short description, push that to Mike and we'll grab that, collate it, go through it and put it back out to folks. Again, that would be very helpful as well as a start point of resources we can share with the intent of taking then that same sort of information, and as we get a web site stood up and other folk's web sites, we can get it out there on web sites and get links established, and share the information among one another. So those

are two points I wanted to make. Again, appreciate your support. Don't worry, we've got thick skin, so give it to us and tells us how we make this conference better. It's not supposed to be a DOD conference; it's supposed to be a conference for all parties involved in stability reconstruction on how can we work together better, and how can we share with one another.

Focus Area A: “Integrating Peace, Stability and Reconstruction Operations (PS & RO) into the curriculum.” (Groups A, B and C)

DISCUSSION:

How is PS & RO curriculum determined? Are there constraints that prevent stability operations from being fully explored?

What is the understood scope of stability operations and is it integrated into other subjects or taken as a stand alone topic?

Is there value in PKSOI coordinating the formation of a curriculum development group to share good ideas and approaches? Or are the existing groups such as the MECC for the war colleges the more appropriate vehicle?

Have your institutions defined the minimum level of proficiency required for a student to have an understanding of stability operations? What types of subject areas should the student be aware of, such as the role NGOs, Rule of Law, Counterinsurgency principles, Cultural Aspects? [See question below if you have time to expand on the cultural and behavior aspects of stability operations.]

What is the best aspect of your curriculum in exposing the students to stability operations?

What directives and policies specifically addressing stability operations education are you using in your organization?

What is the level of interest in the S R & O instruction by your students?

IF YOU HAVE TIME – CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS

Do you have a distance learning aspect of your instruction and how does that approach complement or differ from the resident approach? What are the unique challenges?

How are the “behavioral” or “cultural” aspects of stability operations addressed, i.e., the historical, socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of maintaining peace in these environments? Do you see any need for improvement?

Working Group Presentations

Group A: First Question:

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group A

Key Points

- **No common terms of reference for the interagency in support of S&RO**
- **Who:**
 - DOD within the JIIM context
 - Customers
 - Facility
- **What:**
 - Doctrine or Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP)?
 - Doctrine and concepts have not kept up with the current operating environment – doctrine losing out on best practices/lessons learned
 - Need to teach understanding the situation and what to do about it
- **When:**
 - Basic subjects taught from beginning to end of career
- **Where:**
 - Formal Academic Institutions, training centers and experience based learning
 - Mentoring

Tab 4 of your (conference work) books has a breakout of who was on each team, for you recall. For Team A not listed on there are Larry Hamby from Booze Allen, and Rick Radcliff from TRADOC, were both part of our

team yesterday. I think Teams A, B and C all had the same issue to grapple with and that was integrating peace, stability and reconstruction operations into the curriculum, as it was framed. And as we addressed that issue we used probably the most complex method of organizing our thoughts that we could think of to fit the audience. And so here's how we did it. The who, what, when where and why method of organizing.

We started with a general statement, and it applies not only to this topic but a lot of the discussion yesterday. And that is, the need for a common terminology within the Interagency. And we began by just saying, well, are we talking about training or are we talking about education? And we could have gone down that rat hole and finally focused on education. We will not be presenting to you a group approved definition of those terms. Our statement is simply upfront. In this area as in all others dealing with the Interagency, the need for a common, approved, or at least accepted, terms of reference is absolutely vital before you start any serious undertaking. For workshops, for group work, for the development of policy, at least have a straw man for the key terms that all can at least accept for the purpose of whatever project that you are undertaking.

And then for the rest, instead of dealing with the questions that were on the handout, and I don't know if Groups B and C had the same handout. It began with how is the curriculum determined? We kind of brainstormed various ideas and then organized them into the questions that are listed there. And we began with the who. Who is the curriculum supposed to be for? Who are we educating? And we determined that our primary students, if you will, are those members of the DOD that will take part in peace, stability and reconstruction operations. But they are to be, or should be, educated within the joint Interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational context, which is key. And so, what does that mean? Well, that means privates are in basic training. It means any military personnel as they go through their initial entry. It could mean Cadets in pre-commissioning training. It certainly means Lieutenants at their basic officer leader course and at their officer basic courses. So it's the entire DOD, and so we weren't trying to develop a curriculum for members of the State Department. For us, the curriculum that we grappled with is for the Department of Defense.

Another aspect of the Who, are the customers. Once these members are educated, then where will they then work? And those that we brainstormed were certainly the combatant commanders; those that will be in charge in an AOR of PS&RO, but also Ambassadors in each of the countries. And

we looked at those as key members to gauge are we meeting educational requirements, because later on you will see where at least we thought, what should we be teaching? The What, you know what policy guides, how we ought to be educating, whatever target audience we decide upon to conduct these operations. And a key source for that, what we ought to be teaching, are the customers of those who we educate. And those were the two primary ones we mentioned.

The third bullet under there actually ought to read faculty and not facility. So if you're taking notes, please correct that. The faculty, those that educate, those that are charged with educating our students. It is an interesting dynamic that we discussed that we find ourselves in here in 2005. About 65% of the students that we teach here at the Army War College are coming from CENTCOM's AOR, within the past two or three years, or immediately before this assignment. They have the experience as Lieutenant Colonels or junior Colonels in peace, stability and reconstruction operations. In a few years, they will be eligible to join the faculties at our senior service colleges, once they finish their utilization tour as a Colonel. In other words, the potential faculty that will be available in the next one to ten years will be bringing with them a depth of experience that we have not seen since post Viet Nam era for educating on this topic.

Then we moved to the What. And we approached in very, very general terms, What should we be teaching to get at peace, stability and reconstruction operations? Well, we're taught as you develop a curriculum one source for what you teach, at least within the Department of Defense, is our war fighting doctrine. That's a source for training. It's a source for what functions are performed. It's a source for what responsibilities are performed at each level of command. And it's a source for what tasks need to be performed in order to perform those functions or operations. As opposed to doctrine TTP, Tactic, Techniques and Procedures, how do you do things specifically, specific procedures to fit a specific situation or a specific task. So it's a bit different than enduring doctrine. And so we asked that question. Is it one or the other? The problem with doctrine is that we feel that our doctrine, especially in peace keeping ops, especially at the rate we're learning about how to do certain things, has not kept up with the experience that both those that we would educate and those that would be the educators have, based on operations in the last four years. So to use doctrine as the basis for the What is problematic. TTP, however, because it is more flexible, there is a more agile system under development, and I don't know if it is in fact complete,

to bring tactics, techniques and procedures that have been proven in the field and formalized them and disseminate them into our school houses and into our various units.

Regardless, what we talked about, though, was a general framework for what to teach fall into two general categories. And that is an understanding of the situation and then what to do about it. And the way we discussed it was like this, the understanding of the situation is an understanding of the contemporary operating environment. It's the environment in which we live and it involves the culture and it involves the political aspects. It certainly involves the nature of the threat or the adversaries or the obstacles to PS & RO. And it involves, then, an understanding of what could occur in the next months, weeks, years. And then what to do about it, not necessarily specific procedures, but how to think about the problems. And so while we didn't say this directly, and with apologies to Team A for maybe putting words in our mouth, education really is not about what to think, but how to think about problems. And that type of framework, I think fits, looking at education in that way.

When do we educate our target audience on peace, stability and reconstruction operations throughout their careers? As I mentioned, it has to start early. We talked about the case of the "Strategic Corporal," where any actions they may have could be the topic for the SecDef's next press conference. And they need to understand, not only from a cultural awareness, but because of the prevalence of the media and for various other aspects, that education in PS & RO is mandatory throughout their careers. But what they are taught is certainly going to be different when they are a 20year-old Private, Sergeant, Second Lieutenant, vice when they are a 45year-old Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel, or a 50 year-old Brigadier General. So what they're taught could be different, but a constant continuous program of education throughout their careers, we think is what is called for.

Where do we do it? Academic institutions, training centers, and here, when we got into this discussions on Where in fact the education ought to occur, then the blurring between education and training became much more. Training centers certainly is more a training experience. Experience based learning. It could be self paced. It could be self development. It could be delivered via distance education or distance learning techniques. But, again, we thought it's important to mention that because of the depth of experience that both the audience and the potential faculty will have for the next decade, at least.

And then we discussed the idea of mentoring as a part of a formal education process throughout the years. We, at least in the Army, talked about mentoring from two primary aspects not related to education. And one aspect is kind of you have a mentor to help guide you along your career path. Well, should I take a second company level command as a Captain or should I move on to the highest level staff that's available to me. And it's questions like that that either a serving or a retired general officer can help you early in your career wrestle with based on what your career goals are. The other aspect of mentoring is formalized in our officer evaluation report system, where your senior rater is mandated to counsel you on a periodic basis, on your performance and what you can do to improve. We're talking about mentoring here from an education standpoint. And again, those potential mentors, and they don't have to be general officers now because, again, of the depth of our bench, the depth and the number of potential mentors that have experience in the PS & RO. And so they could team with one or several students, whether in our institutions or in units and mentor

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group A

Why:

- **Current operating environment demands it and the future operating environment will likely require it**
- **Important to the customer**
- **Qualitative Improvement**

• How:

- **DOD mechanism and procedures exist to guide and develop curriculum**
 - » **Questions:**
 - » **are they responsive;**
 - » **do they consider other than DOD;**
 - » **do they consider experiential;**
 - » **are the mechanisms exportable**
- **Policy and guidance – no standard – is it required**
- **Exchange program**
- **Educational Objective determined by study of history, concepts and doctrine, and experience.**

them in the various aspects of PS & RO. I didn't mention it at the outset, but as I'm going through this, if you find a point that you'd like to question on, please do so, embellish or challenge.

Why need we develop a curriculum for PS&RO? We felt for those reasons there. Current operating environment which we find ourselves in now, is the major military operation that we have ongoing now and for the foreseeable future. And as you read documents like the Joint Operational Environment, any of the concepts dealing with future warfare or future conflict talks about a future operating environment in which peace, stability and reconstruction operations will be part of any conflict or post conflict operation. It's important to the customer. We talked about a survey that someone either had access to or participated in as a member of our group in which the combatant commanders were asked about what's important to them. This is beyond simply an integrated priority list. This is what is important to you now and what shall we be preparing service members to do before they come into your command. And the notion of PS&RO was very high on the list. So it's important to those customers. And then a qualitative improvement we believe is called for. And the source of this, I can't speak to firsthand; it could be after action reviews or assessment of unit performance, but how well we conduct peace, stability and reconstruction operations, our group felt certainly could be improved. Education is one way of doing that.

OK. Those were the five Ws. How do we in fact, then, integrate PS&RO into the curriculum? Well we felt that a mechanism already exists at several levels within the Department of Defense to build curriculums. The college here, any senior service college has a process by which curriculums are built. I believe the Joint Staff is responsible for JPME (joint professional military education). Is the J-7 Rep (on the Joint Staff in the J-7 section) still here?

J-7 Rep:

Yes. And you (DOD) were provided guidance.

Group A:

So procedures do exist to guide the development. But just because they exist, we had questions. Are those procedures, are those mechanisms responsive? Again, if you think back to the what should we be teaching, if,

in fact, we ought to be teaching what our doctrine says on peace, stability and reconstruction operations, well, the program of instruction, or the lesson plans may not change for five to seven years. Which is the normal life cycle of a Joint Pub or I can at least speak to Army field manuals. But if in fact we ought to be educating our target audience on what are we learning today and what should these members know before they go into the CENTCOM area of responsibility, well then our doctrine may not be responsive enough. And then we are getting into tactics, techniques and procedures, lessons learned versus lessons observed as a member of our group was quick to point out. And in order to provide in our education system the relevant material to best prepare them for these operations.

Question:

I guess I have a quick question. I mean I know that 60% of the doctrine right now is under revision. But why would, I mean, I don't think an instructor would actually, if they know that the doctrine is outdated, that would be the start. But then they would show how current operations have changed and things need to evolve. I don't think an instructor is going to sit there and just teach outdated doctrine. But you do have to establish here is where the doctrine is today and this is where we're evolving to. I'm not an instructor, but I'm sure that most of the instructors are doing that. And they're supported by the students who have the direct experience. So I mean we can point our finger at doctrine, but we understand that it does take a while to go and get that updated.

Group A:

I agree with you. And I think we're pointing the finger at doctrine because that came up in our discussion as a source for what ought to be teaching.

Comment:

One of the members of the group pointed out, and in fact it's what drove us to that point, is that that's what should happen in the classroom, but in some cases that's what's not happening. There is significant dissatisfaction on the part of those coming back from actual experience that a firm belief on their part that that experience is not being taken into account. And that there is this disconnect with the doctrine that is not being addressed.

Comment:

I mean it's doctrine, but it also is faculty currency. I mean that's a faculty development issue. They should understand that here's where doctrine is, but how are they getting the information that tells them that things have changed. There's all kind of lessons learned out there. There're reports, there's self study, there's self development. You should know as an instructor if you are responsible for that area. What is doctrine today, what is TTP?

PKSOI:

That's probably the people we're trying to get at because to say that you should know as an instructor is a cop out. To say that the instructor does—it's in the doctrine is a cop out. The point we're trying to get out is, how do we get things out there for instructors to do? And we're going down a very DOD-centric path right here right now. So, my thought is that, again, what we're trying to get out of this is how can we, or what should be taught and then how do we make sure that we're teaching the most current and relevant pieces of this? Hopefully, we can distinguish a little bit between what the needs are of the different organizations within it and we can start identifying subject matter experts and resources that we can use together and share between one another. That's what we're trying to get at here. What needs to be taught? How do we teach it? Now we have an understanding what needs to be taught. You were focused on the curriculum. There's another set of groups that will be talking about faculty development. So we'll get to that soon.

Comment:

Just two points probably unrelated in support, I think, of what Larry said on training and education. Training, you are teaching people doctrine and how to apply the doctrine. And that's something, I guess, that basically stops at the staff college level. At the war college level you're beyond that in the education and people are looking at higher levels and they may be analyzing doctrine, rewriting doctrine, but you're certainly not teaching the doctrine. At the higher levels, the way you want to teach people, first off, and I can give you chapter and verse on this, you can't teach 40 year olds anything. They can learn. But you can't teach them anything. So that's the hard part. You have to cause learning without being able to teach. And so the best way to do that is using, I think, a case study method. And finally, and this is just more a comment on OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and OEF (Operation

Enduring Freedom), the whole process of doctrine writing is changing. It was something that was done by the Imperial Them. And it was very much of a top down process. There was an incredible bureaucracy connected to it. But that's really sort of more about the production of field manuals than it is about doctrine. GEN DePew used to say that doctrine is what 51% of the Army believes and practices. And what's going on in the field today is people are writing doctrine from below. And they are passing it out. And Wednesday's doctrine may not be Friday's doctrine. And, you, now, these various nets, the company commander's net, the platoon leader's net and whatever, this is where people are going for doctrine. They are not going to FM so and so and such and such because they know that that was written pre 9/11 or for another battle field or with conventional warfare in mind. So I just throw that out to people who are thinking about doctrine because I think it's probably one of the biggest revolutionary consequences of the conflicts we're involved in right now. And ultimately things like TRADOC will end up on the trash heap of history because their world has been turned upside down and they are no longer relevant. But probably not next year.

Group A:

I think we tried to get at that last discussion here with our bullet on considering experiential activities that are occurring in theater. But again a caveat has to be applied to that. Just because something is working over there, as you said, Sir, that next week a different approach may be working and so what we bring into our institutions as the basis for an education program, we ought to be pretty darn sure that it's not just the technique of the day, and ought to be something enduring, especially if we're talking about education and teaching.

Comment:

My pals who are real students of the higher levels of doctrine say that you're better off today teaching, basic theory than practical, this is how you fight, doctrine because the basic theories are going to satisfy your tests and then stand the test of time.

Group A;

And here, of what I know of our POI, especially as campaign planning, is we do both. They get the theory early on. When they get into the campaign planning, they get into the Joint Pub Five series.

Comment:

I think I was just going to add and I think I agree with Joe in general. But I wanted to bring up a pretty substantial debate in our group and I would offer I would suppose it was probably one in all the groups, was really distinguishing between the lexicon of doctrine in tactics, techniques and procedures. As one of these guys just coming back from over there and going to these sites and CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned), is a phenomenal resource, but frankly that's not doctrine. Frankly, that's tactics, techniques and procedures, a wonderful repository of what to do but in a very specific context. I think our question on one of the previous slides was one that's really getting to the question of doctrine. That raises some concern from today. And that's the concern we have with the lag between the collection. The enemy's given us a wonderful opportunity right now to allow us to collect a lot of tactics, techniques and procedural lessons gathered. But we are questioning the calibration of the operational mechanisms. That middle tier between formulated policy and implementation. That bureaucratic middle ground where doctrine lies that converts these experiential gathered tactics, techniques and procedures and converts those and puts them into a broader context. Actually transforms some of those things and sees what's common within those experiences that can be then actually converted into a theory, doctrine. And transposed forward into new "how's" of doing the business. And that was what we were really questioning in terms of the calibration of the mechanism of doctrine. And the last one I'll make, there is some anecdotal evidence out there, particularly from the junior end of the special military education programs that we are in a moment right now where a lot of these folks are coming out of experiences and experiential based knowledge. They are running up against some folks at that operational tier and higher tiers that are really approaching doctrine as dogma. But we're having a doctrinal dogmatic conflict and for some it's turning them away and they are actually voting with their feet and leaving the ranks. Others it's breeding a degree of cynicism. Some are doing the great thing and they are going toe to toe with their more senior, but perhaps less experience in the contemporary operating environment, professors and actually that's good, I think for me. That's a great environment where they can go in conflict and come out with both the so called student and teacher actually both becoming learners and learning from the experiences. But I think there is a mechanism problem that we tried to address, and I think it's, I'm sure all of us probably addressed it at some point in our discussions.

Comment:

I was just going to ask about that; you talked about year long learning. PS&RO basically is ten years old. We've been at before, since Bosnia, and we were in several years of denial there. So how do we teach the most senior people when you need to teach a new subject from bottom to top, top to bottom. It's not like these are basic trainees and I'm going to teach them to be an infantryman. Colonels and Generals – they've been infantrymen all their lives and knew what they were doing. Now it's a whole new subject. How do we introduce these new thoughts all the way up and down the line?

Group A:

That's kind of THE question. And we didn't come up with a specific answer for that. But that's the task of at least the three panels, integrating this into the curriculum.

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group A

• Recommendations

- **Foster Interagency terminology and concepts**
- **Develop cross-agency baseline educational objectives (amount of time required but what knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes at various levels)**
- **Share curriculum data among agencies**
- **Establish Interagency Education Council**
- **Establish Interagency Policy that can be used to drive curriculum development**
- **Encourage Interagency Exchange**
- **Survey and pursue Advance Civil Schooling for Stability and Reconstruction**

Let me go through the rest of the How, because this was our attempt at answering that question. Now that you asked it so bluntly, I don't think it measures up. No policy in guidance or at least a lack thereof—Oh, I forgot. Are mechanisms exportable? John got it right on. This is DOD-centric, but are our mechanisms exportable to the rest of the Interagency? That's something that we ought to consider.

An exchange program is another way of cross fertilizing among the Interagency. And then this could be within the What, but we put it in the How. The educational objective, the learning objective, the outcome of learning, what you want to achieve by this educational experience. We figured the source is not only a study of history, but what we are doing currently and we called that concepts and doctrine. And then the experience that we're bringing back once it gets approved and formalized.

And given all that discussion then we have a few recommendations. One is to develop some standard, accepted terminology regarding peace, stability and reconstruction operations. Across agency base line educational objectives. And this is something that would apply beyond the Department of Defense. What are those common knowledge skills, abilities and attitudes that could apply to anyone working in a PS&RO operation or environment? We didn't get into the amount of time that would be required either by agency, by individual skill or whatever, but we were under the understanding that this afternoon we're going to be brainstorming some resource or constraints on this process. So we'll leave that for another time.

Speaking for the Army War College I could not say with any certainty that we share our curriculum of PS&RO with the other senior service colleges. OK, we do? Alright, well, there we go. We're still recommending that we share our curriculum data among all those interested in this educational project. There is something called a Military Education Council: we are wondering about the establishment of a similar body, Interagency Education Council, could be to set policy, could be to establish or accept or approve a common curriculum or those aspects of the curriculum that are common — Interagency policy that could be used to drive curriculum development. If one way of furthering our education is to exchange members within the Interagency, then our recommendation is to encourage that exchange. And then in terms of another educational opportunity, advanced civil schooling, and I don't think he's here yet, but Spanky, a member of our group is undertaking a survey of four year colleges that have ROTC that can also be considered centers of excellence for study programs relating to PS&RO.

So he's involved in a survey and then pursue a program like that as another educational outlet. That is the sum of all the Group A discussion items on this issue.

Group B, First Question:

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group B (1)

- **Best aspects**
 - Practical, real life exercises with military and civilian mentors
 - Real time judgment by ambassadors and generals
- **Recommendation**
 - Integrate PS & RO into curricula
 - Tours/detail with civilian agencies and IOs
 - Need a concurrence in the content to be taught

Group B:

Good morning. I live and work in that vague and cloudy area called the Interagency. The Interagency is apparently a vast wasteland impervious to folks who wear uniforms and are able to differentiate their services by what they wear. Those of us in the Interagency who are male are allowed to differentiate ourselves by the color of our necktie on occasion. Ladies, however, may wear what they want. The Group B came pretty much to the conclusion that we are now at a teachable moment within both the civilian side of the government and the military side of the government. And we should not lose this. We're going to paint with a 4-inch brush, not a 1-inch brush. Group B was half members of military schools and half subject matter experts from the civilian side of the government and outside

the government. So we're not going to give you a lot of words that you understand from your doctrine. We looked at the value of the service schools as agents for change and the importance of making sure that those schools stay relevant, keeping up with what's going on. We definitely took a DOD-centric approach because our understanding was we need to start within DOD, and once DOD feels comfortable it might reach out beyond that. But let's look in house before we jump out of house, even though you've invited us into talk about it. We started out bragging. We looked at our best aspects in all of the eight people that were there plus the people from here in Carlisle. There was a remarkable concurrence in that practical, real life exercises with military and civilian mentors in those exercises were the way to go. Peer teaching went along with the formal teaching. We decided that what you really needed was a lot of reading assignments, practical exercises, minimize the lectures, so I'm lecturing, talk to each other. And the real spur to make this work is that when you get done, you have to have real time judgment, standing tall before usually retired Ambassadors and Three-Stars. Because Three-Stars makes you do your best work if you have to talk to him directly. So we like the fact that you were called on the carpet right away and you had to be relevant with senior people's expectations.

We didn't go immediately to recommendations but here are the recommendations that we are putting out. Yes, we believe that PS&RO, sounds like a railroad, ought to be in the curriculum, integrated. You are going to have to integrate it from Lieutenants up to General Officers because there is a basic knowledge that all soldiers will require in how to deal with these things. We determined that wherever there were electives available within the service schools represented in our group, that the people who took those electives were foreign officers and American officers who had already done that job. The notion of an elective was something that was not increasing the number of people trained in these particular skills. You do, however, need an elective just in case you start doing things like we're doing now in sandy places. Or if someone gets a warning order and says they are about to mobilize, they will require that module in order to be able to train up their people, their troops in their division in order to get things going. So the notion of an elective or a module may be useful.

We also like the notion of putting people on tours or perhaps details into that place called the Interagency, specifically USAID, State Department Geographic Bureaus, not State INR, those are the Intelligence folks and they feel real comfortable to you and we're looking for people who uncomfortable

to you. The United Nations and the operations that United Nations operates. We weren't able to come out to a way that we could drop military personnel into the non-governmental community, but that would be helpful, too, trying to be able to get them to understand that just because that person has a uniform doesn't mean he stopped being human. And just because we are all fuzzy minded civilians doesn't mean we stopped being patriots. So there's a cultural thing that has to be handled there, but it's important that military and civilians swap off. For my own personal experience, we had two Lieutenant Colonels in Kabul that sat in the AID mission, it took them four months to figure out what the hell we were doing. Once they figured it out, they were super team members and they pulled their weight and more. We also, I can commiserate a little bit with our British colleagues, we had a DEFID person come into AID in Washington, took him four months also to figure out what we were doing, and we had a common language. So it's not as easy as just "have a tour." There's a lot that's involved there. We also determined that there were quite a number of lists already of what stability operations and reconstruction ought to look like. The taxonomy has done right down to the eashes and pieces. And everybody kind of figures they know what their piece of the elephant looks like, but there is no concurrence on what the content should be for someone who is teaching it to officers of whatever rank or to enlisted people.

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group B (2)

- **Gaps**

- Public security and public order
- Informal power, underground economy, social networks (clan, tribal)
- No front line: reporters, IEDs, etc
- Understanding civilian capacity (S/CRS, USAID, local and international NGOs)

- **Constraints**

- Educating to fight the last war
- Zero sum (courses, budget, inertia)
- Need a champion

We'll look at some gaps. We found a number of gaps. Because we understood that one of the major reasons why this conference is being held is that there some gaps out there. We need to find them and figure out what we can do about them.

This is not a gap but it's perhaps a notional thing. We found the subtlety was a tremendously important piece of what we were looking for in stability and peace operations and reconstruction, because essentially stability operations are not close order drill. Everybody's going to be moving at a different pace. They're going to be at a different step. It's alright. It's unmilitary, perhaps in the doctrinal sense. But it's okay. The subtlety comes in, for instance, peace keeping, peace operations, are very different from stability operations because in stability ops, the Americans are on the ground and we're in charge. And that's a different set of rules of engagement that peace keeping operations when the Americans are on the ground and someone else is in charge. And there are different belligerence and the rest of it. You handle it differently and the people who are in charge for our side must be able to see the difference and not just apply the same tools indiscriminately.

What we looked at then as far as major gaps, public security and public order. When you guys in uniform say security, you're out there fighting terrorists and insurgents, and conventional warfare and the rest of it. Those of us in the Interagency, out there in that fuzzy area, when you tell me public security or security, I'm thinking cops. I want the girls to be able to walk to school. I want commerce to be able to function. I need people not to be assassinated in their homes. Those are police and the American military doesn't do police. We've never been told to. We don't really want to as far as I know. It's a requirement for a constabulary. No number of military policemen on the ground, no matter how well educated, can be a civilian police force analog.

The informal power structures. If you're going to irregular warfare, you're going to run into informal power, underground economies, clans and tribes. They are going to be all kinds of messy and we need to be able to teach our people how to handle that.

There is no front line in many of these irregular wars. You're going to get accosted by a reporter as you walk out the door and you're going to be the strategic Lieutenant at that point. You're going to get hit by IEDs on the way home. You're going to end up having your women transport people captured because they took a wrong turn in southern Iraq, and all kinds of

things like that happen. It's very different than trying to keep Russian tanks coming through the Fulda Gap.

We do need to make sure that there is an appropriate understanding of civilian capacity. That's the State Department's CRS plus what the geographic bureaus do. What my agency, AID, does. The local and the international NGOs, and then also we didn't put the UN on there, but what they are up to as well. I sat through a military exercise not long ago where there were no civilians in the world. And it was a great exercise. We won. But the military had to eat out of its budget all the same stuff that I could have paid for and they didn't have to. And there was the resource issue came up at that point.

We did identify some constraints to putting the business of peace operations, stability and reconstruction into the service schools. We found out that almost everybody wants to fight the last war. Over 50% of the people who come back to the service schools are coming back from Iraq or Afghanistan and that's what they want to talk about. The people that you are educating in your schools are going to go back to an Iraq or an Afghanistan or someplace else, and it's going to be a year later and the conditions will be different and the tactics will be different and everything's going to be different. So let's not fight the last war if we can help it. One of the things that's missing in fighting this war, the National Security Strategy does say diplomacy, development and defense. And we'll have to fit into that in this new irregular area.

We did look at it as a zero sum game. Professors and courses are going to have to deal with the transformation issue just like tankers and striker brigade commanders are dealing with transformation. We expect that the budget will not change significantly, so you are going to have deal within the money we've got. And everybody's risk averse. There will be some inertia. Nobody wants to be the first one because people are going to talk about what you're saying. I would hope that we're not going to create a bureaucracy because bureaucracies are slow moving. We will lose this teachable moment both for the civilians and for the military.

Lastly, we need a champion and we need a champion in uniform. Civilians change. I've been in the government long enough to know I could wait out the political appointee and get the next one and maybe we'll train him better. I presume the same thing happens over on the south side of the river. What we need is somebody like Billy Mitchell who says airplanes are important in the Army. We need Hyman Rickover who says submarines ought to be

nuclear. I don't know who the hero is going to be — who the champion for stability ops is going to be. It's got to be a career military person who's crazy enough to push this through. We believe that stabilization is just as important as kinetics. We want to make sure that this gets into the curriculum and we are able to continue on doing the things that the American military is best at. Questions? Comments by the rest of the team. Did I do an adequate job of saying what you said?

PKSOI:

Good point on public security. So you would say key feedback we'd want to send back to the Sec. Army, that MPs don't equal public security.

Group B:

An MP is trained to do military security. He is not going to investigate a robbery. He doesn't do train of evidence. He's not a detective. You can train your MPs to do that. But is that the best use of a military policeman given the other requirements?

PKSOI:

I tend to agree with you. So I think that is the sort of feedback that we will send back up the chain. He did ask for feedback. I think he is very open. He wasn't just saying, hey, give me feedback, and doesn't want to hear about it. So those are the sort of things we'll think about, again, as you're talking your way through. This is a point from the Secretary of the Army's talk last night and we can give him some feedback. Because I was not struck by that answer that you can have more MPs, that's going to give us public security. I kind of see a gap there.

Comment:

We had a lot of conversations over four years about constabulary forces. Something between military and police. A large number of people like the Carabinieri or the Gendarmerie, most of whom don't deploy actually. But to get them and they would be a law and order force in an intervention to begin with, and then they would also turn around and train the police. In the global peace ops initiative, we roped off a few million dollars which we were transferring, I think we have transferred to Italy, so that they would have their Carabinieri school train people for in Carabinieri kind of skills for peace keeping. I think that's a good solution. British Military Police

train foreign policeman. Why? Because they think it's important. US MPs throw up their hands and say, that's not in our METL (mission essential task list). We don't train foreign police forces. If we want to do that, we can do that. But we need to recognize here, sort of the tyranny of the TTP and the doctrine and the procedures and the SOPs. There's never been a decision by the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States that US Army MPs are not to train foreign policemen. That's something that we've developed on our own and we tell people, "Sorry, boss, we're not capable of that. The reason we're not capable of that is because, you know, the doctrine says." And it becomes sort of a circular kind of thing. I'm struck by how many thousands of MPs we have. What a huge problem we have in training foreign police and how the US Army has stood at attention and just said, "Sorry, not my job." And no one in the leadership has passed on that as to whether or not that's something they want to do. Now, there are also legal problems here in terms of authorities and what we're allowed to do. US Military generally is not allowed to train foreign police. AID is not in that business. We have another bureaucracy in the State Department, INL, which is wired in to a strange outfit in DOJ (Department of Justice) called ISITAP. And that's how that happens and it's a cumbersome system full of contracts and contractors and in small scale things, it can work. In large scale things like Afghanistan or Iraq, it's not going to work. And we just okay, we'll make the contracts bigger. You know at a certain point it just doesn't get it. So, I definitely think that that is a point for Department of Defense leadership addressal. Should US Army Military Police units be in this business?

Group B:

I don't want to get into a policy debate in an education conference. The reason that we brought it up is that we know that military units will either have to do some of the policing themselves as they've done in both the countries mentioned. At the same time, if we're not doing it, we will have to be able to work constructively with whoever is handling the police. That's the reason for putting it in here. Now the conversation we've just had is extraordinarily germane, but not necessarily to education. I take my life in my hands when I ask Mike to talk about public security.

Comment:

I'm blowing off old steam. Well, you basically read my mind. There are two conditions that we have to deal with. One, if the US is operating

unilaterally, then we can't call upon these forces which are now called stability police units that are being developed in the world among allies and other international organizations. We've got a gap that we're going to have to fill. And it's not going to go away. And it's absolutely decisive in terms of the outcome. So, we need to be prepared to address that situation. But the more likely condition will be that we're going to encounter these stability police units. It's a growth industry. The UN has 17 units right now, they're going to 30. They'll go larger if they can obtain the resources. There is in a sense going to become a much larger part of the force mix. And my point being, our troops need to understand how to work effectively with them. And of course that raises the issue of transition. I mean if we did begin in a unilateral manner, we would certainly like to be able to transition to a point where we're working with someone else performing the public order function. That's an international capability. And then transitioning to the point where the locals are able to perform these duties. And in a hostile environment you can't get individual police to do it. And it's a huge gap in Iraq. How do we provide any kind of adult supervision over those police who are going to be in the grip of the clans, the informal power structures, etc. And it really becomes, you know, we can't proceed any further unless we can solve that problem. So that's a gap in terms of understanding. We've got to grapple with it so we can effectively carry out our policy. And also it's a policy question for which road shall we go down, but we can't wish the problem away.

Comment:

I thought that there were institutional training units from the Army Reserves that were in Iraq and their responsibility is to train and peace. And those are units that are specifically designed for retraining of US Military. And this is the first time that they've actually been deployed and they are being utilized in that capacity.

Group B:

The recommendation is that stability ops people need to be able to make the difference between military security and public security, police functions and military functions. Because if you just smuush them together, then the MP commander gets whip-sawed out there. So again we did not intend to start the policy debate, only to say that it's important to make sure that these gaps are covered.

Comment:

If I could just make one comment on that. And I want to offer something on this point. The enemy gets a vote. And enemy is smashing together the [unclear] . . . our dogma that separates security of policing actions. I am in favor of packaging it in modular forms. And I think we may have identified a subject for maybe another conference, the idea of a constabulary type module. And I think this [unclear]. . . that in terms of the direction of the module course development [unclear] . . . that can then put in operating areas as in terms of the modular force concept, with a commander, can have readily access to that capability to plug and play in the ground when the enemy as well as the combatant commander determines face in the nature and the scope and the scale of the environment. But that's rapidly changing. And then another point, you had said that you guys when through and looked at opportunities to imbed individuals in the different organizations [unclear]. . . there was a delta [unclear] . . . how do we get folks, military in particular [unclear] . . . I would offer at the pre-commissioning stage, case in point, at West Point we have a very robust internship program, part of our experience based learning model. Every summer, particularly during the Cadets' Junior and Senior summers, we send them across the globe. And governmental organizations as well as NGOs. One example is the Cross Roads Africa program where we imbed our Cadets, and junior faculty, as leader/mentors that go with these [unclear] . . . doing at pre-commission level, I would assume that we probably have some ROTC programs that do similar things. I think that's a pretty good model, perhaps, for us to look at in terms of doing it for the rest [unclear]

Group B:

It sounds like you need to talk to you, Linda, and see if we can find a constructive solution.

Comment:

I want to point out that in this hiatus between the Peace Keeping Institute and PKSOI, the world has moved forward. And CIVPOL (civilian police) is a integral part of UN Peace Keeping Operations. So if you're not familiar with the civilian police function within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, they have a curriculum, they have a training section, they have a very well thought out role for this issue of public sector and public order. It's not rapidly deployable at the moment but the European Union has

committed to the mobilization of 5,000 police officers within 90 days. And there are people that are working how do we do this better. Whether they are gendarmerie, Carabinieri. My good friend BG Pistolazi from the Italian Carabinieri tells me there's no problem in the world that can't be solved with a battalion of Carabinieri. So, I'm just letting you know that people are working this. Certainly not on this continent necessarily, but elsewhere in the world.

Comment:

When we went into Iraq, we just almost arbitrarily said it would sure be nice for us to have four battalions of gendarmerie, Carabinieri, kinds of troops. And we racked and stacked every country in the world that had those forces and a lot of those countries were in the operation with us. So it wasn't a question of the fact that we were politically turned down. We ended up with one battalion. UNCIVPOL, sorry, 5,000 in 90 days, yeah, that's possible. And when you have something like Bosnia or even Kosovo CIVPOL is an answer. But in those places that are not yet post conflict, you're going to need something more robust. And I don't think CIVPOL or the normal UN way of doing business is the only answer. I think that we have a great asset in the United States and for us to just keep wringing our hands here making out as if this was a problem we can't solve because of posse comitatus or sunspots or whatever, you know. It ought not to be. And we also have to fix our laws in the United States. But I salute you and I think that it is important for anybody, and this is a great point you made, that if you haven't been to the UNPKO website lately, you need to go and spend a few hours there because there are tremendous amount of things that are going on that are useful. And there's a huge peace keeping world outside of what the US is doing. And the complexity of the operations in Africa are something that military people ought to keep an eye on because there are undoubtedly lessons that you can pick up there, too.

Group B:

Are there questions that do not have to do with public security? Mr. Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.

PKSOI:

Well done, well done. Can we have Group C, please.

Group C:

Question One: Curriculum and Constraints

► How is PS & RO curriculum determined?

- Major DOD goals and directives (eg, Joint Staff documents) get translated into the core curriculum, but course directors determine specifics.
- Neither service or joint staff have created explicit requirements for SO, so institutions have taken initiative.
- More guidance equals less latitude, so a "lack of direction" from services & joint staff is not necessarily bad.

► Are there constraints that prevent stability operations from being fully explored?

- Lack of a definition of what SO actually is, lack of clarity about who defines it.
- Requirements come from the services and the RCC, and they may conflict
- Lack of a DOD directive that SO are as important as MCO.
- Institutional denial over the past few years that the US military conducts SO ("the elephant in the living room").
- Teaching other required classes limits time available for SO.
- Not the core function of the military (organizational culture): "we never dealt with stability because it was our job to create instability."
- Resources: the job of USMC is to win the nations wars, and now SO, but were are the resources?
- The military's orientation towards completing objectives conflicts with the non-linear aspect of SO.
- America: "the impatient people." We are "cultural impaired" as a nation, having a bad case of ADD.

We had a very disobedient group. And some of the questions that we were asked to consider we didn't consider at all, and then some questions we weren't asked to consider we spent a lot of time talking about. So I tried to organize our discussions into something that resembled what we were supposed to do. So we'll see how it goes. And I thought you'd probably be tired of white slides, so I decided to add some color. So the first thing we tried to address really is, how is the curriculum determined? We had a discussion from a number of people who represented professional military educational institutions about their processes and it seemed that the consensus was that stuff comes down from high and then it gets translated into the curriculum. That people who direct courses have a great deal of latitude in terms of what they want to do. There are no explicit requirements so far. So people really have an opportunity to take an initiative in terms of the kinds of courses that they develop for their students. There was some discussion about, well, really kind of a consensus, that more guidance would actually be a bad thing because as it is now, people have latitude to develop what they want

to do and if we did have guidance in terms of doctrine or even a really good definition of peace keeping, stability support, reconstruction, etc., that that would limit and restrict what people were able to do.

Are there constraints? We spent a lot of time talking about constraints in many different ways. There's a lack of definition about what stability operations is; a lack of clarity about whose job it is to define it and a lack of clarity about who is supposed to do it. That's a constraint because in a way it limits what we're able to do if we don't have the language to really talk about it. There are requirements that come from the services and the regional combatant commanders and those things can conflict. So as you can see, we're not really in the sense talking about just curriculum. We're also talking about the military at large and its processes internal regarding stability operations.

There is also no DOD directive out there. Although it seems that there might be one soon that basically says that this stuff is as important as major combat operations. So nobody has really said, hey, you have to take this seriously yet. And the result of that of course is that there are not resources. There is not the manpower. It's kind of a sideline to what the military considers still to be its main business, of war fighting. There is some institutional denial that still exists in various places that the military does, in fact, conduct stability operations. Someone referred to this as the elephant in the living room. Something that we all know is there, but there are still people who don't want to acknowledge that it is actually really important and needs to be paid attention to.

In terms of what goes on in military institutions, there is the constraint of actually having to teach classes in other subjects that are mandated, so this is something that kind of gets pushed into the time remaining. Another organizational cultural issue in the military, this is basically not a function of the military. There was quite a nice quote, "We never dealt with stability because it was our job to create instability." There's also the question of resources. For example the job of the Marine Corps is officially fight and win the nation's wars. And you need to do that if you're doing war fighting or if you're doing stability operations. But where are the resources that are being dedicated to allow the military to fulfill this new function it seems to have acquired. That's restraining its ability to do this effectively.

There's also, in the military, there is a focus, another organizational cultural issue on achieving the objective. And when you are in a stability operations environment, it's going to be non-linear and a lot of times the

objective that you are meant to achieve is not going to be as clear as you might like it to be. And I told a funny anecdote which I'll tell you now. The Office of Naval Research, namely me, ran a series of focus groups with Marines from all levels of rank, coming back from Iraq for the Marine Corps War Fighting Lab. And one of those Marines in that group who was a young Captain, told me a story and he said, look if you want to get anything done in Iraq, it's going to take you five hours, fifty cups of tea, fifty dollars and five goats. And you just try to tell that to Gen Mattis, because that's not how Gen Mattis thinks about doing business in the world.

So America, the impatient people, we have some of our own cultural issues that affect our ability to do this type of operation. Someone said we are culturally impaired as a nation, having a bad case of attention deficit disorder. So that is a constraint because it affects, again, our ability to do stability operations which tend to have a very long life cycle. And if you are very impatient for things to get done quickly, to go in and get out as fast as possible, that can affect what we're doing.

Question Two: Scope

► What is the scope of SO?

- The SO doctrine needs to be defined, as it is too broad (alternative view: definitions don't matter since PME institutions teach students how to think)
- There is disagreement between and within services about scope: the Army views SO as security operations, where as CA views SO as anything necessary to create stability including economic development.
- What is the definition of 'war?' Does it include the execution of SO?
- Definitions are critical for defining roles. Narrow definitions can reduce military capabilities (eg, "civil protection" not part of mission in Afghanistan, thus there are no firefighters).
- What is stability? The education necessary for creating a stable environment vice creating a stable environment based on a market economy and democratic procedures.

So then we considered scope. The actual question is what the understood scope of stability operations and how is it integrated into other subjects?

We didn't consider the second part of that question, only the first part. The scope really is extremely broad, how stability operations is defined tends to vary across the board. But the fact that it's extremely broad is not necessarily a bad thing. And that is because basically definitions don't matter because professional military educational institutions teach students how to think. That's their job. They don't teach them doctrine. So you don't actually need doctrine, maybe. That was the alternative view. There's also disagreement within and between services about what the scope of stability operations involves. The Army views stability operations essentially as security operations. Whereas Civil Affairs within the Army views stability operations basically as anything that's necessary to create stability, which might include economic operations or even information operations. There's also a kind of ongoing questions about what is the definition of war. And does it actually include the execution of stability operations. And we don't have an answer. That was just a question.

Definitions are really critical for defining roles. And if you narrow the definition down, that's going to limit military capabilities so that, for example, civil protection might be excluded or was excluded from the mission in Afghanistan and therefore we don't have any firefighters in Afghanistan because it wasn't considered part of what we were meant to do. Then we also considered what is stability, because how you define stability is going to have an effect on how you educate people to create stability. And sometimes the education for doing that, for creating a stable environment is different from the education that you would need to create a stable environment based on a market economy and democratic processes. And that second one, it's much harder.

So question four, we skipped over question three entirely. What are the important proficiencies in subject areas? This actually to me was the most interesting part of the discussion. Essentially, stability operations should be learned at the same time as campaign planning. And phase four should be treated as a military operation. It should be treated like that within the curriculum because the military often operates with the assumption that Interagency assets are going to run phase four. But many US Government agencies really are not prepared to work under fire and as someone said, then the Army gets to turn the electricity on. So if stability operations are not considered part of the Army's official war fighting job, if phase four is excluded from the notion of war fighting, all these other competencies and capabilities are also going to be excluded. SAMS should be teaching phase

Question Four: Proficiency and Subject Areas

► What are the important proficiencies and subject areas?

- SO should be learned at the same time as campaign planning.
- Phase IV should be treated as a military operation. The military operates with the assumption that interagency assets will run Phase IV, but many USG agencies are not prepared to work under fire and “the Army gets to turn the electricity on.”
- SAMS needs to teach Phase IV planning.
- Certain skills (eg, private sector development) are lacking in the active duty and reserve components.
- Is the curriculum actually supporting SO operations?

Question Five: Best Practices

► What are some best practices?

- Effective SO requires diversity, specifically a team of people with different assumptions, priorities and political views (not just multinational partners, but local).
- Including foreign adversaries in educational processes and using examples of enemy success is a powerful learning tool.
- The US believes planning is the basis of coordination, but in the real world of relief organizations, there is no plan only a planning process.
- The function of education is to create informal networks and developing a common picture.
- Nurturing qualities (eg, tolerance for ambiguity) is more important than teaching facts and concepts.
- Non-military immersion experiences are beneficial. Other models include rigorous fieldtrips (“no more wine and cheese tours”).
- Regional studies courses provide great value.
- The focus on metrics (eg, how many projects have been completed) is counterproductive; the focus should be on long-term effect.


four planning. Very important. Also, certain skills even now are lacking in both the active duty military and in the reserve component, including such things as private sector development and perhaps those things ought to be incorporated into the stability operations curriculum. And then we had a really great question and we didn't really discuss it in tremendous detail. Is the curriculum actually supporting operations?

So diversity is very important. Stability operations requires diversities specifically a team of people with different assumptions, priorities and political views. So having multinational partners in your operation, in your curriculum, it's not really adequate. What you really want to do is get people who think outside the box and are really, really different from you. That can make a stronger operation. It can make a stronger institution and it can build a better team. This discussion actually was about a UN training process where they incorporate foreign adversaries into the educational process and use examples of enemy success as a learning tool for students in courses that they run on stability and peace keeping operations. But I thought it was really interesting in any case because you learn how other people think and how your adversaries work by being around them and working with them. So if you ever have the opportunity to include foreign adversaries in your educational curriculum, I think that would be a great idea. It's red teaming at its best.

The US tends to believe that planning is the basis of coordination, but in the real world of relief organizations, there is often no plan and there's only a planning process. And this planning process is in fact the most important thing because it is what creates informal networks and develops a common picture. That's also the function of education. Nurturing qualities such as tolerance for ambiguity is more important than teaching facts and concepts because you want to build people who are leaders, not just people who can recite things from rote memory. Non-military immersion experiences are extremely beneficial. Other models we discussed were rigorous field trips. Meaning no more wine and cheese tours. Regional studies courses have value and the focus on metrics is counter productive. It should be on long term effect.

Basically we say that planning is not the foundation for coordination in relief operations. It's information sharing. Because we never the benefit in the international arena of having a shared plan at the beginning of an operation. It's never worked up. Everybody has a plan, but unfortunately it doesn't necessarily result in THE plan. So the process is on relief, the

priorities for coordination information sharing task division, then planning. Planning then provides the bridge into reconstruction and development activities. The important point for us is that the foundation for all of this is training and education. And if you don't have training and education where you at least have the generation of mutual respect, and you have an understood vocabulary, if not a common vocabulary, then you can never effectively share information. And my argument would be, in this case, we failed at this in the case of Afghanistan. And as a result today, we're still struggling with that transition in the planning arena because we failed to establish the mutual respect, the dialog and the exchange of ideas during the relief operation.



The concept on the other side is that in relief you use local assets and national assets first, international civilian assets and then MCDA international military and civil defense assets. But the whole point of the slide from our perspective is that training and education is the foundation for this. And unless you have people of a diverse background in the same room prior to the operation and prior to the emergency, you are never going to build that foundation of understanding, nor the informal networks that are necessary to effectively operate in this environment.

PKSOI:

To add to your point though and as a military planner I agree with everything you say. I've seen on both on the civil side and on the military side those who succeed in the end state as a plan. The example of that is we have a disaster relief plan for Louisiana, but where is the process? It's the process that was broken, not the plan. So we weren't able to execute the plans, we didn't have a process. But then you start talking about the way to get at the process is to share and bring people on board, the ability of non-governmental organizations, international organizations and the Interagency to participate in planning with the military and the inability of sometimes the military to think past and invite them together, those are the sort of things we need to start pushing and start discussing. And that's hopefully why we're having something like this training and education conference to identify opportunities for us to bring these audiences together to train and educate together. We're talking education here so we can start at that piece and start getting people to understand the importance of the process. So I think it was a very good segue into what we're trying to do in this conference. But at the same time the reality side of it is being on that side as a military planner trying to reach out to non-governmental and international organizations and getting the no because of the cultural bias. So we need to find a way, hopefully through education that we can open up as opportunities and start doing that training and coordination in understanding how the processes work together, so that we are doing it before we head into a conflict zone rather than sitting in the middle of Kabul or Baghdad and try to sort it out to. Excellent point. That's what we're trying to get at here in the education pieces. How do we open up those opportunities?

Question Nine: Cultural Aspects

► What are some cultural aspects of SO?

- Cultural awareness tends to focus on social norms. Of more value is political culture: how is power organized, shared, and used in a given society?
- The US does not have a clear understanding of non-Western social systems, but focuses on formal political processes which are often irrelevant or broken in failed states.
- SO education should focus on how to identify and leverage traditional authority, which can be defined as the informal patronage networks based on status and honor (eg, sheiks).
 - How do you utilize traditional authority but at the same time move a country towards democratic government?
 - How do you get them to give you power without destroying a 6500 year old power structure?

Group C:

And I think we have one more slide and then I'll take questions. These are the cultural aspects of stability operations. This was a sort of consider it if you have time questions. We ended up spending a lot of time on this question because it's interesting. I'm just going to run through this cultural awareness as it's taught in most military institutions tends to focus on the social norms. Of more value something that should be taught is actually political culture, meaning how are societies organized? How is power organized? How is power shared? How is it transmitted and how is it used? And also how can it be destroyed and how can it be rebuilt in a given society. The US really lacks a clear understanding of how non-Western traditional societies are organized. We tend to focus on formal political systems and that actually has very little relevance in failed states where those things tend to be missing, broken or damaged. So we need a better framework for dealing with non-Western traditional society's social systems, how they're organized. Also stability operations education should focus on how to identify and leverage traditional authority. Essentially these are informal systems of power in most non-Western societies. Patronage networks are an example. This type of authority is based on status and honor within the society, not because of any official role. Sheiks are an example of a traditional authority figure.

And an understanding of how these types of processes work and how they are related to the political culture of the society would be of tremendous benefit because this is the kind of stuff people actually have to deal with when they deploy. Some of the questions about traditional authority that are important to think about are how do you use it? How do you utilize it? How do you leverage it in order to conduct your operations and compete what you want to do? But at the same time move a country towards a democratic government where traditional authority systems are probably going to be less important. So there are some issues about the prime directive. Do you go in and change somebody's culture? Is there something ethically wrong with that?

Comment:

One thing we spent a good deal of time also discussing in addition to common terminology was a common understanding of roles that had to be shared as part of the education process so that people really understood exactly what the other person saw their participation as representing.

Comment:

Drawing the distinction between peace and stability operations. When we're operating with an international mandate, US Military is not one of the belligerents but trying to get the belligerents to follow a path towards peace, we have a common objective with our IO and NGO partners. When we are in a stability operation, when we are operating unilaterally, and we do not have an international mandate, and our very presence has a belligerent, threatens the humanitarian space for the NGOs to operate in. No matter how well we construct processes and informal networks and all that, we're not going to be able to plan together with the IO and NGO community until a later phase in that activity. This is a barrier that we're not going to be able to overcome and we should recognize that and just understand that we're operating in two very different environments.

Comment:

One of the hardest things that I always had to explain to my boss was that NGOs are the absolute epitome of independent operators. So international mandate or not, NGOs have their own agenda. They have their own funding that is coming in from people with their agenda and that sort of thing. It always makes it bit dicey. It's not like you are moving a company to the line

of departure when you are trying to get Samaritan's purse to help out with hungry people.

PKSOI:

Before we get another group, we're going to have a break here shortly. What I'd just like to say is a couple of key things I heard out of all the reports, was content concurrence. There's some value added in wrestling with content concurrence and getting the experts from across the sectors to get their opinions in what we're teaching about them to ourselves to make sure that we got it right. So there is some value added, maybe—how do we set something like that on up? So that's something for discussion.

When we are doing counter drug missions, we used to provide 176 Reserve Intel analysts every six months to every alphabet letter organization in the federal agency that was doing counter drug missions in about fifty different cities. And we found out the problem was, you go in there for six month tours, it takes three months just to get the process and procedures under control, and common lexicon, so they were really only there for effective two months, because three months to get on board, two months of effectiveness, cause the last month they are looking at transitioning them back out of there. So what did we do? We then talked to the folks and we wound up having each one of the organizations build, or we built for them, we worked with them and we got their material and we built a CD for everyone of those alphabet organizations that what is it that you would want this guy to understand or gal to understand about your organization. And it was a CD we built and then we sent to the individual before he came on tour. And then we went back and assessed how effective it was. And because we had their participation in building the information about what they wanted to tell this individual about themselves, that person had about a two-week to three-week learning curve rather than a three-month learning curve. So there are smart things out there that we can do. These are the sort of things we ought to be talking about. What is it that you want us to know about you. And help us build that we can work with you in terms of building that sort of product that is something that can be put on the web and people can go and find out about it. And instructors can go, hey, we're going to talk about these organizations. Before we do, go to this portion on the web and here's a block of instruction that can walk you through at your self pace about this organization so you understand. And we start getting at their lexicon and their understanding. So that's something potentially that

we can do. Key point. Electives are not the way to mainstream a subject area. Very clear that electives aren't the way. It's got to be part of the main core curriculum or it's not. And if it's not, it's just an elective and it's not on the same level as what's important. So there's got to be something that says this is as important as everything else and make it part of the main stream.

Doctrine versus TTP — lots of confusion. Within our own military, I don't think we understand it. But I've always fallen back to something that someone taught me a long time ago which was doctrine is a set of principles on which you base action. TTP, then, are how you take those principles and apply them to a set of circumstances that incorporates the environment and the technology. An example is some principles of war, but then doing an air mobile operation. Air mobile operation is very dependent upon the technology of helicopters, but I would still follow the same principles but the TTP I would use to do an air mobile operation, attacking on foot versus attacking from a helicopter are going to be different. So there's a difference between tactics, techniques and procedures and doctrine. And we are so "loosey goosey" that we have confused ourselves as to what really is doctrine and what's really TTP. I think we get at a point of a concern instructors dealing with students who have more experience than they do. If the instructor is focused on the principles, then what he can do is capitalize on the experience and the TTPs the student brings, and provide him a means in which he can articulate what he did in terms of TTP, but how he drew that TTP based on an understanding of certain principles. Or how that TTP that didn't work; maybe the reason why it didn't work was it wasn't based on a set of principles which was guiding his actions. He was just following a set of TTP. So the fact that the instructor who doesn't have the experience that the student has should not be an issue if the instructor is grounded in the doctrine and is able to use the student's experience and draw from him the discussion of the applicability of those principles and how he applied those principles to come up with those TTP. So that get that instructor prep and I think there's some things we can talk about as a challenge.

And finally, the idea of training versus education. There's lots of confusion about what's training and what's education. We sometimes blur our terminology. With training we're teaching what to do in a specific environment; with education we're teaching how to think. Right now we're focused on education, not training.

Overall, a big constraint that has not been mentioned is the lack of capacity within the US government overall. The military has more capacity

than the rest of the US government – what can the military do to help other agencies that don't have the capacity. How can we help? It will be mutually beneficial if we share that capacity with other agencies. This is something we need to talk about.

Questions, Focus Area B:

“Preparation and Development of Educators /Instructors”

(Groups D, E and F)

DISCUSSION:

Are there special skills, understandings and qualifications useful in teaching stability operations? What specific expertise is needed on the part of instructors that teach stability operations courses?

How are instructors selected and assigned? Do you have any ability to identify and obtain key personnel? What is the expertise, educational background, and operational experience of your instructors in peace, stability, and reconstruction operations? What is the system for hiring and preparing instructors in these areas?

Does your institution have a network of experts and organizations so that you can tap into Subject Matter Experts and know what offices, individuals and departments are teaching and researching what?

How do the instructors maintain currency in their areas of expertise?

Do you have access to what are other nations/organizations that have been traditionally involved with peace operations and stability doing (i.e., the Nordic countries/Canada/India/the International Peace Academy/ UN/ ECOWAS)?

Group D

- **Discussion**

- **How are instructors assigned?**

- **Challenge: Limitations to getting instructors to teach these subjects**

- **Who is available?**

- **Assigned military**
 - **Civilian**
 - **Guest Lecturers/speakers**

Group D:

Our discussion was on faculty, on how do we best prepare educators and instructors to teach PKSO subjects. We had a long discussion and much of what you've already talked about was discussed in our group as well. Because you can't separate the curriculum from the faculty. And I think that was a key to our discussion. What is the audience that we're trying to teach? What are the subjects we're trying to teach? And so as you look at your faculties, what can you do? One of the key things about it, though, is how do you get your faculty? And one of the questions we had to discuss was, are there certain characteristics or qualifications useful in teaching stability operations? Of course there are. Experience is really useful in that. And should expertise be needed on part of part of instructors that teach stability operations? What specific expertise? I mean basically we came down on experience and ability to teach. So those things are pretty easy.

Second question not so easy. How are instructors selected and assigned? And that's where you get into the problems that we discussed and how do you prepare instructors. Because at least about, what is it 50% of most of the service schools, at least in the DOD atmosphere, are assigned. Guys like me, who may or may not know anything about stability operations and yet are going to be instructors, teachers in the different courses that we provide.

And the other part are civilian faculty who are on, not permanent contracts, but certainly relatively long term and stable employment, or there's not point in having them, to be honest. And then finally after that you have guest lecturers and speakers, who are available to you, where you can actually get your experience, get your actual experts in the field to come and talk to your students. But the problem with them of course is that they're not there everyday. They don't take the curriculum that we've tried to imbed throughout the course and understand it. And so you have those particular issues.

Group D

- **Recommendations**

- **Faculty Development**

- **Skills**

- **Ability to teach**
 - **Culture**
 - **Ethics**
 - **History**
 - **Critical thinking**
 - **Creative thinking**
 - **linguistics/religion**

- **Experience**

- **Some is valuable but experience needs to be transferable to other faculty**
 - **Faculty should leverage student experience**

So basically we came down on, it's nice to hire somebody with these skills, but it's not really practical in an education environment. So you have to go further to take the faculty you have and improve it. And get it to understand what you want it to teach. The first three groups had accomplished what they wanted and got the curriculum imbedded for peace keeping and stability operations into the curriculums of all the schools. Then the next thing is to get the faculty prepared to teach that curriculum. And it isn't going out and hiring new faculty or a lot us in this room would be out of work. We're not trying to get there.

We looked at skills and discussed for a great deal of time, you know, what skills, what experience, what this, what that, do you need to give to your faculty. And we came to the realization that in most of our education institutions it may not be skills in learning in the specific subjects of peace keeping and stability operations. That, in fact, other things that make you more able to understand the subject and better able to lead your seminars and do the education portion, can be a part of faculty development. And in fact the Army War College started a process this year which we made a hinge of our faculty development recommendation which was to impart to the faculty skills such as ability to teach appreciation of culture as a part of all societies, not just our society, not just our culture. Ethics, history, critical thinking, creative thinking as separate from critical thinking, and an appreciation for linguistics, religion, other pieces of culture that may go across countries and across cultures but are important to your ability to function in an area physically, geographically, and ideologically in which you are not normally operating. And the good news about this is, just as yesterday morning our first speaker said that if you do all of this stuff for stability operations, they'll have carry-over in the major combat operations. I didn't fully agree with him. But in this case if you get these skill set into your faculty and then through the faculty into the seminars and the students, you will in fact positively impact any operations that your students do, whether they are military operations or they are civilians who are in your military schools or anywhere else. These skills, if transferred to a student body audience and then used in an audience of a combatant command or an operation should in fact improve your ability to operate along the spectrum, the range of military operations or civilian operations.

Then experience. We talked about this at great length because it's valuable to the faculty to have some experience. But it's got to be transferable. You can't afford at our institutions to hire, as I said, everyone with peace keeping stability operations experience. So when you do hire it in, you have to make that specific person part of your faculty development in order to spread it across the breadth of the faculty that you do have. You can't have them just teach an elective. It's got to be a part of the core course and it's got to be a part of what goes through the entire operation of the school. And then we also as you've heard, everybody that's in a school understands that 50% of their military population is coming to them having at least considered that they've done this. They walk into the class. Been there, done that. What are you going to teach me, Colonel? Or what are you going to teach me civilian?

I've just come from OIF and I've just been doing this while you've been sitting on your can teaching other student stuff. And that's true. And it's a very valuable resource. And we discussed it at length on how to leverage that resource. And we think that the faculty development and the pieces that we've talked about there prepare a faculty member to properly use that experience within the seminar environment and at the same time, as you heard earlier in a different briefing, raise the level of both the faculty and the student. Because the student is going to come in primarily with a tactical point of view. Usually the highest level they come into the Command and Staff College and even the War College is not as a senior planner on a combatant command, but as a tactical operational kind of guy. And at least at the War Colleges and in the Command and Staff Colleges the goal is to raise the level of thought of the students in the educational process so they can leverage what they've learned to whatever they're going to go do next, which may or may not be stability operations, peace keeping operations. And may or may not be in an active theater, but might be on a higher staff in Stuttgart or Tampa or Honolulu, if they're lucky. And so the leveraging of the student experiences was important to us in trying to get through.

Group D

– Recommendations (cont'd)

- **Exportable POIs that have been centrally developed, researched and vetted**
- **Repository of instruction materials**
 - **Where?**
 - **How to characterize relationship with other institutions?**
 - » **NGOs and Think Tanks (e.g. Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping)**
 - » **Private Security Companies**
 - » **Intl' and regional peacekeeping training centers**
- **Collaborative Website**

Further, and this was also touched on by the other groups, is that there was some discussion earlier whether you need a doctorate. Education is all about the way to think, not what to think and therefore if you don't have what to think, you can still educate people to be successful anywhere. Now, in our group at least, we came down on the idea that we need some structure that's out there. Not an order to teach in a certain way, but something that is exportable POIs that have been centrally developed research and vetted that are quickly turned around and turned out to the field because faculty, civilian and military, may or may not be good enough to update themselves in a pull kind of manner. They might need something that's pushed out there that says, okay, smart guys have come up with this stuff. We provide it to you for incorporation into your curriculum as you see fit. And we give you sources and ideas that are going to help you do that. And we see a place for that. And we also see a corollary place, and maybe all put in the same place at the bottom is a repository of instructional materials where somebody said is the Army War College sharing their stuff? The answer is that the Army War College is sharing their stuff. But they are probably sharing it on a peer to peer basis, not on a across the spectrum basis. So in our final recommendation on this page anyway, we discussed the building of a collaborative website. Kind of along the lines of General Dunn's idea of communities of practice, but not email based, because it's a very difficult process to wade through and maintain, but a collaborative site that is accessible to the schools that an instructor who has developed a course of which he is mightily proud, can put the information and the materials and the syllabi out there and make it available to everybody. And then an instructor who is totally not proud, as I point to myself, can go out and cherry pick the ideas and the materials that are being developed by smart guys. We collaborate in the JLASS program and everybody's willing to do that. And we're looking for the same kind of site for that campaign planning exercise. So as that gets developed, we recommend that both of these things could be put in a collaborative environment. Although the difference between the two, once again, is that the repository of instructional materials and ideas is a pull system. I'm an instructor who needs good ideas beyond what has been put out there in the exportable POI or something that specifically hinges in my curriculum, I go to this place and I pull it out. I look for it at least, along with google and yahoo and everywhere else, I go. The exportable POI on the other hand is a push system which does not wait for the instructor to have to think about updating, but reminds him to when he's too busy or not smart enough, or whatever he is to update.

Group D

– Maintaining Currency

- **Temporary assignments**
- **Exchanges**
- **Courses**
- **Sabbaticals**
- **Research**

We were also asked to look at maintaining currency in this process. Once again, you see much of what you've heard before. Exchanges and temporary assignments, we think, are a great way to give faculty, if you have the breadth of faculty to allow some maneuver and give a guy the time to go do that, are great ways to do it. We did not come up with how to because, you know, the UN has specific rules for uniform guys that you have to work within and get that done. You have to do the memorandums of agreement to get the exchanges, but we concur with the earlier groups that say that these things are important and valuable ways for faculties with individuals to maintain currency. And then come back, and back to the first chart, spread it out to the whole faculty as a payback for that time. Now, we include in that, taking courses, going to conferences, etc. The real academics, not uniform guys, the real academics like sabbaticals. I don't know why, but, you know, it's needed. So we put that in there. And then one thing that military schools in general are not as hard over on because of what we do and what we produce is research. And we need to find ways to incentivize and encourage faculty members as well as students and everybody else to do more research and the focus it in the peace operations and stability operations arena. There are many ways to do that. You can come up with a prize. You can add it to the chairman's stuff there. You can incentivize that stuff for both your faculty and your students. And we think that that might help maintain currency for the faculty. Even if it's the students doing it, if you've got to read it, it's currency.

Question:

When you talking about faculty assignments, you were focusing at the senior service college?

Group D:

We had War College guys in our group, yeah.

Question:

Did you intentionally exclude education at the lower levels within DOD, or if you include it, could faculty assignments be handled differently?

Group D:

I think we were biased towards intermediate and senior level schools and we had a discussion because much of these operations—there was a discussion this morning that peace keeping and stability operations have to be brought through the entire spectrum of military training and education; from Private through General Officer. Well, it may or may not be true. In fact Privates who are trained to do certain things and do them when you tell them to, in the way you tell them to; it's good for them to understand the bigger picture. But it may be operational dependent. It may be chain of command delivered. It may be any other way you want to do it. It doesn't necessarily have to be a part of basic training, which is mandated by law what it includes in their 13, 16 weeks that they get. We were thinking more along guys who were going to work at staff levels that would have impacts on this. That may have been a flaw in our logic yesterday, so we did not discuss the entire range of military education. We did not leave out intermediate schools because we believe that those colleges at the Command and Staff College in Army, Marines, Air Staff College, we all believe those are educational institutions vice training institutions. And we did discuss briefly that really below that level the concentration is truly on training, not on education. Am I on track?

Someone in group:

You are on target.

Question:

I may have missed this, but the exportable POI — what drives the engine of that?

Group D:

That was one of the big questions we had. And here's how we got out early before everybody else. The august leader of this group said, "Well, we can come up with suggestions without solutions." Because, you know, the answer is somebody has to be tapped to do that. And we had a long discussion. Should it be PKSOI? Well, is it a part of the joint professional military education system? In which case PKSOI is truly an Army organization and may not be able to push the exportable POI. Should it be JFCOM that does it? We had a JFCOM representative and he said it should be JFCOM. And there's no question about it. We actually assigned it to JFCOM. The issue is it took a lot of discussion because while we think it's important and that the right organization to do it is in fact a good question. And we discussed during that period whether PKSOI needed to be chartered by somebody besides the chief of staff of the Army, if they were going to take it on. Whether JFCOM should come up with the ability to do that. J-7 tasks them to do this. It was really a discussion point, but not one that we could solve. And yet we still think it's important enough to put the bullet up.

Question:

It seems to me that it's more a question of resource capability than it is of authorities or appropriateness. As long as someone does it, then the results essentially are the same. A volunteer could step up and do it, couldn't they?

Group D:

Well, I agree with you as far as the product is concerned. But the product needs to have some authority or viability when it is pushed out. As saying, there's a book, "A Quest for a Viable Peace;" the authors of that book are doing a great job of providing that book to different organizations as a test ground. But they're out selling their book which has a lot of good information in it, but what we're talking about is an organization that has the ability to say not only am I pushing this out here, but you should look at it before you abandon it. And figure out how to use what you can out of it.

Question:

I think that JFCOM is not the proper organization to do it. I'm not JFCOM. Actually Joint Forces Staff College is. But also each one of the intermediate and senior level colleges is responsible for JP and execution of Joint Professional education. So in that case there is nothing to say the PKSOI can't put something together, coordinate with the senior and intermediate level colleges and if they all agree that, yeah, this is the way we need to go, publish a POI. We encourage you to do that. Or you go work with JFSC or NDU and see something can come together. We do that all the time. I mean that occurs all the time. And there's nothing else going to restrict that.

Group D:

But the context we looked at it in was coming up with a common POI so that we weren't all teaching different things, so that everyone had a central instructional start point to go from. And that's where you get into the authorities, because the authorities believe in resourcing. I mean I would love, John will kill me, but I would love for PKSOI to stand up and say okay, this is our thing, or the Armed Forces Staff College to stand up and say this is our thing, but to maintain it, keep it relevant, goes back to the authorities which [unclear]. When we started getting into that, we said, okay, let's stop. Let's move it back. So the concept is this should be developed and then we'll try to figure how we get there.

Comment:

But I think you have the authority. This right here is the SAE list, Special Areas of Emphasis list, that the Director of Joint Staff put out, sent to the services and said, include stability operations. And here it is right here. March 2005. So there's your authority, but it doesn't say how because the title 10 responsibility for training and education rests with the service chiefs. So if the Army says that this is a very important thing, I have the authority right here, and they want to apply resources to it and work with the other services to put something together, the authority is there.

Comment:

That's precisely the problem. The authority rests in everybody's court.

Comment:

That's the problem right there. We came to the conclusion was that he developed a POI, I'm developing a POI, he's developing a POI. We've got seven or eight different institutions doing it. Probably have some pretty good ideas, but we could use some help on reinforcing those ideas.

Comment:

I think when you hear our group; we basically talked about that issue. There's a way. There's a lot more collaboration that should be occurring with all of the schools. You should not be going out there and doing anything in necessarily a vacuum. There's a lot we have within the joint community, a military education coordinating council, where we do get together and we do ensure that that ideas are shared. But that's just one venue. You can duplicate that for this particular area and share that information. Bring in all the instructors that do stability operations. Bring them all together and all the curriculum developers from all the schools and come up with something.

Comment:

The problem is that somebody has got to do it. We can't say everybody has got the job.

Comment:

I'd like to just voice a caution on a notion of a common POI. Common POI suggests that there's a common institution and in that common institution there is a common student. And they are all going to get the M-1, A-1 stability ops POI. Common subjects that we all ought to agree on basic definitions and whatever, that's fine. But each institution is different, and the students at the institutions are different.

Group D:

We discussed that at great length. And that's why we wanted to actually put it up there. I said it's not directive. But what it does, once again, it's the matter of who can do it, can be everybody. Who can do it can be a guy outside the system. Who will do it is the question. And then it's purpose is, really, our question was faculty. Its purpose is to allow faculty development to have the resources it needs in a pull environment, collaborative website, which we fully agree needs to be developed in this subject and many others. But a push that gives them information so that within the context of their

structure, whether it's Marine Corps Command & Staff, or War College or Army Command & Staff or Army War College or Air Staff or whatever, they have resources in there that are, because of the venue it comes from, and this is why we are pushing on this, because of the authority it comes from, you will pay attention to the push. And even though it's not directive, you will look at it. If it's a pull, I've got to have time to go out to the collaborative website. I've got to be developing the course. It may be an elective. So we understand the danger.

Comment:

A vehicle that you ought to think about if PKSOI or Joint Forces Staff College or whatever is the blackboard program, which is excellent, and it's available on the web to anyone, anywhere, and you know, as long have a password. So there could be a piece and stability operations academic area on the blackboard. You get the password and then you go into it and anybody who is a member can post things. And you can post your, well we post everything now. Readings. We post syllabus. We post training aids, counterpoint programs.

Comment:

That's for your students.

Comment:

Right it's for my students, but, you can sort of develop a separate module for this. I'm in one in Georgetown. I'm in one at the National War College. And so this is a doable thing. There's already a commercial product out there that if everybody wanted to post their stuff ... you know.

Group D:

There are several commercial products to my understanding, none of them are free, but there are several commercial products that will facilitate being able to do this. And that's exactly right. That's why we wanted a collaborative website.

Comment:

I don't mean to put you on the spot over there, but doesn't ITEA do something similar for Interagency?

Comment:

Yes. We use the Blackboard system as our password protected user site. But our public site that everyone can go to, but if we have anything that's sensitive or, because we try to, as I said, be a clearing house for so many different agencies across the spectrum, we like to protect their information within it. We're looking at who's requesting a password and that's how they access that material.

Group D:

But you pay for it and use the end user.

Comment:

We are on the MBU system. Above that I'm not sure what the relationship is or the cost.

Comment:

Could I just also say one more thing and Montgomery brought this up yesterday, talking about a project that she ran. The difference between experience, very important, interesting, gives you creditability versus experiential knowledge. Everyone who's been on an operation or has even visited an operation, has the sense of what stability ops are all about. But the systematic learning about people's experience is something that's just really beginning. And I salute all efforts that go in that direction. And we need to encourage, particularly over the next few years while people's personal experiences are ripe, surveys and focus group kinds of activities where we get the stuff and ask questions in a scientific way and start to come up. I'm the strangest person in the world to come up with a notion like this. Except I participated during the end of the Clinton Administration in the study of Military Culture. We surveyed 12,000 people in the armed forces; we had focus groups with over 800 people. And at the end of it, although at that time I had never been to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sinai, or whatever, our little group of folks became the experts in what was going on in the armed forces at that time. And we had data that folks were coming after. And we were the kings of K Street for a week or two. But in any case, that sort of thing really needs to be done in a systematic fashion so that all of this great knowledge is not lost. And every guy who comes home and has had a significant experience. Every GI Joe or Jane who comes back and who is not scientifically sort of debriefed, that stuff is being lost.

Question:

Is there anyone here from the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

CALL Rep:

Yes.

Question:

Are you doing anything of the type that he is talking about?

CALL Rep:

On a selective basis, we're conducting post deployment interviews. But it depends on, we're not catching everybody that comes through — every level of command. It's very selective because of limited resources on our part. We do have what we call "embeds" in theater. Who are positioned to gather from the deployed units. Plus we deploy specifically focused collection teams for periods of time in the theater, in any theater, but in the theater of operations to collect against specific issues that have been identified by us or for us. And that information is done, password protected and put on our website.

Question:

I mean I actually call you to be a great resource. But now you're classified, right? It's not open.

Comment:

It's password protected. We do have a classified website, but we've got a nipernet website. Some information on that nipernet website is public access, and some is restricted access.

Comment:

At USIP we have stood up a lessons learned unit on the civilian side and it's small, it's embryonic but we've done 113 interviews with civilians. We're just completing about 100 civilians who served in PRTs in Afghanistan. And those interviews are all accessible on our website or collected interviews. Those that agree to have their interviews put up. And we are trying to link with various institutions. But it's a difficult process. And so this is the first time that we've ever tried to document the experiences of civilians in the United States government. It's hard for us to figure out how to make that resource available.

PKSOI:

The other part of it is you do the interview and then you have to be able to test the data that's coming out of there. It's one thing to do an interview. The other one to systematically do a study of and correlate the data, the validity of as well. I've seen some of the interviews both military and civilian side. And, you know, I question some of the statements being made by the folks that are being putting out there as fact and getting quoted. Hmmmm, that's an interesting perspective. A little different than when I saw it. So that is a challenge to do that. And I think when you talk about systematic surveys; I'm sure particular activities were real scientific.

Question:

Who did that, Army Research Institute? Somebody put together that survey.

Comment:

It was put together by GEN Walt Umber and a social scientist by the name of Owen Jacobs. So it was a specific instrument designed for specific study. That's way beyond me. I mean I couldn't do anything like that with any sort of validity, but there are people who can.

PKSOI:

If we look at what USAID is doing and USAID has a lot of folks coming back. But they also have a ton of contractors. Folks that we work with who are doing great work who would do some real good bang up things in there. And we're losing those experiences.

Comment:

Well, we're relying on AID and others to help try to identify the people for us.

Group D:

But the other thing is, if there was a collaborative web space it would give you a place to put you links that would, hopefully, send your information more into the area where faculty, if they could, if they wanted to, could look at.

Comment:

One of the other initiatives that we've undertaken that gets into this lessons learned to lessons applied, is something I might have mentioned earlier. But the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, a community of practice which hopefully will be replicated in other areas relevant to peace and stability ops. But the way it will work is that as issues arise in the field and there's a need to respond, the experience pool of practitioners in the network will contribute their thoughts. Let me use a specific example. One of the communities will be stability police units. And the recognized authority for that activity is the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. So they would serve as the moderator. They would assemble a consolidated response and reply to the field. That's to serve the practitioner community. But if you're talking about creating a network among educators, that's an aspect I had not thought of linking. This network of real world practitioners confronting problems in the field and letting at least the educational community benefit from that exchange and being aware of the cutting edge issues that are arising. So that's something we need to think about is how to integrate the one effort with what you are talking about creating here to maintain currency.

Comment:

Just to add in, on the slide on repositories, we added the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. And I don't know if everyone knows about that organization. It's a collection of NGOs and Think Tanks that deal with issues related to peace keeping and stability ops. They have a website, effectivepeacekeeping.org, which is the beginning of a really strong repository of what's been written by organizations like USIP, RAND, CSIS, Stimson and they have both non-governmental, governmental, international organization documents there as well. So I think that's something that it can start to link up these types of information.

Comment:

Add to that, they also follow congressional action on these issues in a very timely way, which is something I think we ultimately all have to pay attention to.

Comment:

And they have monthly roundtables that anyone is invited to. They have great presentations. So it's a real good mixture of the types of Think Tank organizations, but also the humanitarian providers like CARE. So you really get a mixture of different types of perspectives.

Group E, First Question:

Educational Challenges

Question #1: How to achieve a common baseline knowledge**Recommendations:**

- Define common baseline
- Assign responsible agent to develop the baseline and ensure quality control
- Continuous process/group interaction to determine best practices; Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTP); products for education
- Push & pull Lessons learned, electronic libraries
- Copy civilian executive education model (combine part-time resident with distance education)
- Collaboration communities/websites to support education effort
- Mechanisms to ensure quality of content

Group E:

Two years ago, the Chief of Staff of the Army let a contract to the Combined Arms Center for the development of a collaborative system of networks called the BCKS, Battle Command Knowledge System. And basically it's everything that I've heard people talking about now. The first year it was let's get ready to get organized. We're teamed with an IT organization. We've got all the network people and all the people that make data bases and hook databases together. Our side, a Cubic side, we hire the content managers. And you've seen some of that. Before data gets put in these individual databases, it's bedded by a content manager who is an expert in that field. We've got a leaders' network. We've established one at the Sergeants Major Academy. And I really am at a loss to know, but there are about eight different networks. I will provide anybody in here with a little

flyer. I don't have them with me now, but we've got a slick little tri-fold there that tells you just about everything you need to know for the battle command knowledge system. It'll probably go for another three or four years for sure under contract. We're in the second year of the first option year. And I believe it's a four year contract.

We started off in our group with a dynamite facilitator. First of all we looked around the group and we were decidedly DOD heavy. There was no doubt about that. And that kind of pushed us off of track on our initial go here, and then we had to restart. The first thing we did, we took a ballot. We had two pieces of paper, one with educational challenges on it, and the other with a list of about six or seven questions. We took a secret written ballot on the back of a piece of paper and the educational challenges won, by a majority vote. On the other side of that paper, the group took a vote on who was going to be the stuck key to be up here. And by a majority of one, I guess I won. It's the only thing I've won on an elected office since I've been aboard. The first thing we did, we did some big muscle movements. We now know we're on the sheet for educational challenges. So we divided up into four chunks. We realized that how are we going to achieve a common baseline on what you ought to be teaching these peacekeepers. That was number one. We also agreed that the timing of when you teach certain things and how you teach it, that's very critical. Because you can't wait until you're ready. You're on alert to go someplace to start training peacekeeping operations. So the timing of the educational experience was very important. The next thing was how are we going to do this? Are we going to hang it on the web and let everybody go out and get it on their own? Or are we going to do lectures, seminars, exercises, practicums and probably a combination is the first thing you come up with that would be a good idea. But we figured we'd better go ahead and kick that around. And then the hard one was, how do you know that what you've put together when you get the system rolling, how do you know that it's actually doing the job? How can you tell? And what are the measures of merit or how do you know that your educational experience is really working? And I've been checked out on this thing here.

We talked about the common baseline. And what we're talking about here, I heard some comments about a common curriculum. There needs to be a base that every peacekeeper needs. And we came to the conclusion; a lot of us who had been there, that, yeah, the Private may not need to know everything that the commander of the multinational force knows, but he

probably needs to know a little bit more than the Bradley driver that was in the Fulda Gap. He's got to have a little feel for what's going on there. So we figured that we need some sort of common educational baseline. Now once you've come to that, I heard my buddy back here, Bob Coon, talk about, okay, we know what we need. Who's going to step up to the plate and say I got the ball. I got the mission. So we need to define that. And we did not come to a conclusion on who that ought to be. But we did come to the conclusion that there was a definite need for that. This is not a one time shot. If I had stability ops when I was in the advance course, I don't need it any more. It's like you were inoculated for smallpox and you're good to go. It is a continuous upgrade and you need to make sure that the upgrade embodies what's going on in theater now. And sending people that are going to be on the platform to places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo is probably a good idea.

We talked a lot about tactics, techniques and procedures. We, too, talked about a pull system or push system. Marv Decker over here works in CALL. And there are two types of things: I can go to the CALL website, log on and go and get data. If I'm a little bit savvy, I won't get 22,000 hits. I'll be able to narrow it down and pull what I need when I need it. Marv is also pushing things out to commanders. The important things. For example when we went into Bosnia, one of the things we had to do was clear the zone of separation. Find out what a ZOS is. I didn't know what a ZOS was. So he came back and said, Sir, there's nothing written on that. The closest thing we could find to anything that even resembled what they wanted us to do in Dayton, was the green line in Cypress. There's now a CALL publication that talks about drawing a line in the mud. And it captured our experiences and now somebody else if they've got to go in and set it up, is on a separation, they've got something. But at that point, it wasn't there.

We figured that the civilian education model has been around for a long time. We shouldn't go out and try to reinvent the wheel. But let me just say about how we started off. We started off with a DOD heavy—you got a General up here and you've got a Private down there. Now what are we going to teach all of those levels. We didn't think anything about anybody else. The Red Cross, the State Department, it was strictly military. We got about a half an hour into that, feeling pretty good about it. And then we said, hey, wait a minute, this whole peacekeeping apparatus here is a lot bigger than just a bunch of trigger pullers. We then talked a little bit about collaboration communities and I think everybody here has mentioned that,

the ability to capture data from every quadrant coming back to maintain a current curriculum. The only thing we came to, though, is, for example, companycommander.com. That's great. But who's vetting that data that make sure that that company commander that's putting that on the web really knows what he's talking about. So you need to have sort of filter, faucet, content manager or something like that. But collaboration, there is the definite need for that.

We also talked about every level of training. There is the upper level, the senior guys. There's the brigade commander level, the 06 level, the MIL-1 War College graduate. And I will tell you from my point of view having gone in with Task Force Eagle, that's where the rubber met the road right there. If that was a success, you had success in that sector. But the company commander's got to have savvy. The senior non-commissioned officer's got to have a certain amount of cultural savvy. What's going on? What the overall mission is? And that little strategic corporeal or whatever you want to call him has got to know a little bit more than the average type bear that was in the Fulda Gap. So he's got to have a feel for what the overall organization is trying to do.

We talked about periodic venues for vetting and networking. That has to be a systematic process and there needs to be a system that once you get this curriculum developed with all these multiple agencies or institutions that have the capability to develop them, there has to be a system that will allow it to be updated and captures the newest data coming back from the field,

We talked a little bit about SMEs. Subject Matter Experts. There was a lot of those out there. And when you are in the bottom feeding contractor world, you hire those type people. You're hiring people that have expertise that are coming back from theater afar. And normally in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, some Colonels. But that's how you keep your organization fresh. You also do it by sending embeds like Marv talks about. Sending soldiers that are stationed, let's say at Ft. Leavenworth, and they go do 179 days in one of the theaters overseas.

The next one is provide adequate resources for this additional education. We came to the conclusion that this is going to be a zero sum game. We've all got a little bit of background working in the government. That you're probably not going to get a whole ration of extra money to go ahead and develop these different hours for peacekeeping instruction. So then you have to say, okay, what's going to go when you are doing this. So it's probably a zero sum game. We don't see a big bag of dollars coming with

this. Hopefully, I'll be wrong on that because we came to the conclusion that it's definitely needed. But something's probably going to have to come out of the rucksack. But I will tell you, when you get ready to go on one of these deployments, the US government is going to give you every new piece of kit in the world. And you've got to have time to go ahead and force modernize. That's something additional. Every person that is going to send you down range, there's not a commander alive that's not going to have you qualify with your individual weapon. If you are a member of an armored vehicle crew, you're going to qualify with that, too. So those are givens. But all of this is going to be resource intensive. But we didn't see a whole lot of money coming with it.

The next one talks about, let's take a look at what we've got. Let's not reinvent the wheel here. There are some pretty good, and I have attended several seminars that have to do with peacekeeping particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo. But we're pretty much on the mark. So there's a lot of educational curricula out there that's already developed. And let's go ahead and do a search before we reinvent the wheel.

We have to educate a core, maybe educate is a hard word, but we've got to familiarize a core of interagency professionals. I've done five consequence management exercise—three for USAREUR and two for EUCOM. The last one was SACEUR, is flag officers. And we did not have a State Department rep there, and I don't know why because it was a conspicuous lack because we really needed them. If you're going to talk about foreign consequence management, the lead federal agency for that is the State Department. So we've got to somehow marry at the hip and get them, the interagency folks thinking a little bit more the way we think. And we need to certainly know how they thing. And I'll talk a little bit more about that in a few minutes.

We need to let people know what's out there so there needs to be an advertisement campaign to let people know what's going on, so everybody is familiar for these curricula are being developed. We thought that perhaps a net team, new equipment training team. That we'd educate a team that will be able to go out and train the trainers. So we could expand the training base and not just have x-dozen people and that kind of propagates across the fleet. I've seen it on two other charts, an exchange program to get out there. And when heard about the West Point, getting folks out there like the Cadet program. It's outstanding. And we have to do that. Because what I know about the State Department and USAID, you probably could put in a small thimble. OK.

Educational Challenges

Question #2: Timing of educational opportunities

Recommendations:

- Tailored depending on when specific tasks/skills are required
- At each increasing level of responsibility
- Refresher education immediately prior to actual employment/deployment
- Prior to assumption of “new” functional/skill area

Discussion:

- Duration of educational opportunities must be determined after both common baseline and specific/focused area content are identified

The second one is, we talked a little bit about timing of the educational responsibilities. We have a tendency, at least in the military – you don’t just alert, then train, then deploy. You have a basic training program, then you alert, then you focus the training, and then you deploy. When do you have certain types of education, how is it taught, etc? So there’s a timing issue there. It’s got to be across every level from the Private on up. It’s probably going to reside a little bit from mid level managers to CGSC (Command and General Staff College – mid level planners) level folks on up. That’s where you can really get in trouble, but we figure that whatever the POI is, it has to be able to be stretched over the entire spectrum of rank and responsibility.

A refresher packet: now-a-days that’s particularly germane because you get youngsters that are coming back. They touch down here in States from Afghanistan and 10 months later they are on their way back to Iraq. So they need to be re-spun up or re-tooled before they go back for their second or third deployment. And then if you just look at the discussion here. Common base line—already talked about that.

Educational Challenges

Question #3: Selecting/balancing effective delivery methods

Recommendations:

- Establish Professional IA Education (PIAE) system
 - Increase other agency participation in DOD schools as interim measure
 - Create quick response education capability (e.g. traveling team)
- Incorporate all delivery methods (lectures, dialogue, experiential learning, etc.) appropriately throughout the education program
- At each level complete education within own organization prior to initiating inter-organization education
- Conduct planning exercises
 - With other agency participation
 - Role play by actual assignees
- Robust IA liaison officer education
- Reinstitute Defense Fellows program with Congress

Now we said, “Okay, we got a common base line.” We never did come up with who was going to be the guy in the bullpen that we went to do that, but we know we need that. And now, how are we going to actually propagate this education? We thought it was an, and I had never heard of a PIA&E. It’s an interagency education system where we could educate not only green suit peacekeepers but we could get our interagency brethren to know the same thing that we did. And we’d know a little more about them. Because it’s a daunting feeling when you go in the theater and there are so many agencies to work with. There were 130 NGOs and PVOs in Bosnia and I couldn’t even spell it when I first went in there. But there are a very, very valuable asset; they get a lot of mileage. They’re good people trying to do right. But how they operate, where they are, whatever, what they do is not well known. Maybe get Interagency participation in existing DOD schools. I know when I came to the War College a hundred years ago, we had a couple of CIA folks in here, a couple of State Department folks. But in all the other schools that I’ve attended there hasn’t been that flavor for anything other than green suits or DOD, I should say.

I’ve already talked about all delivery methods. The bullet down there — planning exercises. You now only have to plan things. We used to go

through and we do all these planning drills or whatever. We are an execution based force now. Used to put a piece of tape down and that was a mine field. Now you got to get the mines. Take them out of the box, arm them, bury them, whatever. So these planning exercises. We've got to structure these planning exercises and they have to be a combination of both green suit, and our Interagency brethren. You see the liaison there? We get a big fat F on the Army side of DOD when we talk about liaison. We don't take it very, very seriously. Normally, it's a first or second Lieutenant, the newest guy there, go over there. You are our liaison officer. European Armies send former Battalion commanders as liaison officers because they think at the level of their commander. And we've got to have a better liaison with the Interagency so we know what's going on and for the lead IA guy or gal and the lead peacekeeper if the green suit all know the same thing. And Lorelei talked about the Defense Fellows program. I don't know a lot about that, but it seemed like it was a good idea to re-institute that.

Comment:

It still exists, by the way. It's just been drastically cut back.

Group E:

Why don't you give us 2 seconds on what it is anyway. A lot of people in here probably never heard of it.

Response:

Defense Fellows, younger officers usually, were detailed to congress. And then they find an office to house them for a year. And something that probably a lot officers don't realize is that certainly in the '90s these people had these tremendous sort of liberal artsy international perspective. And they could provide all kinds of information on staff about exactly what we're doing for world and the changing roles admissions of the US Military from their own perspective. Having worked in congressional offices for so long, that's who people go to for information. They go to the cubicle next to them. They don't call Carnegie Endowment or go to the PKSOI website. And so a lot of these new more progressive issues inside the military, that nobody know about them, in a critical mass. You know what I mean. In a general way. So then they don't become priorities. I really feel like that's what happened to PKI. They almost got closed. I'm just to tell a little story about how out of it sometimes members are even ones that have really salient concerns is

Todd Platts, the member from this district. I ran over to his office when I found out about the realignment task force for PKI that it was going to be shut down. And I caught him going into his office. And he was about to go visit his reserve troops in Bosnia. So it was a perfect moment to say did you realize that the only place that is capturing this institutional memory is going to disappear. And that woke him up. And I think that it's just these little tiny things of people talking to each other that are very missing on these types of issues. And again, it's not the armed services staff. They are great. And it's not necessarily even the foreign relations staff. It's sort of everybody else, which makes this not a priority. And that's a huge challenge, but the Defense Fellows from one of these repositories of knowledge that you could go to. Another example is like the Air Force officer I remember who was a new liaison officer in the Rayburn Building. Every time I took some people in there to talk to him, all they wanted to talk about were tactical fighters. And this guy had been the liaison at the United Nations. He had this huge, wonderful background that was so relevant. And for some reason those questions never get asked. And I'm thinking, what are ways to get inside the initiation loop of a place like congress? And the Defense Fellows is one way to do that. Of course I know there's lots and lots of professional restrictions on policy advocacy, but being there and offering your expert advice that's very pragmatic and solid. It's not policy advocacy. And I think that's a huge mental block the military needs to get over.

Question:

Why was the program shut down? And how could it be restarted?

Answer:

It hasn't been shut down. It's been severely reduced. It still exists. But I know that's also been a problem in the other agencies. And the gossip on this, and people here probably know more than I do, is that Secretary Rumsfeld got very angry when the Crusader (artillery system) caused such a rumpus on Capital Hill because they wanted to get rid of it. And there was a lot of behind the scenes action to somehow stop that from happening. And I think that got to this tall issue of there're too many loose cannons. And we need to shut them down. So, and correct me if I'm wrong, but that it was one of the—I mean, they took the fall on that. And I'm somebody who is always looking at the big picture aspects of congress, and it hurts us tremendously to not have those people there just offering consistent low level advice. So

that's that story. But I think you would get members who would just fall over themselves to get a military officer working with them.

Educational Challenges

Question #4: Methods to track the effectiveness of education

Recommendations:

- Feedback from graduates and reach-back mechanisms
- Accreditation process/requirements at appropriate levels/units
- Execute capstone exercises to measure results
- Results of peer & 360 degree evaluation mechanisms
- Measure increase in IA collaborative personnel activities (e.g. number of IA liaison officers, number of exercises, number of role players in exercises that are/will be actually in portrayed role, etc.)

Discussion:

- Common popular belief that more defense spending buys more security makes it difficult to get funding for non-DOD programs

Group E:

I thank you for that. I said early on the hard part here was how do you know when you've developed this baseline and you've got all your ducks in a row and you've taught the curriculum. And how do you know you've got a successful product, or your educational effort has been successful. We kind of had a discussion on the Army mode. There's a new trend that started back before we went into Bosnia. It's called certification. You don't get on an airplane and go to Bosnia or Kosovo or anyplace unless you've been through some sort of capstone exercise that has been supported by observer controllers, OCs for short. You normally have a senior observer who's a retired four star military. And you've got more than likely the combatant command who's going to say like Nero, thumbs up or thumbs down, or not quite good enough, or whatever. Mainly this is for the leadership. But this type of system here where there's some sort of certification exercise or whatever to make sure that you've gotten through to the individual peacekeepers. One of the low level items that we had because of the tremendous number of mines in Bosnia was everybody had to pass a mine recognition test. And

you had to get above 80%. And it had everybody from 2-star Generals on down to the youngest Private doing that. But we accredited the low number of people who really got hurt by mines for that education. And that's what I mean by the capstone exercise there. To make sure that the people have hoisted in the individual items relative to peacekeeping that you wanted them to. The brief back when you come back from theater, I was debriefed. I came back to Ft. Leavenworth after seven and a half months. I talked to the people in the combat studies institute. And I also had an interview from the Center of Army Lessons Learned, wanting to know, was the peacekeeping Mountain Eagle series of exercises that we gave you and your colleagues, did that hit the mark? And really it got fairly high grades.

The fourth one down there, you might not know about the 360 degree leadership assessment program. That involves your superiors, your subordinates and your peers. A lot of information is exchanged there. A lot of close knit coaching. So along with the close knit coaching you can find out how well the educational program is. We just figured that was another medium if you will to be able to use. And you can measure the number of hits on the collaborative nature on these individual networks and see if people are really cooperating.

Focus Area B: Preparation and Development of Educators/Instructors

Discussion items:

- Special skills, understanding and qualifications are required for teaching stability operations. Exact expertise needed depends upon common baseline and specific/focused area content.
- Select and obtain SMEs via networking
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 - with UN, international organizations,, senior level schools and other education institutions, other agencies such as DOS, service doctrine divisions, etc.

And the last one here. We felt that in order to have creditability as a faculty member, that you did have to have some experience. We see this all the time at places. I grew up in the Viet Nam era. If you were teaching

at Ft. Benning and you didn't have a combat patch on your right shoulder, students didn't want to talk to you. Pretty much now, I think it's probably up around 60-70% of the Majors; I mean you look out there at the class and everybody's got a right shoulder patch from one of the conflicts we've been in for the last few years. But we did feel that in order to train the individual he needed rather intricate peacekeeping skills to include negotiation. I never knew what BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement) was until a guy from the War College parachuted in and told us when you're arguing with the Serbs or Croats or whatever, you've got to go in with a position that if he gets you in a half nelson and you can't get out, what's the back up mode there. But things like that that you normally come up as a green suit trigger puller, you'd never hear of. We've got to go ahead and grow a field full of peacekeeping subject matter experts. I mean we've got hundreds of them now that are coming back from these multiple conflicts. We've got to cap that, bottle it and identify who they are. So we know that when you need something, I know to go to Ft. Carson to get the expert on negotiation. Or I know to go to Ft. Stewart to get someone who knows more about factions than anybody else. So there needs to be some sort of system to be able to do that.

And we talked a little bit about the UN but that's about it. And as you can see here from the lines and the bullets on the slide, even independently, in A, B, C, D, & E, a lot of the same things were batted around. Collaboration is a big one; the use of subject matter experts; use of a common baseline curriculum. So that's what our group came up with and I'll try to answer your questions if I can or get one of our group to go ahead and do it.

Comment:

I might add in that I like some of your recommendations because it's precisely what we're doing. At the Naval Post Graduate school a year ago we created a new teaching institute. It's called the Center for Stabilization, Reconstructions Studies. It's the one place in the federal government where the executive branch is spending money to do combined education of all of the communities from the peach officers, stability ops, or what ever we want to call it now, environment. And it's a little bit different that inviting the relief community to participate in DOD events, or DOD education. Rather than that, which that's really structured for DOD's benefit, our mandate, our purpose is to design education and deliver education that's relevant to all of the communities. To everyone, not just DOD. We're learning how to do

that. We're trying to learn how to do that because it's new. We've had great collaborations from the other communities of actors that are involved on the ground around the world. And so we're hopeful that we can live up to some of the recommendations that your group and the previous groups also.

Group E:

Just a little personal anecdote; I told it to the group. Before we went to Bosnia in December '95, we started about two months out. We had the folks from GEN Clark's group come over from Dayton. And we're down, about 30 of us, up in the ark on the floor going across the boundary line to make sure we could live with it. We had classes from the people who wrote the framework for peace. We then had a two-day, fourteen hours a day seminar, where we learned a little bit about the cultural things for each one of the factions. We had a Canadian battalion commander in there that had been UNFORFOR for a year. It was a very, very intensive two day seminar period followed by anywhere from 14 to 18 days of 24/7 training to include everything to manipulating rules of engagement to fire coordination exercise. All part of it. And then we came up to about somewhere around the 12th of December and the peace treaty hasn't been signed yet, so we said, okay, let's do it again. And that didn't make me feel too good then. But when I got off the C130 in Sereavo, and a day later I'm dealing with a most obstreperous serve you ever saw in your life. The fellow that prepared me as the speaking Servo-Croat when I was in Grafenvier, Germany, prepared me well to deal with that person. And I really felt like I swung the heavy bat and now I'm swinging the light bat. So I think most of the people from Major on up would probably echo that same sentiment that it was the first one out of the chute, if you will, peacekeeping operation. But we felt we were pretty well prepared going in. Other questions?

Question:

Quick question to the presentation but also to the group, was there any mention in any of these discussions of the international association for peacekeeping training centers, IAPTC? And is PKSOI the only member of that association of any of the training centers in the US is a question. And then was there any discussion of some of the models and best practices of other peacekeeping training centers. Over the past two years as part of our research, we've been traveling to about eight or ten of them around the world. There are some good models. SACOPAC in Santiago, Chile, is an

excellent model of how to use information technology to really get these materials out to their students, current and past students, and actually get it out to them in the field. So I would recommend looking at what some of the models are that other peacekeeping training centers are doing around the world.

Comment:

We do go to IAPTC. It's a good place for the part there about networking particularly. Networking for international subject matter expertise, networking for other organizations. So if you want to go try to see what's out there, what they're doing. That's a lot of place where we pick up some of our international subject matter experts. Unfortunately, in my view, the organization is not quite as effective as it could be. If it actually sort of stepped up to kind of what the promise is, it would be good. But it's obviously funded resource.

PKSOI:

Pearson Peace Training Center in Canada are the guys who are steering it. And the Pearson folks are struggling with the focus of that organization in the IAPTC. And in conjunctions with the challenges, but there's another project out there that in Sweden. What we're trying to get is a happy medium the IAPTC which has more of a tactical focus on training vice a focus on education. Challenges is talking about collaboration in training and education. What they are trying to do is maybe draw a line between the two organizations and have the IAPTC take a look at the tactical operational level training first, education next, because that's what they are more comfortable with right now. And have Challenges Project look at operational education. And trying to split that between [unclear] trying to get that steered. Trying to get that division put in place. And as Rich said, I agree they have not lived up to their potential, but it is worthy to keep working with them. And the context you make with the other organizations, the other folks playing in there, I think are excellent. So that you can get views of what's out there. So, yeah, we are working with them. I don't know if it was discussed in the group and if the folks were aware of it, so we can give folks information about the IAPTC. It's an organization and an effort that's still growing and developing.

Comment:

It's also one of the things that is interesting it has a lot of CIVPOL component that is growing in it. So that's another case, if you're interested in the development of the civilian police sector, it's useful. Because there're a lot of those other training institutions are starting to come to that.

Group F, Question 1:

Question

- How do we better prepare and develop military educators to provide stability operations instruction at the senior, intermediate, and entry levels?

Group F:

I have the enviable position of coming after everyone and I do remember what John said at the beginning about not repeating and I will try not to do so. I want to start off by saying, in a slightly different way than the last group, that I for one definitely appreciate the diversity of perspective that existed within our group. And we did discuss the preparation and development of educators. And we focused almost exclusively on educating the educators. I would say training the trainers except the difference from the DOD's perspective has been explained to me in a way much along the lines that John described, but perhaps more vividly. So we started off trying to figure out what we were going to talk about and what we weren't going to talk about. And once we got beyond that and figured it out, things went very smoothly. I did not actually have a big part in the leadership of how smoothly things went. I just volunteered to be up here to get a different view of the room. So we started off saying, "Well maybe we should be answering this question, how do we better prepare and develop military educators to provide stability operations at the senior, intermediate and entry level." We diverged from that to a certain extent in that like Group D, in a way we were biased towards focusing on the senior and intermediate level and for

other reasons that have been mentioned. We focused in the end on senior and intermediate levels. But we also ended up discussing not just military educators but educators from the Interagency and from outside the US government.

Context

- Can't make every Soldier/Marine a Stability Operations expert
 - Time is a constraint
 - SME availability is a constraint
- Different education required at different levels
- larger than just the US military -- Stability Operations is inherently Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational

This slide is pretty much just explaining some of the challenges that we reviewed before launching into a discussion of recommendations. A lot of this has been discussed. I remember Group A even started at the very beginning talking about different education required at different levels, so I won't go into that too much. It's true we can't all of our service men and women be experts in stability operations. And when you are talking about schools, you are talking about a varying level of time. Allison comes from a program in which they have degrees in peacekeeping operations stability operations. And some of these classes have one week. Some classes have one three hour session. So definitely when you are talking about educating educators, it's a question of to what degree are they actually engaging their students on these questions.

We declared victory over all those challenges and moved on to a discussion of recommendations or some possible solutions. And these are they. Some of these have come up in discussions throughout and in both of the first three groups and the last two presentations. Once again I will just reiterate that we were focusing on the educators. So when we're talking about exchanges, we're talking about exchanges of educators and similarly in terms of symposia and who the repository is for.

Solutions

- Faculty Diversity
- Symposium
- Exchanges
- Collateral Repository

Faculty Diversity

- More Interagency Hires
- Hiring Practices

On the issue of faculty diversity, everyone who's working in this field when it comes to educating on stability operations, seems to recognize the tremendous value of having people from outside your organization there teaching. And that's true whether you are teaching in a private university and you've got people from the military side coming in and teaching courses as well and it's true at the Army War College. The question is if PKSOI has been benefiting from one USAID professor or instructor, why not two? If there have been two State Department people at a certain college, why not three? I mean, what is stopping further Interagency involvement? Is it prestige of the position? How a person moves up within the ranks of their own organization? If so, and we really want to change it then there's a way to do that. We start attacking that problem. We have to identify the problem and attack it accordingly. State Department Foreign Service Officers can do Y tours. And they can come over to NDU and other places and perhaps engage at a more expanded level. It's not to say that we're not doing this, but we could be doing it more.

Symposium

–Teachers Conference

–Pre-Conference Working Group

We basically saw that, you know, we've talked about different groups in lots of different fields in the field of education. There are teachers' conferences. And this is a burgeoning field with relation to stability operations, reconstruction, peacekeeping, peace operations. And why not actually set up a standing teachers' conference? Perhaps that exists among the various branches that have their own schools, but it does not exist between all of the various educators within the field. We have plenty of conferences where we bring together a lot of the folks here in this room. A lot of people here know each other. And a lot of people in the field know each other. But what we were talking about is getting people who actually teach together in a standing symposium that meets perhaps once or twice a year. And it could be led by a university that does this. Whether it's GMU or Tufts or it could also be led by NDU or others within the government. This is one recommendation, one thing that I think would definitely help educators to help themselves. And it would basically just convene all the stakeholders. And in order to do that, the next step is really to actually have a pre-conference working group of educators. Get them together. Have them find out who's missing. Have them find out when they want to have the first session. Who's going to host it. Where's the funding going to come from. And let's do this.

On the issue of exchanges, it's come up quite a bit. Back in Group B even, Ross and Ike and Linda discussed internships for pre-commission and ROTC service men and women. And Group C talked about non-military emersion. And they were talking about it from the position of the folks who are actually being educated to go out and do these things. And what we were approaching was the educators. It is useful for them to go out to the field to have interactions with NGOs and the UN. And similarly they should actually be encouraged to go out to the State Department and USAID. One concrete recommendation that our group felt should come out of this workshop is

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 - with UN, international organizations,, senior level schools and other education institutions, other agencies such as DOS, service doctrine divisions, etc.

that this workshop should actually call upon USAID and State Department to prepare some sort of educational opportunity for the various professors and instructors in this field from the DOD side. And have them come over on mass and have them work through a module. This can be done. I think there would be a very receptive audience. It's just a question of asking for it and getting it together. It's also important to have students resident at schools. Another opportunity would be for sabbatical opportunities to make these sort of more of a possibility for educators and also we talked about field fellowships. It's possible the NGOs would take on an educator. Not just somebody who's actually being trained, but one of the people doing the training and the educating in this field to come on for several months, share their experience and learn from that perspective. It's definitely worth looking into.

We discussed the model that exists at Tufts University; The Feinstein Famine Center brings in people from the humanitarian community, from government and non-government, who have been out in the field for quite some time, need some time to actually reflect upon their experiences. And Tufts brings them in. They do some writing and they help with instructors and teach some courses. There's no reason why the military schools cannot set up a similarly prestigious system whereby we bring in folks from the outside. Give them an opportunity to work with the expertise that exists within our various institutions and also contribute to the teaching. And so urge the larger group to look into that.

Collateral Repository

- Case Studies
- Syllabi
- Web-based portal w/Staff
- Databases/analysis tools
- Simulations/Gaming

Repository of information — this has been mentioned a lot so I won't go too much into it. Basically just to keep momentum and the clearing house. And the key that I want to emphasize, in addition to everything else that has been discussed on this topic, is that this just requires some resources and some staff. Where it is, is not as important as the fact that you have two people who are working on this. And it's not just about being filters and content monitors, but it's really going out and actually continuing to perpetuate this type of clearing house. I think there have been solid recommendations for this already. And if there's anything that I missed, I would appreciate it if my group would chime in.

PKSOI:

Some thought out there from what I just heard some people talk about. And, again, are some things that people talk about are useful tools. The NDU and the ITEA of a blackboard sort of idea. Effectiveness of government organizations. PCKS. Push/pull sort of collaboration. There are a lot of ideas out there and challenges. And hopefully we can pull some of those together and that will be some of the discussion. That will be some of the discussion that we will get at in your groups today about more details about resourcing and do we get at it and development in collaborative opportunities. There seems to be some confusion as to whether is a focus on the military versus a holistic focus. The idea was that we want it to be a holistic focus but in this first step we had a predominantly military showing. It isn't that we didn't reach out to academic IOs and NGOs, just that the timing and Katrina and

others limited the pull that we could pull from in this initial conference. Plus at the same time there is a perception along the board as what are you trying to do. Are you trying to do this just so DOD can benefit. So our thought is that this is a first step in a process that we'd like to continue and we would like this to be something that is inclusive of all organizations. We are holding for examination as the start point a lot of what we are doing within DOD. And we're looking at criticism of what we're doing, and/or constructive critique of what we're doing in DOD. When I talk as that as the start point, but we do want to focus in on how we make this all inclusive for all the organizations. Because as I said, it would be of not use for you to come here if the only thing you are seeing is that you're giving and not getting. And the idea is that we want to make sure that we are helping to identify ways that we can collectively learn from one another's experiences. So while we may be using the military school systems as a first point of departure, it is not strictly a DOD focus that we're after. We are truly after across the entire spectrum. And we are looking at DOD as well as one way of doing that right now. But we'd like to look at other schools as well.

You talked about Tufts and the Famstein — both of them were invited but could not make it because the academic school year started. So we are looking at a more inclusive group to bring here to have this discussion. And that's part of what we'll talk about at the critique point is what did you think you were going to get out of this conference? I'd ask you then to look at what you did get. And maybe if you didn't get you thought. Why? And that's part of the critique. If you in fact think that this idea of continuing these conferences are of value, to help us shape it in a way that it is more palatable and more focused on what you are looking to get out of the conference. I mean this is our first shot at it. And it is something we wrestled with. And we wrestle with multiple things. The other thing is the level — what level we focus at. Look, we can't solve the world's issues. And we don't want to be handling, I don't think, from Private to General. So where's the focus. And I think the fellow who said, you know the liaison office is a big piece of this, and militaries in Europe saying that guys who form battalions think like their commander. So as we're talking here, I think we want to stay at a level where we're talking at the higher level. We're talking the intermediate level schooling on up, which is the Majors and above to the military. We're talking the middle managers to the executive level. The GS12 to the SES for government civilians. That's the level we're talking and that's probably the level we want to focus at. Because that's a level that we need to influence

significantly. There are a lot of smarter guys. The Captains and the Majors, they're pretty good and the lower level folks who are pretty good at training the Privates and can do a good job at that. But we're here talking at the policy level and the operational level. That's where we want to focus our energy. So just to give you some thoughts. I mean that's what we want to get at. So if we can get some clarification out there.

DOD schools, as a departure point, because that was predominantly who we had here, and at the same time you don't want to put other organizations on the spot and say hey, we're going to introspectively look at your organization and critique it. We're a lot more comfortable getting ourselves looked at introspectively and critiqued than other organizations are right now. And we have a higher level right now of participation. But we want to get past that and get looking at it holistically. So I just wanted to cover those points with you. So again, what level we're looking at. Those are levels to cross all boundaries. Yeah, we're looking at some of the military pieces, organizations. But, again, that's also one of my comments that said, you know, I haven't heard as much about the lack of US Government capacity because we can fix the military and give us lots of good screw drivers. But we're only part of the solution. And we aren't the whole solution. And we need to stop looking at the military as the solution. It's got to be a holistic approach that has success. And we need to be talking about it in a holistic fashion. Who else needs to be taught? Who else needs to be educated? By whom? In what areas? How can we share the information in an effective way so we have a holistic approach to what we're doing, rather than there's a military approach. I don't think there's a military approach to stability operations. I don't think there's a military strategy. I think those are misnomers. I think those are terms that get us in trouble. I think there's a US Government and international approach. I think there's a US government to exit strategy and an international exit strategy. And I think I'm a member of the US government. That's the focus I want to get at in this conference. And I think that what we've done so far has been pretty good stuff.

Chapter 4

Collaborative Tool Demonstration

PKSOI:

Now what I would like to talk about is a collaboration tool. We are aware of a tool called WebEx. It's another tool that's out there. All I'm looking for is ideas on how you use technology. What can we do to use technology to get synergy with what we are trying to do. We don't have the money to keep on coming to conferences. We don't have the time to keep on coming to conferences. So what are some techniques that we can use so we can collaborate more effectively and we can assure that we're not covering the same ground. This is a system that does not require a huge investment and it's a system that can be shared across all organizations. The challenge is where does it sit? It sits on a DOD server, but we can send this thing out and anybody who is in DOD can use it and set up a collaborative meeting with different organizations anywhere from any organization and have on your desktop VTC discussion of a particular topic area. And the only reason I put this out here is that as we look at what recommendations can come out of today's sessions and those we're going to make tomorrow, there may be a desire to get a community of practice together, or a planning team together to continue moving the ball forward on select recommendations. And this is a means to potentially do that. Also, we would like to explore ideas like "Blackboard" and others that are out there so that we can really get some synergy to use technology and start making advances rather than have a three day conference and end the conference with some great recommendations that nobody's going to do anything with. I'd like to use a system to combine with other means so we can start to move the recommendations forward and start getting some folks working together.

Let's look at the construct of a POI. You're right; no one has taken the lead on it. DOD 3000 may be a means in which that may be directed, but until that point, if we have a community of practice, I think it's a good idea to maybe through this technology, through one of the group leads, we can start to work in developing what does a standard POI look like. What are the good points of it? What are the bad points of it? What are some good databases that we can continue to develop? We said we are going to push out these educational materials on a CD ROM and resources that people have identified. Well, maybe we can have a group that gets together and talks on

a quarterly basis. “Hey, here are some different things we evaluating. Here are some things that are making sense.” So it could be a push/pull system, or a means to generate that push/pull that everybody has talked about, and push it forward until somebody is given the formal authorities on it. But as you said, there’s a lot of stuff that can be done right now without the formal authorities. I agree. There’s a point in time when you are going to need those formal authorities, but until then, this is just a technique that I saw to continue pushing forward and to keep you thinking about it. When you are in your work groups today talking about how do we resource? How do we get synergy? How do we maintain the energy? Keep these in mind today. Mike Esper will walk us through the details of this software.



Continuing Work Group Collaboration



- Education conference is projected to be a an annual event
- But do not want to waste effort by covering old ground
- Continued work group collaboration is desirable
- As necessary, workgroups can continue to meet online when convened by the workgroup leaders

Mike:

Hopefully nothing will go wrong. We’ve got a lot of technology working right now, to include a wireless mouse and a wireless keyboard. I’m Mike Esper; I’m a doctrine analyst. I’ve been with the Institute for over five years; four on active duty and one as a civilian. And you can see my information there if you want to ask me questions. I won’t profess to be an expert on this system because it’s fairly new to our organization but I have figured out a lot of the things that we have to do in order to make it work.



Why Online Meetings?

- Participants are geographically dispersed
- Can attend a meeting at your desk on your PC
- Allow users to be more efficient/save time in sharing knowledge
- Collaboration: Boost productivity by collaborating with colleagues in real-time.
- Save TDY \$\$

The boss already talked a little bit about why can use online meetings. Of course you've got people all over the world. When we can have a meeting instead of bringing everybody together and spending all the travel money we do, we can have a meeting right there on your computer. Now you wouldn't want to have a large conference like this one, obviously. It takes up a lot of time, etc. Also, you can see that they've shown in some studies that collaboration with colleagues in real time which is what this is, it's a real time system, synchronous is another term that people may use. Also is to boost productivity because of it.



What is WebEx?



WebEx the Next Generation Collaboration System
(NGCS) pilot software.




Online Meetings/Web Conferencing – (secure/encrypted)

- Real-time, interactive communications
 - Audio - Voice over IP (VOIP)/Video – microphone/web cam required
- Text Chat
- Share Presentations/ Documents – flip slides – annotate on slides
- Whiteboard
- Share Web Browser
- Application Sharing
- Simple Online Polls – instant results
- Record meetings/playback
- Invite via e-mail
 - Can invite people outside of DoD
 - CAC card required to set up, but not to participate
- Completely browser based – 1 MB browser plug-in
(Meeting Manager) needs to be installed


What is WebEx? It's actually a pilot software that's on a DOD system, at DISA. And it does all these things and I'll demonstrate most of them to you. But I do want to bring up the point. Right now as it exists on the DISA system, only people with a CAC card, a military ID card with a little chip in it, can actually set up a meeting. However, they can invite anybody. For example, I originally set this up on my computer down at my desk with my CAC card. I said I want to invite Mike Esper at hotmail.com and we are running through a DSL line right into that computer on my hotmail account. No CAC card required up here to get in; just one to set it up. And that's the beauty of this system. For example, if one of you wanted to call a meeting on the education workgroup you had been in, you could easily call PKSOI because we all have the CAC cards and we could set a meeting up, invite the people, and then turn over the host responsibilities to you.




Share Video



Presenter



Single-point
Up to 15 frames/sec




Multi-point
Participants

I do want to show you some of the advantages of this. Right now you see you can share video. There are other means that you can actually come in and do more than one at a time. Actually, this signal is going all the way out to California and back and it's fairly good in terms of response time, we've found. And the other one's down there that I've got in will pop up in a minute. You can see COL Brown down there on his computer. Hopefully, he won't do anything wrong while we've got him on the video. I turned his sound off, too, by the way. Anyway, but what we have found, however, and in this view actually it's kind of nice because you can change any time you want and go to the different view like that. However, I'm going to keep it in this single point demonstration.

Once again what we found also in this single point is that it is better to just have the person that's speaking show up on the video. It makes it easier to understand things.

- Similar to Instant Messenger
- Chat with all participants
- Hold private chats with individual attendees



There is a “chat” feature in this and while we were sitting here COL Brown and I were holding a chat trying to get the machines to work right. We had a little bit of problem with the cameras. It’s just like Instant Messenger, if some of you have used the MSM Messenger. You can chat with all the participants or you can have a private conversation offline, if you will, with somebody else in the group. So that even though the presenter may be speaking on one thing, you want to talk to a third party, you can hold this chat feature and nobody else knows what you are talking about.

You can share presentations online. And in fact this presentation was opened on my computer downstairs and then I transferred the host responsibilities up here. The host manages the meeting. However, there is another role called presenter where you can have people present their own documents. One of the nice things about this also is there’s a file transfer capability so that if I bring up a document, I can easily put it under file transfer and then the participants in the meeting can download that document.



Share Presentations Online



The screenshot shows a WebEx Meeting Manager window titled "esperm's meeting". The main presentation area displays a slide with the PKSOI logo and two images: one of a group of people in a field and another of a soldier in a military uniform. A "File Transfer" window is open in the foreground, showing a list of files for transfer:

File name	Location	Size	Status
WebEx Demo.ppt		444416	Not Saved
PollResults.txt		497	Not Saved

The right sidebar contains a "Participants" list with "MICHAEL ESPER (Host)" listed. Below it is a "Chat" window and a "Video" window showing a video feed of Michael Esper.

PKSOI:



One of the things there is if you are doing a collaborative piece on a briefing or on a paper and you can all sit there, do the final editing of the brief or the paper and then do file transfer and everybody has the updated copy of it.

Mike:

For example, I just opened another document and you can see that was a move plan we had into our new spaces. I could then share this document with everybody, allow them to make edits to it and then get a final document at the very end. So that's all fairly simple to do.



Whiteboard



Draw on blank whiteboard

- or - Annotate on any conference document or shared application


Also there's a whiteboard capability in this. And I'll bring that up right now and you can see that you can draw a very quickly pictures that everybody can see, or you can---I'm not a very good artist as you can probably tell. And JB's down there with the purple pointer. Now, you can see that.

Alright, one other thing you can do and I'm sure I'm going to get some flack on this one. You can share images. This is last week's game with a touchdown pass against Michigan. You can also do that with any of the shared applications or any presentation that you happen to bring up with the whiteboard. There's also the ability in this that you can type text rather than try to write it out with that pointer. If you've ever tried to write with a mouse you know how hard that is.


You can share your desktop. I'm not sure I'd recommend this necessarily to you, because all of a sudden other people can control your computer and if you have network connections you probably don't want to allow them to do that. However, one thing we thought about was the boss is always calling us when he's TDY about how he needs files. Well we could go into his computer, share the desktop and he could pull those files right up off of his computer, rather than trying to talk that over the phone.



Displays what you see on your desktop to all others
– Can give control to others and take back control



1.




2.

3.



4.



- Allow participants to see your application on their screen.
- Can allow a participant to control your application, (e.g. PowerPoint/ Word) – Allow others to make their own edits & updates
- Host takes back control at anytime

You can also share applications. For example one I've got up here comes up with a window. And it will show you the applications that you have open or you can go to a new application. For example if there was a DVD of something that you wanted to play, you could very easy go into your windows media player, play that DVD and then talk about it or whatever in the rest of that meeting.



Share Web Browser





File Edit Share View Communicate Participant Meeting

- Presentation or Document... Ctrl+Alt+O
- Application... Ctrl+Alt+A
- Desktop... Ctrl+Alt+D
- Whiteboard Ctrl+Alt+N
- Web Content...
- Web Browser**
- Remote Computer...
- My Meeting Manager

Browse the web and share the web pages that you are viewing with other attendees



You can also share your web browser so if you are talking about a website, you can come in and do that right away. For example, here's a nice little video; there's a Notre Dame touchdown and about to come up with another one. So, anyway, you can see there that you can share all these kinds of things on the video. I won't go to the next play because I think it's a bad one. And you can hear the sounds coming through as well on that. And I better shut it off or we'll have a problem.



Polling



Time elapsed: 0:14 Time limit: 5:00

Poll Questions:

1. Do you like this presentation?

☒ a. Yes
☐ b. No

2. Do you like WebEx?

☒ a. Yes
☐ b. No
☐ c. Not sure

3. My Favorite flavors of ice cream are:

☒ a. Vanilla
☐ b. Chocolate
☐ c. Strawberry
☐ d. rocky road

Your answer will not be anonymous

Polls on the fly to participants

Poll Questions:

Questions	Results	Bar Graph
1. Do you like this presentation?		
a. Yes	1/1(100%)	<div></div>
b. No	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
No Answer	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
2. Do you like WebEx?		
a. Yes	1/1(100%)	<div></div>
b. No	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
c. Not sure	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
No Answer	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
3. My Favorite flavors of ice cre...		
a. Vanilla	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
b. Chocolate	1/1(100%)	<div></div>
c. Strawberry	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
d. rocky road	0/1(0%)	<div></div>
No Answer	0/1(0%)	<div></div>

Polling status:
1 of 1 attendees has responded
Remaining time: 3:44 Time limit: 5:00

Share with attendees:
☒ Poll results

Instant results - Share Poll with participants

Also there's a polling capability on this which is kind of interesting in that you can prepare a poll and at the end of the meeting, or even during the meeting, bring up this poll. People can then respond over a time period and then you get the results of the poll. One of the interesting features of the poll is then that you can either choose or choose not to share the poll with the other participants depending on what the outcome is if it doesn't suit your needs. I'm not sure who thought that one up, but it could come in handy. For example, I put a little poll in here already—multiple choice. It took me about a minute to do; not hard to do at all. "What do you think of WebEx? Greatest thing since sliced bread? It's okay but I'm a 20th Century man trapped in the 21st Century? It sucks pond scum?" "What did you think of this briefing: Mike Esper should get a raise right now. (I vote for that one.) It was okay, but I don't see how it applies." And finally, "Fire this clown now." And then we get all the results of that in and you could use that however you saw fit.



Record/Playback Meetings




Record button



WebEx Player on desktop



Open saved meeting



- Plays back meeting
- Records all mouse movements/pen strokes
- Records all voice

Lastly, on the features of this, you can actually record and play back the entire meeting. Now, I'm not sure I'd recommend that to you because these are very large files. However, what you could do is record maybe the last ten minutes of the meeting which would be the conclusions and the wrap up and then you would be able to play that back and also send it to the other participants so they can play it back. But you could use that to get your transcripts, your recommendations, and then put them into a written document.

It can be a band width hog depending on how many of these features you're using. We did find that if you're doing just a flipping slides and then using the telephone itself for a voice conference, it does work over 56K modem which is what most people have on their computers. You can also just do audio if you want on your 56K modem. However, when you start to get into the other things such as sharing presentations, sharing applications, combining audio, etc, the web cam, you do need either a DSL line, cable modem or networks with a T1 lines that a lot of people have.



WebEx Bandwidth Analysis



- WebEx services create network traffic only when there is activity like slides changing, desktop sharing, video, etc. Otherwise, if there is no activity in the meeting (viewing a slide) then very little traffic is generated
- **Just flipping slides** – voice is though telephone conference
 - ❖ Presentation Share (after import) Avg. (kbps): 6.5, Max. (kbps): 7.5
 - ❖ Recommended bandwidth: 56k modem or higher.
- **Audio**
 - ❖ Full Duplex (2 people speaking) – Avg. 35, Max. (kbps) :42
 - ❖ Recommended bandwidth: 56k modem or higher.
- **Presenter desktop shared with PowerPoint presentation.**
 - ❖ Desktop Share - Avg. (kbps): 43.4 Max. (kbps): 618
 - ❖ Recommended bandwidth – DSL, cable modem or higher.
- **Audio combined with Presentation share or Desktop share**
 - ❖ Recommended bandwidth - DSL, cable modem or higher
- **Web Cam**
 - ❖ Avg. (kbps): 172 Max. (kbps): 298
 - ❖ Recommended bandwidth – DSL, cable modem or higher



What does it cost?



- Microphone
- Speakers or Headset
- Camera
- As inexpensive as \$50

What does it cost to you? Well, actually it would cost you a microphone, speakers or a headset, and if you wanted to participate through the video cam, you have to have one of those. And I've gone on the web just recently, looked at the prices and you can get all that for around \$50. You can get more expensive ones which we have. We bought a little bit more expensive ones to do this. Also a lot of the new web cams can fit right in your laptop. You can load the software and participate in these.

One other point I do want to make and I'm sorry I forgot it at the very beginning is that it is primarily browser based. The first time that you do come in there is a browser plug in that goes into your Windows Explorer that's called Meeting Manager. It needs to be installed. We're able to do it here and it doesn't violate the firewall or the putting on of new applications. However, if you can't get that loaded, you may have to talk to your network administrator in order to do that.

Question:

I one of those people, too, who are trapped in the 20th Century. What I'm wondering is, can you give me this presentation so I can give it to our IT guys?

Mike:

Yes, I can. I can put it on a CD for you if you'd like. If there are a lot of people that want this, I'll also include it on the CD that's going to come out probably next week sometime. Be mailed out next week with all the presentations on.

Question:

How is this WebEx different from the similar product that's being shopped by JFCOM that does web meetings?

Mike:

It's here and JFCOM's not. This is a pilot software on the Defense Information Support Agency. In that sense it's free. In that we don't have any costs. If you go on it, you don't have any costs. I'm not sure about the JFCOM product whether you have to have licenses to use that. There are other systems out there. This one has the feature of being free to it that we like this best.

PKSOI:

I do know that some of the JFCOM software that they are pursuing, you still need a camera and you still need microphone. Nothing in here in any way precludes you from using that software, and we're not trying to put a proprietary software out there. But what we are trying to tell you is that this is a software that the only cost eventually a camera and a microphone. And we can use it very easily. And there's no other cost to you and the microphone and camera you can use for other net meetings and other things as well. So, again, that's the only reason to push it. It's a technique that's out there that seemed very powerful and it doesn't cost you anything. People can use it for this kind of collaborations. It seems to be something that's talked about. So all we're trying to say is here is a method out there. And we're looking for some thoughts on how we could use that to have collaborative meetings with a small group of folks on a specific topic and move the ball forward so we don't have to be sitting in the same building, but we could continue to still work the ideas.

Mike:

One disadvantage, if you will, of this specific system is as we said real time. There are other collaboration work space systems out there that will allow you to post documents, leave them on there for periods of time; people can edit them, etc. This is really for an online meeting type of collaboration.

PKSOI:

I don't think anybody would accuse us of being digital natives; we're all kind of digital immigrants. We're all trying to figure out how to use technology. Show this to our kids and they go, oh, this is easy. And they'd be all over it. Again, it's a shot at how can we use technology. And folks know of other technology that's better or technology you can add to, again that's the other part of this. And that's an idea about how to use technology. So those who are more 21st Century people you can help us move along. But we thought we'd just through this out there as a technique that has some potential value that we could use.

Comment:

Thank you for sharing this. Not being exposed to IWS, workspace and e-rooms and other collaborative tools, you did put your finger on one real limitation, which is capturing that information so that if you want to go

back. And it seems to me that if we were to use this we would still need something else, like e-rooms or even something as simple as Yahoo Groups if we're going to operate entirely on unclassified environment to store shared documents.

Mike:

One of the things we are looking at and we're going through an approval process is for the product called Groove, which is an asynchronous or non-real time collaboration work space. Although I do believe Groove also some online capability as well. So we are working on that side of it.

Comment:

Just speaking from the State Department perspective, one bit issue is just the accreditation. I know some of those softwares have already been approved. Others haven't, and by the time you approve these and get these things through the accreditation sometimes, they're obsolete. And that is one difference in working with some of the latest gadgetry. It really combines multimedia in this fashion. It's wonderful to see, thought, I have to say.

Mike:

At least on the DOD side I can tell you that these products that I've mentioned, WebEx and Groove, have both gone through DISA or the computer folks out there, their procedures, they are also of or have completed the Army NETCOM approval as well. But we do have some capabilities here at the Institute with doing some pilot work on some of these things.

Question:

You mentioned that this was beta. But isn't it the same WebEx that's been out there, it's just beta to DISA?

Mike:

What it is, it's a pilot software on the DISA network, but it is actually a commercial product.

Comment:

And used heavily in the commercial world.

Mike:

In the commercial world. And I can tell you on the DISA site for this right now there's probably 50 meetings scheduled on it today. And anytime you go and look and you can see all the meetings that are ongoing. You can see there's anywhere from 30-50 meetings I've counted on any given day. One of the things I also failed to mention was, is that you also have the capability once you're in it, you all say, oh, I forgot GEN Cherry there in this meeting. You can actually invite him right then while you are in the middle of the meeting and have him come on. So there's that capability as well to bring into it.

Question:

Just a small technical question. When you have a number of people on the line, is it like a conference call where people can speak whenever they need to or do they have to ask permission?

Mike:

No. Let me show you here. I obviously didn't go into all the features on this. You can see these little microphones here. Well, there's a way that you can't see on this one, but the other folks that are in this conference, we're actually the MCR host right now. The other folks can raise their hand. In other words, I want to speak. And then what the host does or the meeting manager does, is goes to that and passes them the mike so that they actually have the microphone. And then you can go back and forth. Only two people can talk at a time on this. That's, I think, one of the beauty of this -- it's not like being in a real meeting. And frankly that's why we said it's important to maybe only keep one person or two up there on the cameras. Anyway, yes, it does have the capability for more than one person but only two can talk at the same time.

Chapter 5

PKSOI:

Mr. Lynch, the Political Advisor for the Chief of Staff of the Army joined us yesterday and he was not fully introduced to everybody. He's been with us all of yesterday and all of today. He'll be departing; he has to go back to some meetings this afternoon. I would just ask him to give us some thoughts he might have from his perspective as Political Advisor on the proceedings here.

Mr. Lynch:

This is pre-lunch water torture so I'm going to count the seconds.

I'm here as a "foreigner" or outsider and one with the odd background of having spent a couple of years in stability operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

I liked the phrase used this morning: "teachable moment." I think we may well have arrived at such a point in the U.S. Government. There is in Washington a general sense of disappointment that we have not managed to achieve more in our efforts to get the U.S. Government organized for success in conducting stability ops. What you heard from Secretary Harvey last night suggests that the efforts continue in earnest, that S/CRS is still at work, and that we are trying in Washington to move this forward. What I've seen here is the stability ops community at work on a parallel track trying to do what it can to generate some capacity and stay in touch. Certainly this is welcome.

"Teachable moment." Some of your target audience is senior policy makers who are by extension educators: generals and political leaders. When you had an Army Chief of Staff affirming a few years ago that the Army's real purpose was to fight and win the nation's wars – well, that was education. Or a National Security Advisor-designate who said that soldiers shouldn't deliver school lunches – that was education.

One question that I haven't heard the answer to is how you would describe to our senior political leaders what is the present state of affairs in respect to the teaching of stability operations in the schoolhouses?

I began to form an impression in Afghanistan – and it continued to develop in Washington – that the generals believe our young officers' cutting-edge experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq are being recycled and leveraged in the schoolhouses. I don't think this assumption has been evaluated very critically or carefully.

A couple of personal prejudices and observations. On cultural sensitivity, keep focus on what you're aiming for. You can be sensitive and still be tone deaf. Please look at other nations' experiences. I've been really interested by India conducting a 50-year stability operation. Could we do that?

We need to think Joint and Combined. The broader communities. I don't understand how this is going to work if we continue to define the Interagency as the military on one hand and a loose set of sovereign civilian entities on the other hand. They've got to come closer together. The military has got to be part of the Interagency.

Understanding "civilian capacity." A biologist would be astonished, I think, to look at typology where you have Active Component, Reserve Component, National Guard, contractors, and civilians defined as co-equivalent species. At least 97 percent of homo sapiens are civilians, and we need much more definition of what is needed on the "civilian side."

Finally, on the discussion of force structure and constabulary forces. We need to be careful not to confuse force structure and capacity with desired effects. Aren't we saying to ourselves sometimes, "Well, such and such must be going on in Wardak Province or in Nangarhar because we've got such and such capacity deployed there?" That's a bit of a tricky transaction and we need to look out for it. Thank you.

Chapter 6

Work Group Session Two: Thursday, 15 September

Group E:

Question #1: What are the most critical resource shortfalls with respect to PSRO education?

- Time-
 - Conduct education needs analysis
 - Cultural differences: trade off with employment demands (civ) or existing curricula contact hours (DOD)
- Index of available resources, one-stop place to go
- Personnel-
 - SMEs: number, qualifications, identification
 - Faculty: number, qualifications, appropriateness to level of students
 - Partial solution?- Instructor development course
 - Partial solution?- UN website course for UN mil missions (www.unitarpoci.org)
 - Students: funding for IA students
 - Team to conduct curriculum development
 - Fielding of mobile education teams (MET)/suitcase education
- Materials
 - Develop exportable curriculum module that other agencies/NGOs could use
 - PSRO education content and process should include emphasis on shaping & deterring

Our breakout Group E explored the questions related to the critical resource shortfalls, prioritization of supporting acquisitions, incorporating multinational PRSO special research programs, capturing and sharing those research products. What are the publishing opportunities for those research projects? And the last thing we addressed was the specific questions we would like to see addressed or brought up as topic material for the next conference.

First I really want to thank you all for hosting this. This has been a great opportunity to develop some of those relationships and network. I am taking one major point away that I learned last night. Don't stand between a dog and the fire hydrant.

When we looked at the most critical resource shortfall, we put time at the top. And as part under the time aspect, we think there really needs to be educational needs analysis to look at the core competencies and skill sets needed. We also looked at the complication that is created of bringing people to training and making that time available. When we look at some of the community members, they have limited planning staff, and the availability just simply due to the ongoing operations they are involved in, their ongoing commitments. As far as SMEs and the personnel side of it, we looked at what is the number of folks we need trained in this. And what kind of core competencies, qualifications do they need to have. And then how do we identify folks with that and track that community. We looked at some of the problems are the funding aspect. If you want them to attend some kind of formal training program, are we going to have to fund it? Is DOD or the US Government going to have to fund to get those people to come and attend; some kind of incentivization for them to come to the training.

On the material side, we really looked at having it exportable. So that we could limit the amount of time they had to be away from their place of duty or their operation; so that we could take it to them in a modular form. We looked at focusing on the shaping and deterring -- the upfront piece -- so that we can prevent or mitigate the circumstances behind the crises. And the shaping and deterring that comes from the new joint phasing model that hasn't been put out yet, but I've seen briefings on it. And those are the two phases. We're moving to a six phasing construct as opposed to a four phasing construct.

Question #1 (Part 2): How would you prioritize new acquisition/development programs among case studies, multi-media presentations, video teleconference opportunities, simulations, models, games, etc.?

- Develop suitcase model scenario-driven PSRO game(s)
- Develop a common PSRO scenario or small set of scenarios for all to use
- Develop modular education materials
 - Systematic approach from less complex to more complex (crawl/walk/run)
 - Event duration approach: 1-day, 3-5 day, 7-14 day

Once again what you see here is a focus on exportable tools to assist in the education process. The bottom bullet we wanted those materials to be tailorable to the level of knowledge and the time available.

Question:

Any thoughts on organizations that could do that sort of activity? In your group, anybody talk about what their organization do to help in developing that sort of material. Any organizations interested in doing that?

Group E:

I think we are looking at PKSOI. To be honest, that's the big problem that we saw and it will come up later in the slides, is there's got to be a lead agent. We've got to have a lead federal agent that's pushing this. If PKSOI does it, we're focused on the military side and that may not be the right focus. We've got a much broader community that needs to be involved.

Comment:

JFCOM had a whole team that teaches affects based operations and systems analysis. And they have databases that they are developing. What they need to do is just develop that into the new phases and maybe that's one of the organizations that can help us do it. Because they have a whole contracting organization down there that's developing that system.

Questions;

I guess what I'm asking are there things out there that already exist. Are there organizations that have worked on things similar to this? Are there organizations that are looking to work on it some more?

Comment:

I put my bottom feeding contractor's hat on here. We do this for a living. I used an anecdote yesterday in the class that Kansas City Power and Light came to us and asked can you develop an exercise? It's analogous to peacekeeping. You don't factions; you've got power lines down and things like that. But developing an exercise specifically to train people whether they are going to East Timor, or they're going into Bosnia, Kosovo or whatever -- it ain't hard. It doesn't take a lot of effort and you can do it in a fairly short amount of time. You don't need to develop simulations like a lot of defense contractors will say we'll develop a simulation for you. They are

there already. Janus, JCATs, PBS, CBS, they're already there. So doing this type stuff just isn't hard. Just have to know where to go to the bullpen.

Question #2: In order of priority/desirability, what are suitable methods for incorporating/integrating multinational expertise and insights into PSRO education?

- Include International instructors
 - Liaison and exchange officers
 - Obtain UN OCHA, UN HCR, ICRC, OSCE, EU, AU, and NATO personnel as instructors at education events and exercises
 - International fellows (IF)
- Network to international education institutes
 - Develop exchange program with other foreign PSRO schools, track faculty
 - Borrow curricula
- Send U.S. instructors to foreign PSRO education courses and NATO, UN and other international organization schools
- Incorporate international role players & students
- Leverage Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation efforts as part of overall education effort
- Seek cross fertilization with local universities

Group E:

Here we looked at the methods for incorporating or integrating a multinational expertise. I really think when you get down to the fourth bullet from the bottom, sending US instructors to foreign PSRO education courses -- there is a plethora of countries that have stood up peacekeeping, stability ops types organizations. The gamut runs from Canada to Kenya that have courses that we can send folks to. And they have a lot of experience in stability operations that we need to leverage or capitalize on. We also need to tie it back to the combatant commanders, theater security cooperation efforts, so we can do that mitigation again upfront.

Question #3: What are the opportunities for special research programs for students within PSRO education?

- Senior Level Colleges (SLC):
 - SLC research project
 - NPS graduate program
 - American Military University
 - Senior Service Fellows
- Possible Federally Funded Research Development Center (FFRDC) support for student research
- Potentially improve focus by:
 - Possible responsible agent annual directed focus study (PSRO topic)
 - Annual PSRO research topic conference (perhaps linked to JPME conference)
 - Identify and designate specific PSRO research advisors

Moving on to the special research programs and opportunities. Each of the senior service schools has a research requirement of their students. We looked at potentially holding a conference with people from the community to come up with specific hot topic areas that could be potentially done as a directed study, maybe even a group study at a senior service college, or intermediate level school. Questions?

Question #3 (cont): What system(s) exist for capturing and sharing the products of PSRO research done as part of an educational process? Which one, if any, should be recommended for adoption as a single “common use” system?

•Multiple systems exists, some examples:

- Educational Institution Student Papers
 - NPS- all student papers online
 - DOD SLC- most if not all resident student research project papers online
- “Peace Negotiations Bulletin” online
- German government has significant PSRO information online “Bonn site”
- Air University Library includes link to major overseas PSRO sites

•Conclusion:

- No existing system meets all needs
- Recommend creation of web portal system dedicated to PSRO

One thing we had some in depth discussion on, there’s a lot of research being done but nobody has an all one source spot they can go to get that information. So we really looked at having some type of portal to be able to go in and get access to those papers. What we’ve listed up there is just some of the things that exist that we captured as good sites to go to.

PKSOI:

A key piece we may ask for, because we are trying to stand up a web portal and we’re working with the Army G-6, but would be for organizations who think they have a piece or part that would be useful to get linked into a web portal to send that information to Mike Cross so we could start that discussion with him and start linking them on in. So that would be something, we’ll send something out on that. But that would be a specific piece, if you could send us the names of your folks who work those and get that information to us. And we can start thinking about how we build a collaborative site and make sure we tie in all the different points of contact and get the right material on.

Question #4: What opportunities exist for students/faculty to publish PSRO related materials? Which have the greatest potential to be influential?

- Multiple military and foreign affairs venues exist; however, need to publish in “popular” magazines as well as in academic/military publications
 - Part of Strategic communications plan for PSRO
 - Determine and then address all the target audience(s)
- Improving existing opportunities:
 - Request existing military periodicals to dedicate an issue to PSRO topics occasionally
 - Encourage personnel on PSRO missions to submit articles to military publication
- Create new opportunities:
 - Publish a dedicated PSRO periodical (PSRO often lost in plethora of topics)
 - Sponsor writing competition and publish compendium
 - Establish an online PSRO library/link site
 - Include Blogs, collaboration, common scenario(s), etc.
 - Portal for various PSRO education institutions, peacekeeping training centers, other nations PSRO electronic web pages

Group E:

And then, what opportunities exist to get material published. We entertained the idea of maybe PKSOI producing some kind of periodical where we capture key issues. But then we went back to the idea of maybe going to some of the existing like parameters and have a focused edition on PSRO as a means of collecting some of the hot topics and get it in one publication.

Again I think there needs to be some incentives for people to do the research and publish in this area and establishing a program in that regard would also be beneficial.

Final Question: What specific question or issue would you like the next PSRO conference to address? (slide 1)

- What are the limits for the use of military force and when does the use of military force become self defeating?
- How can the PSRO community help address the specific concerns and issues related to PSRO of the SECDEF and OSD? Of the Combatant Commanders?
- What have we learned new in PSRO since last conference?
- How are PSRO training, education and research interlinked?
- How do you get unity of effort in PSRO among the disparate participants (UN, national governments, international organizations, intergovernmental organizations, NGO, etc.)?
- How do we translate post-PSRO lessons into pre-crisis policy and preventative actions?

And then the final questions that we came up with. Questions or comments on these?

Final Question: What specific question or issue would you like the next PSRO conference to address? (slide 2)

- What changes in education can we implement in next 6 months to effect change (Plan of action & milestones)?
- How do we achieve, and what is, a common PSRO terminology or at least an acceptable level of mutual understanding?
- How do we improve the process for producing PSRO doctrine (speed, coordination, effectiveness)?
- How do we identify and involve all the appropriate organizations concerned with PSRO?
- Who should be the lead U.S. federal agency for PSRO?
- What are the proper roles, missions, task and responsibilities for each of the various PSRO participants?

Once again we pretty much came to a consensus this bullet is the long pole in the tent. It drives everything else.

Comment:

That was my question and the only reason that I put that one up there is in doing consequence management duties for the last couple of years I found out that when you are overseas and Germany (for example) gets in trouble with a dirty bomb or terrorist act and they need help, they go the country team; they go to the ambassador. And the President has dictated that the State Department is the LFA, lead federal agency. You've got the ball, pal. I'm handing it off to you and you've got it. We're not there yet and I think everybody's trying to do God's work here. But unless you've got some quarterback licking his fingers and saying, okay, here's the play, gang, we're going to be floundering for awhile. And I think that's a subject that should go to the Secretary of the Army so that they are talking about it at that level. Determine what is the lead agency for peacekeeping operations and come up with strategy. And that's not saying that that agency has to do all the work, but they are the coordinating agency that pulls this thing together. Maybe we'll be meeting in the State Department next year. I think that point is critical. Who is going to do it for the United States of America?

PKSOI:

Any thoughts or comments around the room? I'll say on the federal agent piece that is something Ambassador Pascal's office is wrestling with. They have congressional action trying to get him that codified authority, but it hasn't happened yet. He does have it informally from the NSC, but funding doesn't match the words so that's one of the organizations we're trying to help. And within DOD they were debating out the DOD 3000. So we'll see. I think we are making progress, but it is a contentious issue for sure. So all we can do is what we can do is sort out and step up and take the lead as organizations in certain areas continue moving the ball forward. And then when federal lead is identified, attach our efforts to that federal lead and tell them what we've been doing, how we've been moving the ball forward and adjust accordingly. But you are right, we don't have that right now. And it is something we definitely can use.

Group E:

One last comment. How do we create more joint doctrine without creating more acronyms?

Group F:

Discussion Focus

Resources, Current Practices, Gaps, Proposed solutions for the education of Stability Operations

Team F:

OK. Most of the points that were covered by Group E so I'll go through it very quickly. I am the only one in the group with no stabilization operations experience and very limited exposure on the subject; they figure if I can make sense out of what we discuss and could it explain it in it's simplest terms, we would not field any questions and we could get out of here early. So with that in mind the method we used for yesterday's discussion was interesting. Group dynamics were somewhat complex. The notion to follow NDNP, the military decision making process or even a modified approach was quickly thwarted by the entire group, half of which were active duty or retired and half of which included Reps from the State Department, International Medical Corps, DOD and George Mason University. Group F, like the preceding group addressed yesterday's topic on the slide in front of you. We took a holistic approach and attempted to gear our discussion to both military and civilians who would benefit from stability operations education. In our eagerness to put our thoughts together we omitted any of the sub-corresponding questions and instead opted to examine each element of the focus topic individually. Resources, current practices, gaps and proposed solutions.

Resources

- Service Educational Training Commands
 - e.g. TRADOC, AETC, TECOM
 - PKSOI, NPS, NDU
- Universities and Colleges
- Peacekeeping Centers
- Regional Centers
- Subject Matter Experts
 - Military
 - Civilian

As you read this slide, you see that we decided to come up with a list of who provides or could provide sustainment operations education. Our list of five does seem obvious, but it gave us a point of departure. Starting at the top, each of the service educational training commands is the first one. Next private universities and colleges. As was mentioned by Group E international peacekeeping centers, combatant commanders' regional centers such as the Asia Pacific Center in PACOM. And at the lower level, individual or collective mentoring from civilian and DOD SMEs.

Next, we realized that in order to fully analyze the resources, we needed to grasp what is presently provided by all of the actors previously mentioned. We identified five, but are there more? And what are their capabilities? Although we could not accomplish yesterday afternoon, we thought it was necessary to review all the programs. For example the US Government, DOD and their associated schools, the Interagency, the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons school and the FBI academy. And for academia such as Geroge Mason's program and those of other schools.

Resources

- Need to identify current actors & their capabilities?
- Requires a data call/review for all Stability Operations education activities:
 - USG
 - DoD (Service Schools, Academies, PKSOI, NPS, Regional Centers)
 - IA: DOS (FSI), DOJ (BoP& FBI Academy)
 - Academia (GMU, NII List)
 - NGOs (OJT)
 - International (Pearson, UN, COESPU, Others)
- Need to know: organization, degree/attendance requirements, capacity, product

The last bullet simply summarizes that we would like to identify all organizations providing SO Education. I don't understand how they work and what they provide. Now from our collective expertise we could fill in some of those blanks, but to do it right we recommend that perhaps setting up a matrix where we could crosswalk each program against a respective curriculum.

Without knowing the benefit of the details of all SO education programs, we did attempt to delineate some of the major current practices. Please review this slide. Our Rep from the Joint Step J-7 told us that DOD only recommends stability operations be taught at our DOD career officer's schools. Across the services at both ILS, the intermediate level school for Majors and TLS the top level school for Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, each presently incorporates some SO education, however, it is not mandated by the J-7 and there is no baseline across the boards. For the civilian US government, we did not know of any circumstances where SO education is required. We even took a stab at why this might occur. Is it considered nonessential and a distracter base on one's current job? Is there no course available besides a possible DOG ones I previously mentioned? Is this FSI leaning in this direction or is a money an obstacle to all these endeavors.

Current Practices

- DoD recommends Stability Operations included in the career PME curriculum
 - ILS and TLS include some Stability Operations curriculum
 - Not mandated
 - No identified baseline
- Civilian USG Stability Operations education not required:
 - Institutional bias against education after hiring?
 - Civilian USG does not have Stability Operations curriculum
 - FSI considering Stability Operations courses?
 - Budget constraints
- NGOs have limited educational opportunities
 - No formal education identified

For NGOs, our Rep from the international medical corps informed us there is generally enough money to spend on our foreign partners, but for NGOs there's none identified for their practitioners.

Gaps

- USG lacks a comprehensive educational approach to Stability Operations (IAEB?)
- Current level of DoD Stability Operations curriculum not comprehensive
- Civilian USG Stability Operations curriculum does not exist
- NGOs needed to teach application of technical skills for SO

We then attempted to delineate substantial gaps. Please review this slide. First as was mentioned by Group E, no comprehensive approach exist. Slices are present in various forms from a multitude of institutions. The US government doesn't provide such a curriculum and DOD, although making many great strides, we can't go to one program for comprehensive overview. Likewise the civilian US government SO programs do not exist. And although no NGO programs are available, we need their expertise incorporated into all programs.

Gaps (Continued)

- USG lacks common lexicon for Stability Operations
- DoD exercises lack adequate role players to provide proper context for actions/decisions
- No formal USG-wide exercise for Stability Operations where USG-wide participation is mandated

Please review these final gaps. As was previously mentioned yesterday, we need a common lexicon or at least understand each other's terms to include IA, NGO and international partners. Next, sometimes role players are appropriately designated for DOD exercises, but often we resort to in-house solutions. Finally, we identified no US government wide or DOD IA or NGO exercise mandated to bring all the players together.

Proposed Solutions

- **USG Stability Operations Education Roadmap to success**
 - Possibly include IO, NGO, academic community
- **Endorse previous proposal for a USG Interagency Standing Committee on Education**
 - Establish USG baseline education requirements with NGOs/IOs/Contractor/academic input
 - Portable "Teach-the-Teacher" program (web-based)

We came up with some proposed solutions. I'll let you read that slide. First, in coordination with SCRS, we ought to build a campaign plan or a roadmap for the education of civilian operations. As the General said, we need a quarterback to honcho this endeavor. We also saw possibly including this endeavor IO and NGO and the academic environment.

Next, we decided to endorse one of yesterday's recommendations from a previous group. And perhaps create a US Interagency standing committee for the education of stability operations. This committee could write the campaign plan; they could create a baseline requirement for each of the school houses; and they could make it portable, so it could be taught to others who can't get to a resident school. It could either be web based or taught through an MTT, a mobile training team.

Proposed Solutions

- Create DoD Center of Excellence for Stability Operations education (PKSOI, NDU, NPS)
- Consider support for establishment of a USG CoE (S/CRS?)
 - Develop USG-wide exercises/wargaming

And our final solutions: we could possibly create a center of excellence. And this center of excellence could be either a virtual organization incorporating some are that already exist, such as PKSOI, NDU or the Naval Post Graduate School. Or it can be a new standing organization, one perhaps created by the US government that would incorporate all players. And thus, that organization could then develop a USG-wide exercise and mandate one in which all players would be incorporated. That's it for Group F unless I have any questions.

Group D:

Resources

- **Is it well resourced? Yes at its current level of DOD prioritization in the educational field**
- **Are there shortfalls? Yes**
 - **Not enough TIME** (there were mixed opinions on this issue in the group)
 - **Not enough AWARENESS**
 - **Abundance of materials (including foreign resources)**
 - **Hard to discern the value of each**
- **Recommendation**
 - **Cataloguing existing materials and SMEs – as part of repository**
 - **Vet materials for quality**

Group D: Speaking Norwegian.

New Group D Presenter:

Our Group certainly was not as organized as the last group. And that's probably because we actually were over burdened by academics in this, myself being one, Army War College, Naval War College and a Commanding General Staff College represented. So when we start talking about education we think in terms of strictly education. We don't get outside of our wicket too much. We had the resource questions as well. And we talked about them. And we came up with simple answers to the questions we were given which were basically yes, no, maybe, duh and yes. And then we came up with some points that we thought were worth looking at. The resource questions form the educators' point of view, with which we were over burdened with once again, military educators, is that are you well enough resourced? And that was our questions. And the question was quickly answered that within our own spectrum we are well enough resourced to teach those things that we are asked to teach. As you were told in the last group, Larry and the Chiefs and the Chairman have not directed us to incorporate into our education systems any form of stability ops training. Now, granted we would be fools if we didn't incorporate it and we do incorporate it in all the schools. And we do it within our resources and we don't feel over burdened by the amount of attention that we give to it. So we did not spend a lot of time looking for pure resource issues. We also decided that the resources that we really needed to talk to were time, and once again that is not an issue that we can resolve, because we have a spectrum of issues that we have to address. We are told to the op meps and told by our chiefs to do a certain number of things with a certain number of classroom hours as we discussed before. And we do those things. In addition without being told other than informally we do stability ops throughout the curriculum. We also believe that it's integrated across the curriculum and we'll talk about that a little further. If time is a resource for education, that is the main constraint, we also believe that the lead federal agency, whoever is designated to be in charge of the education systems for the military is going to have to change the priority of stability operations education in order to force us to change. Do we want that? I will tell you the discussion in our group and anybody can jump in here, was that education once again concentrates on how to think not what to think. That we aren't training operators for stability operations in our education system, we're training people how to react to new and different environments. And

those things go on on a regular basis inclusive of the subjects that we teach. So we probably won't on our own go more than 20 hours in stability ops during the course of an academic year. Command and Staff has made major changes on how they address this subject, and that's based on their Director and his guidance. The time has to be—it could be internally generated for this, but if we agree across the board that's it not sufficient, it has to be externally mandated to change anything that we do with it.

We also thought, and this is probably our biggest issue. We had a hard time determining it as a resource, but awareness. We talked about it lot yesterday in our briefings across the board that we need a place where information exists and we can get to it. And people are made aware of those assets that are available to improve the teaching that we do do and make our stability ops teaching go better. There's an abundance of materials, but it needs to be appropriately cataloged. And once again we fell back to the idea that a lead agency, some agency develops the web portal that have been talking about that designs the way for people to get to the information so that educators, once again, can improve their courses and their curriculum in this area. So we called it awareness as a resource. And you can see our recommendations right there.

We also included SMEs which you saw earlier. We understand that awareness includes intelligence of people that know what they are doing. And that's SMEs. And so you've got to do that.

min \mathcal{D} the Gaps

- Lack of connectivity between DOD and other actors and agencies

J.I.I.M.

We are, in fact J. __. __. m.

Lack of understanding and introduction to agency and organizational cultures

This is a result of composition issues in students and Faculty

Frustration with the lack of support that S/CRS is getting from USG.

And then we decided to mind the gaps. We decided to go outside the questions and say okay, we got all these questions and we think that we're looking at them and we're not seeing a big particular issue that we want to address. And instead of going for a nice organized thought process we went into a brainstorming session which is fun, but it doesn't necessarily lead anywhere. We think it led to one particular place in this case and it was a lack of connectivity as we've all heard in the overall process, not just the Interagency process. But when we called JIAM that we believe in our education systems, DOD-centric once again, as you see earlier that there are not a lot of other education systems devoted to this kind of study. We're Joint with a big J. Goldwater-Nickels, we get it. We love each other. All the services hug all the time. It's a great world and "Kumbaya" as far as the jointness is concerned. We are not Interagency. We're not intergovernmental. And I put that small m, multinational on there. Because I still believe that multinational operations are a challenge for us, particularly if somebody doesn't want to do what we want them to do. It's real easy if everybody does what we tell them to and we bring them on and we transport them and we give them what they have to do. And it's all coordinated, but we aren't truly multinational because it's difficult for us to give the lead up and work the operation.

Then we asked what can the education system do to address the two i's in the middle -- the pieces between the bookends? And so we brainstormed that for awhile and determined that it was once again a resource issue. But the resource was lack of availability of expertise within our education programs, both student and instructor. We don't have state government officials and we don't have enough interagency participation at all the schools. Maybe some do; maybe National (War College) is an exception, but the rest of the schools, the service schools, are limited on faculty and student participation. And we also saw it as a resource that could not be changed easily because if I want an NGO in every seminar, like I want a Marine in every seminar, I've got to get an NGO to give me an NGO guy to go to every seminar and every senior service college. And we all thought that while that's really good, it's not going to happen. So, we're not going to get guys to give up their workers for that length of time on a regular basis. Same thing with other resources. And if you go to the staff, one guy on staff is great for any of the organizations we're talking about in the Interagency process, but that one guy has to be able to transfer the knowledge to everyone else. And if it really becomes bigger than just putting one guy or one student into a course.

And what do we really miss? As you saw from Ingrid in the beginning of our presentation, what we really miss is a true understanding of what each other is saying even if we are all speaking English. That's the problem. A lot of that is language and acronym and lexicon based, but much of it as it was before we become big, hugging joint guys in the military, is culturally based. And a group of NGOs have a certain culture within their way of doing business. They have a methodology. They believe they know what they need to do and how to get it done and they do it in a way that suits them. And this is good. The Interagency, the State Department, the USAID, the CIA, all of these organizations have their own cultures. And the reason we like to have students around is because it allows our students and our faculty to understand their cultures. So we tried to come up with that as the big issue. And we also have as a small point down here that the lead federal agency thing, we see S/CRS as causing par to this because we don't have that synergy in the US government of a lead federal agency and a well resourced group pushing through this to break down these barriers for us. So we looked at all that as the big problem.

Min~~D~~ the Gap

- Recommendations
 - Video project to introduce other agency/organization cultures
 - Promote agency/NGO participation in major exercises
 - Exchanges

Once again this came out of the Army War College and how a project that they are building which perhaps could be hung on the web portal. And that is that to have each to go out and ask each of the people we want cultural organizational information to help us out by doing a video interview. And an action officer; a person who works this way gets a set of questions to say this is what I do in the USAID. This is what my NGO does and how I do it. And interviewing them for that purpose. And we thought a video would be good. You can't get the person in class, but you can show a person in an interaction which allows them to explain themselves and their organization.

And we all thought that this was a great idea. So we thought that perhaps the Army War College is working it. Bob said he's working that. And we're going to go through that. That might be something that we could all resource together somehow. And when it gets done, put those pieces out there. You know, guys at National War College that represent agencies that become part of this and go to the agencies and that's fine. And Ingrid even said that the UN has done that for their different operating groups so that they can get that flavor. And we thought that this was a good way to kind of bridge the gap that we see as an educational barrier for us. Then we also thought that we wanted to promote Interagency and NGO participation. Do you have a question?

Question:

Well, no. I just wanted to say that we've actually produced a DVD just for NGOs for the military to learn a little bit about NGO culture. So it has a series of interviews with different folks.

Group D:

That's a great idea.

Comment:

They're in replication at the moment. We are doing our second run, but I'm happy to send them to you and anybody who's interested.

Group D:

There's the NGO piece and there're probably other pieces like that.

Comment:

Since this is the advertisement moment. We're in the process of updating a guide that we have. It's called the guide to IOs, NCOs in the military. And it's a sort of pocket sized. In fact a lot of service men and women carry it in their BDUs out on the field and so forth. But each of the sections is being written by representatives from the military, representatives from IO, representative from NGOs, so it's really reflective of their organizations. We are going to have a conference to release it. But we are also looking to do something that's either web based or this is a great idea. I'm going to do a DVD or something off that. The written material will exist and the question is how we can turn it into something that's live.

PKSOI:

Maybe we can plan to do with what you're talking about the DVD can be redone. I think Tammi you are working with them at well at ITEA. If we can take the IO/NGO guide because what we talked about was the guide. It's the best selling product off the USIP website. We're updating it. We have SCRS working on it. We have the military PKSOI as a military rep, Roy Williams working as the NGO rep helping to update that piece. We brought in the civil affairs folks. We have the Marine Corps chopping on it. We've got it to the other services, so it is broad based. But we also had strictly a user's guided, so we kept it small for the practitioner. And we had talked about expanding it so we could get some more information, some of the things you are talking about. So maybe it would be, as we also worked at IO/NGO that Ambassador Pascal, OSD and USIP are hosting that link these efforts and maybe we can produce a product like that. I think there is some real usefulness there. If InterAction would like to play, that would be very excellent I think.

Comment:

This is an example of what's going on around the community right now. There are four different agencies that are trying to get this stuff out on the net. How much more dynamic if we could all work together. Shame on us, but that's just the truth in it. What we're developing at the Army War College is more educational pieces for education. I emphasize that: interactive, computer driven model that allows them to dig for information. We couldn't capture all of the NGOs, but we would sprinkle NGOs in there, a representative sampling of them. NGOs talking heads themselves [unclear] go about business. It is important to us. Have five, ten minutes clips, and then behind that talk about the more information on the organization. But it is purely educational.

Question:

Where do you get this? Where can one access it?

Answer:

You can't yet. But what I'm saying is, we're doing this now for educational purposes. We have a lot of Marine Corps officers who come in and they don't know a lot about the Air Force. And Army officers who don't know anything about the Navy, so we've done it for the service cultures already.

Actually the interagency piece, as we speak. The next step in that is our non-governmental agencies. It's an educational tool that we're trying to [unclear]

Group D:

But it's a good one and we thought that it was worth spreading to the education conference. But all these tools are.

PKSOI:

So that's a key point. Now we have different organizations going down a path and that would put those efforts together and make them more effective because it just makes common sense to do so. So we'll sit down and that will be one of the probably the working groups we can form up after this and get the folks working together, bring this together and make this a more effective process that we can use for the different organizations to use to get through that cultural barrier. So at least from that point of view, that's what we're trying to get at in this conference is exactly that. Identify duplicate efforts. Identify where we can link those efforts together and we get some synergy and we just hit one in a big way.

Group D:

And we also believe that in addition to providing this resource because we don't have the numbers of faculty and students and they can some cultural information on the other organizations. We thought that we've got to do a better job at promoting interagency and NGO participation. You heard it earlier in a different group that in fact when you have major exercise within your educational system, in many cases you don't have the actual agency or NGO on the ground. What you have is one of your faculty members or somebody replicating that. And while they can do the reading and understand something, or have some experience, they simply aren't as good as having somebody else who can during the course of the exercise spread that information and maybe do it in a ten-day block. And maybe you can get people to sign up for that where they won't give a guy up for a year. But that's something that we need to look at. And we reiterated the exchanges issue that the way you get the culture into your organization is by sending your educators out for a number of months at a time to work with other organizations and bringing those people in as we discussed yesterday at length.

Research

Students are provided with ample opportunities to research and publish

Recommendation

Offer new incentives

PKSOI Writing Award

We did address research. Once again all the intermediate and senior service colleges in our educational systems provide their students to write and publish. Do they all write well? No. We figured that out. Do they all publish? No. But they all have opportunities to do that. And we also thought there was one thing you had to do. Well, we could incentivize it. And I did look that up as a word and it does exist. We can offer new incentives which is the recommended way to say it. And we also thought we would put you on the hook that the incentive for writing ought to be some kind of recognition. And whether it's a plaque or dollars or publication in your brand new Journal that you recommended in the last group, one way or another there should be an award for this kind of writing. And it should be well publicized across the educational spectrum. And in all likelihood into the civilian educational arena.

Comment:

I just heard of a comment on the military exercise pieces. One of the things that SCRS is trying to look at, is how to focus in on what makes most sense. There are way too many. And last year there was some priority setting. And we're trying to do a better job this year with the idea of not only what does SCRS do but trying to link in with others. How do we jointly participate in some things where we all gain something instead of having everybody go out for one day at 35 different things and get little.

PKSOI:

And you are working that with Joint Forces Command, coming up with a prioritized listing of exercises based on a series of factors that are important to both the military in terms of the exercises they are trying to accomplish. As well as it's important to what Ambassador Pascal is trying to do with his

office, and move forward with his office. And what we don't have, I don't have a copy of those, I know you are getting ready to finalize that with JFCOM. But once that is finalized, that would probably something that we could share so folks understood what those key exercises were and what the objects were you were trying to get out of it. And that would be very useful.

Comment:

Just let me make the not only are we talking about training exercises, but here, our focus was on the educational exercises. For example at the Army War College we do a major event, a two-week strategic crisis exercise where you can touch 330 students over a 10-day period. And I'm sure other educational institutions have similar major exercises. So that's the focus of this recommendation, it's on the educational side.

PKSOI:

And that's a great point because that's something we can talk with JFCOM about and see if they are just on the training side of the house, there's some goodness there. But we can also potentially look and see if they've included any of the educational ones as well. So that's a good point to go after.

Comment:

Just a comment on your small "m" in terms of multilateral. We found ourselves when we started our training program being very, very drawn to a Euro-centric U and plenty of first world European partners and participants. And we've now shifted to where our heaviest emphasis is, Africa. And you need only look at what are the ten top troop contributing countries into the UN Peacekeeping operations and realize that none of them are in this room and most of them probably don't participate in these some of these educational opportunities. And I point out the fact that fastest rising participant is China. So we're often preaching or at least preaching to the last generation of peacekeepers. The Nordic presence, despite Ingrid's best efforts, is waning. You have a veneer of first world peacekeepers in the Sudan. You may have a few iron majors drawn from places like the British forces that are in there as the Deputy Chief of Staff to put some rigor into the planning process. But the rest of it is a very, very different world.

PKSOI:

That also, to get to your point of organizations like the international association of peace training centers. The challenge is project as well which is trying to focus on education. The challenge has reached out to China and pulled China in as a charter member of the challenge project because of that. And has reached out to those other countries and has tried to reduce it as just a Nordic, Western European presence. So you are right. It's an outreach piece. The thought is, let's start getting our act together and then we can reach out and start pulling them on in. Excellent point.

Comment:

I want to switch it a little bit to the research because I've heard that for the past three presentations and we had that yesterday as well. Back in May we, being George Mason University, were talking to John about why don't we set up some sort of academic research consortium from different universities and also the military education. Let's get everybody together so we can look commonly at different projects. We had our first meeting in September, just to get this whole ball running. But quite honestly, a lot of people in the room here aren't even part of this. So if nobody objects that I'll send out an email anyway. People with their email address here, I'll put you onto this consortium list so that we can get talking about that. We are going to be sending out a call or papers, actually on Friday. And I think we're sending it around right now for the first call and this would be in December when the manuscripts would be due. We're looking at past operations. But what we also are looking at right now, too, is setting forth what are we going to do for the spring call. And some people in the small groups, I know we're talking about well, what are the research priorities? One of the things on the things on the email will also do is say, "Hey, can you give me your three topics. What are the hot topics you guys need investigated. What would be good?" And then I can go and filter them all together. See what stands out up there. And that can probably what we'll call for in spring. If you don't want to be on it, just let me know by email. If you think I'm missing someone, please send me an email with their contact information. For people that have assistant professors in your system, this is a good way for them to get published. And we were talking about many different venues that we could do that, whether PKSOI or maybe SSI that put out a Journal or maybe it's a collection of articles or maybe foreign Journals. We don't know. There are different things that we can do as far as that's concerned. And I guess (someone) had an idea about a student award type of a program.

Comment:

When we were talking about, I guess, every year there are three or four hundred military papers done throughout all around. And one of the concepts was that once a year, we publish the best of those papers in the stability and reconstruction world. And then incentivize the folks to do that. So there's an annual publication of those papers. So if you consider that from your institutions that that may be an excellent way to get identity of the folks, capitalize on what their most recent experiences have been coming back from the field, and identify and reward some of the folks for thinking. The schools do it anyway. The papers are already out there, already produced. It's just the need to identify, collect and move forward. And I think PKSOI is gonna be coming back to everybody on that and see what we can do.

Comment:

And whether or not that just remains like on the research aspect, I mean, we were talking in our small group about an education consortium for educators and getting together a workshop for educators, and we basically have that here. And whether these spring off into two different types of animals or not, we can see that as well. We were talking about a matrix for the different people. What are they teaching? What are the syllabi? This might be a venue we might be able to get that information out to. And I just wanted to point that out.

Group C:

Educational Resources

- ▶ Several educational institutions represented in Group C: NPS CSRS, NDU ICAF, NDU AWC, USMC Security Cooperation Education and Training, USAWC, UNOCHA Training.
- ▶ Most schools/programs use a variety of teaching techniques.
 - Case studies
 - Games/simulations/role playing
 - Seminar
 - Group projects
 - Student research projects
- ▶ Large supply of material to draw from to create curriculum.
- ▶ Professors create much of their own learning tools. But are able to use some pre-prepared products.

Group C:

Well Group C does in fact have an efficient presentation. Primarily because I was worried, I've been sitting back there and I can see the mouse and how everyone is fussing with it. It is kind of scary. I'll just have a little practice here. Oh, it's easy. I can't see why all you "old" folks have been having such a trouble with it.

Well, I was going to say that we had a lot of educators and because of that we had, you know, certain pathologies among the group. The first bullet there shows the educational institutions that were represented in our group. Not all of us that are in there would say that we are professors but we're involved in education. In addition to this, we had about four practitioners from across the community. Our questions dealt basically with the tools or techniques, the instruments, that are available for S&R education. That was the first category of questions. And then we dealt with questions that I think were oriented to have us identify whether or not those tools were sufficient or had gaps. And the final questions trying to tease us into suggesting what solutions or recommendations might be. So we were partially compliant to those questions. And this is a summary of some of the things we said.

First of all we do now where we have education focused on S&R, we do use a variety of really the plethora of typical educational tools to accomplish education. The education that is offered as we've been discussing throughout the couple days, ranges from high level, graduate school education to more practitioner or professional school oriented teaching which you might call training. It's not field training, but it's teaching skills, it's teaching method. And along with that there's a lot of learning about how to understand the environment of peace operations. They really go hand in hand and sometimes our distinctions which are driven largely by our lanes, get it a little blurry, the distinctions do. So, yes, we use all of these tools. More and more of us that are in the classroom at the podium with US and foreign military officers or students are moving more and more into interactive processes because we have so many students that are coming back from the field. It can be intimidating to many professors who have never been to the field. Especially like at my institution where we have a 99% civilian academic instructor staff, regular professors. We have students that have a lot of experiences. And it's the professor's job to draw out those particular experiences and as someone in our group said, build it into the context of the field, the industry or the theory of S&R. And so while they are smart and have knowledge and lots of specific experiences, that is quite insufficient. And they need to

come together and through a facilitative process, this is really the key for the instructor to draw out from the other students that are together in these courses, but also from the existing literature, to really cause education and learning to happen around their experiences that they've had in the field. Somebody else said, and I forget if it was in our group or on the margins at one of the breaks, that somebody said, teaching these kinds of courses now is like being a counselor. You have---everyone's like, "Oh, my gosh, in Afghanistan, you know they weren't there and there weren't resources and they weren't doing their job." So what you do is you take that experience and you can connect it through other experiences and through written material into some learning, a bigger context. There is a lot, tons, of material that is available to professors to create curriculum To create their teaching products. And the professors do largely create their own products. If you talk with professors about a portal where they can download products that are instantly teachable into their courses, they're going to be cynical about that. They are going to wonder, well, who thought through the educational objectives. Why is that material that came from somewhere else, if it's not the party answer (which they won't like) why is it better than something we can do here? At the same time, they and we are going to complain that we have insufficient time to prepare. That the best practices, if you will, are blazing ahead faster than we can completely understand and get our hands around, so we like to kind of have it both ways. That's one of the pathologies, I think, of our educational institutions. There're ways to deal with that actually. It's not an insurmountable issue at all. If we can, and I guess I should go to the next slide.

Games/simulations/role playing

- ▶ A useful educational tool for S&R, especially among diverse participants.
- ▶ Best when focused on principles of S&R (which need to be developed).
- ▶ Need to make clear that S&R is dynamic (intervention may not have the initiative)
- ▶ Interesting topics:
 - Cross-community interaction & info sharing
 - Non-Western power structures and political culture
 - Spoiler problems and political losers
 - Counter-insurgency
 - Humanitarian issues
 - Demob, demil, and reintegration
 - How to negotiate
 - Overall S&R strategy development

If we can---don't read this slide yet, it's not the one I'm going to talk about. I'm not going to try to find the right one. If anyone would like to help me. If we can create a repository of case studies, many of our questions dealt with case studies and which one we use, how we use them, where we get them, those kinds of questions. If there is a place where there are base documents, not necessarily an entirely scripted teaching module. Most high level professors don't have extensive teaching notes or teaching plans. They kind of wing it in some ways. But if there's a place where they can look at stuff and draw from it as they choose, if there's someplace where actual base documents, the political/military planning from Kosovo documents, the execution matrixes from other documents, things like that. If those were consolidated and available to professors, I think they would use them. They would go to that place and get the information and figure out if it's relevant to their teaching and also to their research, which is important to most of the professors as well. So that's how you cut through some of that whining about insufficient time to stay current but being unwilling to accept somebody else's answer.

Our discussion focused quite a bit on this method of education, gaming, simulating or role playing. Now a moment ago we talked about the distinction between training exercises and academic or classroom exercises. And we were speaking in our group about educational role playing, gaming, simulations or exercising. We used a lot of terms. This we find is particularly useful for education within S&R if, as we've been telling each other, we are able to achieve a diverse audience. If you don't have a diverse audience or representatives that can stand in to mimic a diverse audience, you're not going to learn as much.

We were trying to figure out what the principles or what the focus of these types of events could be or should be. We had an interesting discussion about the fact that these are educational devices. They are not efforts designed to predict specific outcomes in a particular situation. They are not predictive tools, they are not modeling. They rely on some of that same processes, but they are not designed to do that. And I think in our group we had skepticism that there would be much utility to try to go to that level of specificity to make a kind of a policy tool, if you will. But as an educational tool, this kind of method can be and is in our experience a very useful method to basically cause your students to understand the reality of unintended consequences, even if you can't use the tool to predict what they might be. To cause your students to understand the realities that, and this is particularly important for our military students, to cause them to understand that the levers that they are going to engage and pull on within a piece operation in a broken society, those levers do not have a direct response. When you do this maneuver or this activity with your battalion along with the other actors, it may or may not have the desired effect that your brigade commander had in mind. That's something that is a very important "aha" moment for the military community.

In the same sense, someone earlier in the week made the point that, I think it was one of the professors from West Point, that the enemy has a vote, or the opponent, a better term in this scenario, has a vote. In US policy and I think largely in US education, we do not effectively get that point. We don't get it that even as we, as international actors in some plays, are working like crazy to cause some outcome, that everything else is dynamic too. And people are working to either cooperate with that, (rare), to avoid what we're doing or to subvert what we're doing or to openly attack what the outsiders are doing. So we're learning that we have to teach that. And I think within the academic community, the policy community, we're starting

to recognize that it's there. It's hard for us to seize the initiative in these activities.

We also came up with some ideas which are a lessertive, I would say, this was kind of our brainstorming of different modules, role playing or gaming modules that would be interesting to the ideas that we, in our group, had. And they are listed here. Some of them you will recognize from earlier discussions about where the educational gaps are. This would be a way to get at some of those educational gaps.

Question 4: Access to other USG?

- ▶ Yes, thru personal networks (which are limited).
- ▶ Some agencies have processes to capture lessons; few learn the lessons.

Question 5: Best practices?

- ▶ Captured thru individual networks, individual professional development, published reports.
- ▶ 2 Issues:
 1. Determination of what is "best" requires significant analytic art – who determines?
 2. Few formalized feedback loops to educators to gauge if education hits the mark.

We also had some very specific questions. Question 4, do we have basically input from other US Government agencies that we can use in our educational material? And a separate question do those agencies have mechanisms for collecting lessons learned. Our answer is here, yes. We have personal networks. That's the primary method that the professors use to stay connected. By default, those have severe limits. On the lessons learned issue, other agencies do, to the best of our knowledge, have lessons learned processes. We had kind of an editorial comment. It didn't really seem like, just like us, they tend not to learn their lessons either. But I would say from what we didn't say in our discussion most likely that our professors do not tap into a formalized lessons learned process across the US Government and certainly not beyond that to the other communities of actors that we see.

Question 5. Best practices. How do we identify best practices? Again, they are captured through individual networks. Also they are learned through individual professional development, through traditional kind of academic ways of learning what is best. We're starting at our school, at our university, my center the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies is going to in the coming year, we're going to set aside about \$100,000 and set some parameters for the professors. Basically this money will be reserved for them to petition for professional development. Because other parts of the university or the university itself is not resourcing that issue adequately. So what I can do is, by putting some travel money or some conference fee money or even if a professor wants to go to a course, go to one of these foreign courses that requires probably not tuition but TDY funding, we can make that available so that they can actually go out and do these things. So it's important. A year ago when we created our center, we did basically an assessment of capabilities within the university. We realized that we needed more professional development among our faculty to update them, to help them keep current.

It's basically an individual responsibility. And for a year I've been expecting that to be happening because we had identified it as a need, and they all agreed. And to be honest, it hasn't really happened because there is not space or resourcing available to do it. So we're going to try to get at that in some fashion.

The discussion of best practices brought up some issues which you will see here. The first one is basically, well, who decides what's best? And right now I think it's pretty much the person giving the instruction decides what's best. And also what's best for their course, for their students. I don't necessarily think that's wrong. But it might result in some misfires which is an issue. The quality of our personnel, of our educators, has a significant effect on the quality and the appropriateness of the education that is provided. And since those of us in the government don't really operate in a market system, I mean the students keep coming even if we are no good. We may need to think to about some market intervention to QC the products that we are producing. And maybe it's not necessarily poor quality, but maybe we're missing the mark in some cases. We're less relevant than we might be, perhaps. We've been tuning up some of the courses within our Masters Degree in S&R so that we are dealing more with than we have in the past the issues of basically the fighting the counter insurgency while trying to do peacekeeping and state building. That's one of the things that we're trying

to build more into our teaching because that's what our students need to understand. So we need a feedback loop is what our group said.

PKSOI:

Could I just comment? That was one of the things that GEN Dunn when he put out the ideas of Communities of Practice was trying to establish informal feedback loops on these sort of things. So that is one method. But you are right, I mean, the different varieties of ways that you can teach the capabilities of the instructors, those are all things that fill that, or cause that tension in there of best practices. But if you can at least get a dialog. Like this is the start of a dialog. Continue the dialog, sharing ideas and finding ways to share materials. And as Dave talked about a push and a pull system. Help establish a push system which is pushing ideas out there, and a pull system where repository people can get at. Again, what's best is in the eyes of the beholder. And for your personality, your experience, for your audience, that may work very well today, but it won't work for me tomorrow. But at least I can talk about why I thought it was a good process. If we can get that sort of dialog going. That's what we are trying to get at through this conference and through the follow on actions from you. So I think that it's excellent to brand best considered a loose terminology. It's really an idea of getting out there what are some of the unique practices that you've done. What are the experiences you've had so we can provide a system out there with a wide range of views on how to do this. And people can pick and choose from those and learn from each other's experience, and as a minimum identify what didn't work and why. And what was a real bomb and why. And that in itself is helpful as well. So those the sort of things that we're looking at. It's a good point, but we ought not to get too caught around the idea of best. And just be more focused on exposure to different techniques and ideas and different ways of doing it, and share that with each other.

Group C:

For example, we didn't put it on the slides, and I just thought of it now, that's why it's not on the slides. One of our professors is a movie buff. And for almost any learning point that you might have, this person can think of a clip from a movie. And, you know, that is a useful device in the classroom. Throw it in the DVD machine, watch five, ten minutes of a film and say, "Okay, what's going on here?" That's a way to grab your student's attention. But if you're like me and you don't remember the movies very much after

you see them, that's, you know, I need someone to say, "Oh, get this film. Here's the blah, blah, blah." So you know that would be a different kind of method or tool, like a case study.

PKSOI:

The key there is going out to that sort of person and is that person willing to share, that's the other piece. Is that person willing to share his list of movies for teaching points? You know, and maybe he isn't. And I know a lot of folks who aren't. And the idea would be maybe to encourage to share some of them. But there are a lot who are proprietary and say no, that's my piece and I don't want to give up the uniqueness of my teaching style, and everybody out there copying it. And I understand that as well. So, that's the balance. But if you know it's a good system, can you encourage that person to share some of their techniques, maybe not everything. That would be helpful.

Group C:

Yeah, that is an issue, the control over intellectual property and technique. Now as we move forward we will not and we should not ever try to replace the personal networks because that is actually where the sharing does happen. So if we can expand the personal networks. If I go to a professor and say, "Can I have your syllabus that you just spent a hundred hours devising or creating? I want to post it on the web for all of your colleagues to borrow from, etc." They are going to be shy about that. But if they get an email from a friend of theirs, a colleague from another school and it says, "Do you have something on such and so?" They are probably going to zap it right back. So the personal connection, the personal networking is critically important to cause sharing. Otherwise you are going to have a lot of architecture and lip service. So we have to think about it with the human dimension in mind.

PKSOI:

And from the folks who are the educators who are different facilities. That's the sort of task, the sort of thing that you can do to help the others. It isn't so much to go out there and ask this person to post material, but kind of survey your instructors and ask them what they are comfortable with putting out there. For example this individual used movie clips, just say, "Do you mind if we put out there that you're a source who knows how to use movie clips, and someone might have an idea they come to you directly?" He may say

yes. He may not want to put his things out there, but he may say, “If these are the sort of topics that I have some good ideas on, give me a call.” And you establish the one on one contact. He doesn’t all of his material out on the web. So we would be dependent upon collectively you going back to your instructors and see what they are familiar with so that those folks can say here’s what is. And that’s how we can start to populate the web with those thoughts and materials and connections and the people and what their skill sets are. So we can let them build those into personal networks and not just have it as one thing. We are only interested in putting out there material. If you don’t want the material, then we don’t want to list you on the web. You’ve got to come back and tell us what your instructors are comfortable with and how we can make a website, or access to what they have shared with others and what they’re the most comfortable with.

Question 6: how to find the gold nuggets?

- ▶ Practitioners and educators find trusted and familiar outlets thru word of mouth and trial and error, e.g.,
 - The Economist, Financial Times, Christian Science Monitor
 - International Crisis Group, Relief Web, UN Joint Logistics Center

Question 7: technology for dissemination?

- Websites
- Distance and distributed education
- Event CDs
- In the field, some relief groups use Rapid Data Management System

Group C:

Our last two questions are quite focused actually. The first one is Question 6. How do we as educators deal with the piles, the volumes of material that is now being produced within our industry? Basically we deal with it the same way we always have. We sort through it and we find what works for

us. We find the trusted and familiar products. As an illustrative example, the sources that are identified there, those are the ones that we said to each other that we have come to trust and be able to rely upon for some of our needs. And our discussion on this question was not only about education it was very much about education and practice. How do you actually get information that is supportive of operations?

Question 7. What kind of technology do we or others use to disseminate information? It's the standard stuff. Institutional websites or distance or distributed education. Most of our universities have a major emphasis on that in some fashion. Event CDs. We were passing around one from the recent event that my Center held. There are other ones that are out there from other centers. And then out in the field in an operational way, there's a lot of innovation that's being tested or prototyped, and the rapid data management system is one of those ways of collecting, or basically organizing the collection process and sharing of information. So we just put that on there as an indicator that it is happening elsewhere.

Group B:

Current Practices, Gaps and Proposed Solutions Group B Question Set A

- Question: "Lessons Learned"
- Discussion Points:
 - Doctrine development not same as education
 - Challenge: How should the lessons learned process inform education for PS & RO
 - Military Lessons learned process: Systematic; authoritative; connected to the field
 - Civilian Lessons Learned Process: Ad hoc, decentralized, lacking a delivery system
 - Challenge: How to develop a civilian equivalent
 - Some good news: (S/CRS – Lead for IA Thematic Guides); NGO security lessons and assessment process
- Recommendations
 - Combine recent field observations with enduring principles and doctrine in Pre-deployment training (UK OPTAG)
 - Historians at service schools use oral histories of students
 - Rotate lessons learned specialists into classroom; instructors into field
 - Have commanders identify areas requiring academic research
 - Develop knowledge networks for civilian communities of practice (e.g. INPROL)

Group B:

The last group talked about the perspective of professors. We talked about the difference between the lessons learned and how you get lessons learned into the classroom. Lessons learned are intended form a doctrinal development process. And that's not the same as the way knowledge accumulates in the scholarly world. So just to kind of the way that you've go to go do primary research. And then that's published if your review says it's worthy. And then maybe it's used in the classroom if people think that it has something to contribute. So the challenge then becomes how can we use the lessons learned process to inform what goes on in the classroom. It's not just a simple matter of taking the lessons learned and putting them into instruction. If fact if that's the approach we want to take, the professor is always going to be behind the student. Because the student's know what's going on out in the field and it's going to be real hard for the professor to keep up with him. So that was the way we framed the issue.

And then the second thing we looked at, sort of a systemic and a crude overview of the way it works, the military has a very well defined systematic, authoritative process to validate whether the lessons learned make sense, whether they should be followed, whether they should go into doctrine. And a delivery mechanism. An education system. And of course a train-up pre-deployment process. Those don't exist in the civilian world, by and large. I mean there are a few good news stories. Thank God we have SCRS. I don't know how they are doing all the things they are doing. How are they going to develop thematic eyes for all of these areas? I mean, how big is the structure within the military to do this? You know how is SCRS going to be even able to begin to replicate that. But nevertheless they are undertaking this process. But it's nasty. It's just begun. AID has a system, but it isn't really well connected between what happens in the field with people doing the lessons learned. The challenge then is how do we replicate what the military does on the civilian side. So there's the two things our recommendations wanted to look at.

So we had a great description of how the British military does it. The fundamental point was that in terms of lessons learned, they need to be put within the broader context of doctrine as they're discussed or whether it's part of the train-up for units going into deployment, or certainly discussions in classroom in terms of how they fit into the broader theory. We had some very good possible practices that could be adopted more broadly from the

Marine Corps University. They have just established a history directorate, I guess. But they are going to be doing oral histories of students and the feeding that back into the curriculum. So that's a very interesting concept. And the analog to that, or follow onto that, is that those who are doing the lessons learned process, in this case they are historians, could possibly spend time in the classroom. So they understand better how to make that connection. And of course the professors spending time in the field. So you've got sort of that whole route covered. Those are some good ideas that came out of our discussion.

And in terms of informing, having the academic process, being informed by the lessons learned requirements, if you will, but if the commanders in the field, and I think it's the PAD system, but I can't describe it. There is a way by which we can extract from commanders what is needed. What areas could benefit from additional research. And then of course, fund that activity by the academic community. So we're beginning to plug the gaps that exist. The biggest gap is how do you create a mechanism by which lessons learned in the civilian world are not just learned, but they are also applied? And that's going to challenge what we've been trying to address at USIP for about four years now, but we're in a couple of months going to have functioning, at least, a community of practice for the rule of law practitioners. Which is a broad spectrum from, really I include military intelligence, you are the people who have to gather evidence for judges, prosecutors, police, etc. to incarceration, that whole community to be able to link the people in the field, the practitioner who needs to have access to the lessons that have been learned with those who have done the learning in the past experience base, and also the documents that have been developed. Not just lessons learned documents, but what they actually need to have to make a mission function, whether it's a strategic plan, or assessments, budgets, regulations, SOPs, etc. But that is intended. That's the very purpose of that network is in a sense to create on the civilian side a process that replicates what the military does in its lessons learned to doctrine process.

Next slide please. We looked at the case studies exercises simulation area. We obviously felt they were valuable but there should be a range of them that would show the diversity of peace and stability operations and their complexity, but also the way we've evolved in our understanding of what needs to be done, because the challenge has certainly expanded over time. So we've had to adapt and come up with new structures, new capabilities, new concepts. So case studies can help us understand that evolution. In fact

that puts us on the bow wave of that lessons learned learning curve. OK, now we have a new mission. It's presenting new challenges, but here's the history of how we've evolved from prior to that. And of course the whole point being to illustrate the basic principles.

Current Practices, Gaps and Proposed Solutions Group B Question Set A

- Question: Case Studies, Exercises, Simulations, or Games
- Discussion Points
 - Case Studies/Research
 - use broad range of cases to capture complexity and diversity of PS&RO
 - to illustrate/reinforce principals and learning points
 - to show evolution of our understanding of principles
 - Exercises/Simulations
 - Adds realism by including experienced practitioners
 - Use Red Teams but ensure support for teaching objective
- Recommendation
 - Directed research to develop relevant case studies for classroom use
 - Involve reps from entire PS&RO community in the development of exercises, stimulations, games and in the play
 - Computer simulations for distance learning

Exercises in simulation, we felt that it's vitally important. Yes, those are great, but should involve practitioners from across the whole spectrum of the peace and stability ops community, to be involved in the development of the exercises, and then of course in the play. And Dave had a great description of the challenge in getting students from the NGO world, or the IO world into our courses, but that certainly would be extremely beneficial. And maybe we need to think creatively about how to do that. I mean, we didn't discuss this, but, Dave, you challenged us. Maybe we only have NGO and IO participants as students in the block of instruction that deals peace and stability ops. Maybe they only come in play during the exercise. So they don't have to spend nine months but they are there when we need them and they are there when it benefits them the most. So that's the student body participation.

On the other side in terms of development of the exercise scenarios, the good news story there, and I may have skipped over it before, but there is

a process now that's just begun. We've started to institutionalize it, where at least the NGO community and DOD are meeting on a regular basis in a working group to talk about a number of things. But the top priority of that group right now is to help find a way for DOD to understand the principles, the practices, the motivations, that drive the NGO community. You don't say no?

PKSOI:

It's to help the US government understand the roles and motivations (of NGOs). To help the NGOs understand that it's more than the military -- it's the whole government. And to get us all working together.

Group B:

True. So that's the top priority, though, is that understanding of the principles that guide NGO practice. And how to get them into our education system and into the mindsets of the commanders and staff, etc. So a step was taken in that direction out in Monterrey in August where we had an exercise, and we've discussed where we're trying to go with this. But we envision after having several of these where we can actually get to the point where we capture the real issues that are at play here in terms of coordination, information sharing, security, the role of the military in providing assistance, etc. Then perhaps we can then have a DVD that really describes, that really explains to whoever would watch it, the issues they are going to confront in the field themselves. So that's one of the mechanisms that could be used for this purpose. Afterwards, actually it was Bill Peterson, who mentioned, you know, we have a whole community out there in terms at least of intermediate and senior service schools, who have to learn, not by coming to the school house where they can participate in these exercises, but they are learning through distance learning. So computer simulations would be extremely valuable tools, I think, that would replicate the experience that one goes through on a peace and stability operation, and to allow the student to put themselves in that position. And either play the role in a solitary way, but ideally with other actors if we can make that happen.

Current Practices, Gaps and Proposed Solutions

Group B Question Set A

- Question: Sharing of Information on PS&RO and Access to Other Civilian Agencies
- Discussion:
 - No known lessons learned process among civilian agencies except S/CRS (new) and AID (limited)
 - DOD-NGO Working Group has been created
- Recommendation:
 - Develop a Community of Practice for educators in PS & RO
 - Bibliography of educational resource materials (case studies, exercises, lessons learned, etc.)

Next slide please. So sharing information and access the civilian agencies -- and of course, we were not aware of lessons learned processes other than what I mentioned -- one that's beginning at S/CRS and AID. And so there wasn't a lot to be shared. And in fact lessons may be, even if they were being learned, they're not being applied. So do we need to do things, as I mentioned before, try to create those processes on the civilian side. And I mentioned the working group here. But what do we do about this void for sharing information across the different communities? And this is an idea that has been mentioned previously, so we are just endorsing it and calling it a community of practice here. But a community of practice for educators. So that they can, as somebody said, Dave, I think, awareness of what's going on. And one of the things that that community could do would be to endorse or identify what it considers to be the best literature out there for potential adoption.

Current Practices, Gaps and Proposed Solutions

Group B Question Set A

- Question: Identifying and Sorting Relevant Information
- Discussion
 - Idiosyncratic process
- Recommendations:
 - A community of practice with website needs to be established
 - moderated by subject matter expert(s)
 - supported by information management
 - The community of practices needs “face-to-face” contact (e.g. annual PKSOI education conference)

Next slide please. Sorting relevant information. And that made a good point. Professional development is an individual responsibility. So every professor is going to approach that problem in their own manner with their own networks. But how can we assist that? And that's the awareness issue. And again we've obviously reached a good idea, a cutoff point, but that community of practice should at least make them aware; make it possible for them to become aware of what's evolving in the field, what's being written and what's being adopted in other classes. That community of practice has to have, and this is I think probably the most important value added in terms of our discussion, two things are really needed if you are going to make it work. Somebody's got to play the role of a moderator. Somebody's got to step up to the plate. It's not like we all say that this person is the fount of all knowledge, but rather they are willing to put the resources forward to assist the broader community and help us coordinate our efforts.

And that's the subject matter side, but it also requires information management. And that's not just technology, but an investment in the ability to share information. Something that we've invested in at USIP, in fact this is directly relevant, to do that, to share information across databases, you need to have something called a thesaurus, Library Science folks tell us. We've invested \$100,000 in creating such a thesaurus for rule of law purposes, with the intention of expanding it to all of the communities of practice involved in peace and stability ops. What it's going to do is allow the OSCE, the UN, the European Union, they're the ones who sent practitioners into the field for rule of law purposes, but any other organization that does, to share information across those organizations. And then tap into other databases

like the Library of Congress that has a global legal information network. That's just one example of other databases. So they will be mutually communicable. And a point that was made previously, I think by Dave, there has to be the personal contact. That abstract community that exists in the ether out there, has to come together, at least some of them, on a personal basis. And I think this is where the PKSOI annual education conference at least would be one venue where people come together and get to know each other. But then that community can flourish using the network subsequently. And I think that's it. So---questions, please.

Question:

You made a statement in talking to this slide that I may not have caught the entire meaning of, but something to the effect that professional development being an individual responsibility.

Group B:

That's for the instructor in the classroom.

Question:

Could you expand by what's meant by that, because if that's all there is to it, I have to push back a little.

Group B:

Well, I mean, I was picking up on something that Nat said. But our point was that it is idiosyncratic, everybody does it in their own way. It's their responsibility fundamentally to add, and of course, that's I guess in my understanding of what he was saying. In an educational setting, it's academic freedom. There are things that you have to get across to your students, but the way you do that is up to you. So there's a limit of the extent to which there could be a top down approach to this is what we need to teach in the classroom. You can only go so far.

Comment:

That came out of the conversations about when we were talking about how do you keep everything current as much as you can. And the business of where are we going rather than having the people coming and fighting the last war. So it wasn't a matter of saying that professors don't do this. It was, how do you ensure that you leave the space for them.

Group B:

Right, and assist them. And the point of that is that you can't tell the professor what to do, but we can make information available more readily and easily accessible. And actually if you have some entity, and I think we all would like to see one logical place to take some of the lead in this, would be PKSOI. And if PKSOI says here's some interesting reading lists that the War Colleges have, or here is some literature you should be aware of, it's an individual responsibility to go look it up. But at least they've been told here is what people are reading. Here's what's shaping the way people are thinking and acting in the field. And you may want to incorporate it in your instruction, but beyond that we really can't go much further. Other questions?

PKSOI:

Thank you, now it's Group A.

Day 2 Questions A, B, C**Question 1.**

- How are "lessons learned" obtained and used? Are they available and readily accessible in formats that are useful in meeting your educational goals?
 - Data has to be gathered, coded and evaluated and then converted from lessons gathered into lessons learned
 - How the lessons are obtained can affect it's accuracy and utility
 - Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), JFCOM initiatives (JULLS)
 - Operational/Strategic Level ???
 - A need to take advantage of lessons learned from other agencies
 - USAID, DoS, etc have Lessons Leaned
 - Examine the Harvard Business School Model: Learning Before/During/After

Group A:

This is a very similar area to discuss that teams B and C had. And it's all right there. Our focus area were resources, but defined in those three areas. Current practices, gaps, proposed solutions, seven discussion questions or

seven sets of questions, because some are multiple questions, so a simplistic brief back to the group is we'll have one slide per question set and offer that up for further discussion.

We spent a lot of time on both this and best practices. Lessons learned, how are they obtained and are they available readily accessible and in the format that you need? Here's our issue with this. Do we really use lessons learned? Are there such things as lessons learned because for the most part we don't believe there are. We believe there are thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of lessons gathered. But what process exists to actually turn that into something that we could call a lesson learned? I mean there's a vetting process for taking a collector who's in Iraq and what they've observed; they write that down and they give it back to their boss, or committee of bosses, and they take that information and it is eventually blessed and makes it into a publication. So what would you call that? Is that a lesson learned? Who has learned this change in procedure, or this new way of doing business, or the pitfall of doing it this way, or this piece of cultural knowledge that was contrary to what we thought going into this operation? Who has in fact learned it? Who gets it after that? Is there a process in place so that the people over there now operating in this peace, stability or reconstruction operation receive this so-called lesson learned? And even if they do receive it before they cease their current mission, is there a process in place for them to actually go through a retraining period, a meeting, some type of forum? So that they can discuss, okay, here's how we were doing business. This agency said that's no longer the way to do it. This is the new way to do it. Do we have the resources to do it? Do we have the time to do it? Do we even understand a different way of doing it? We challenge the entire thing we're calling lessons learned. Because there doesn't seem to be an institutionalized process to take an observation into a change in behavior that causes the effect that we want.

Comment:

I would challenge your statement within the Army. Now across DOD and outside the Department of Defense, I'm not prepared to talk about. But within the Army, first thing I'd say is I agree with your comment that in order for a lesson to be learned, there must be some kind of a behavior change, or change must be made somewhere in doctrine, training or something like that. Our name, Center for Army Lessons Learned was given to us by the

Chief of Staff of the Army about 20 years ago. So that was a given, but we knew that the learning piece of it meant that there had to be something that happened that as a result of the observations or the tactic techniques and procedures that were shared across the Army. But as far as the comments about the formal process for both sharing and for institutionalizing the changes that need to be made, we do have that in place. And even within theater, we're capable of sharing significant lessons. We get thousands of observations or thousands of tactics, techniques and procedures on an annual basis. Many of them are very mundane, very low level. Nevertheless they are important to somebody who has a problem they are faced with and are trying to work through, and want to use somebody else's learning process to get there. But the more significant ones, we're capable of sharing in theater on almost a real time basis. Now we can't provide the resources that someone might have used to effectively do something. As they come across a new problem and they figure out how to solve that problem. But we share the information on how that organization or that unit performed that task with others so someone else coming across that same or similar type of situation now has something other than a blank piece of paper to work with. And we've done that at least since Bosnia. Because when we go into theater with a team, they work for the Chief of Staff of the unit, and we are capable of assisting the unit in the process of learning as they're doing. I had to make the statement because within the Army I know for a fact that we've been doing this now for about 20 years.

PKSOI:

But again, we are talking education. And we can't exhibit ADD when we're talking education. Attention Deficit Disorder, because with education the change is not going to be as readily apparent, as rapidly apparent, whereas with tactics, techniques and procedures in training, you're going to see the change. And you see the change in tactics, techniques and procedures as you watched the progression of people's experiences and their performance at training centers over time. You also see it fall back again when we start [unclear] coming on up. And you can do a trend on an analysis of that sort of stuff at training centers. But it is harder to do it within the educational system and within the doctrine and the constant development, absolutely, but you can't be looking for the immediate satisfaction of "I automatically see change." Because what we are trying to do is teach people how to think,

not what to think from the educational point of view. So it's going to have to be a long term as you see that and you assess it. And that is a challenge. How do you still assess it? I absolutely agree. I just don't, you know, I can talk of things that did occur in planning and things like that in Baghdad where folks came in and people did adjust because the idea made sense, or someone had a better way of doing things. And you saw those incremental changes, but still you might have changed the process because someone shared an observation with you, but did it change the effect on the ground? I don't know because that takes a long time to determine that. So you've got to be careful. I agree with your point that lessons gathered versus lessons learned and how do we verify that the lesson is being learned. We need to look at that. I think that's something we're studying and trying to be able to assess that. But we've also got to make sure we're not looking for immediate satisfaction because that's not going to be.

Group A:

And the point may be that we're over emphasizing, over prioritizing so called lessons learned as an educational resource. The last bullet I'd like to talk to was an interesting point that we weren't aware of: a Harvard business school model of learning -- learning before, learning during, learning after. And the idea of lessons learned seems to be focused on how we learn after something has taken place. Are there similar processes? We don't believe there are, within this community for capturing learning before operations and learning during operations. Yes?

Question:

Is there anybody here who can explain what the JULL is?

Group A:

Oh, yeah. Joint Uniform Lessons Learned. It's the joint equivalent to the gathering of lessons learned on the Army side. So that there is a database that has joint lessons learned in it, just like the CALL, the Center for Army Lessons Learned database, has Army lessons learned in it. And I'm sure there are several in this room that could make subjective assessments of the joint lessons learned database. I will not at this time.

Day 2 Questions A, B, C

Question 2.

- Does your organization use case studies in your instruction? Where do you get your case studies?
 - Case Studies are valid sources.
 - Provided by the Institution
 - Student Produced

The second question was on case studies and we didn't have much to say on it. We think they are valid. There are two sources for them: the institution, at least those teaching institutions that we're aware of in our group already have prepared case studies. Although no one in our group knew if there are specific peace, stability and reconstruction operation case studies because we didn't have that particular department represented in our group. But I know for a fact in the Department that I'm in, we use case studies frequently. So that is an instructional method. But when you have students develop a case study over a term or over a year, now it becomes research and another educational method, and another way of adding to the body of knowledge. So we looked at these case studies in two ways in that respect.

The third question dealt with resources. We had quite a bit of discussion and there is a lot of expertise, especially in the areas of exercises and simulations and games, that not all of us were aware of. But first on resources. Many organizations are collecting stuff. Someone talked about three to four hundred research papers. We could probably get a lot more every year, just from senior service colleges. 330 students at the Army War College. Let's take the others as an equivalent number so we're over five or six hundred senior level or research papers that are available. Not of all of the, granted, deal with peace, stability and reconstruction operations. Here at the War College, at least last year, a great majority dealt with are topics out of what we've developed a key strategic issues list. And that's developed here, but it's coordinated with the joint staff, the army staff, interagency and combatant commands and other major commands within the Department of the Army. It was a list of issues on what ought to be studied for a given year. A previous bullet from one of the other groups talked about a recommendation was that commanders talk about what we ought to conduct research on in

Day 2 Questions A, B, C

Question 3.

- What resources – such as case studies, exercises, simulations, or games – could usefully be developed to aid educators in teaching stability operations? What do you use in your courses?
 - Many organizations collecting data (stuff)
 - A need for qualitative checks (institutional biases, e.g. AWC/SRP/SSI)
 - Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)
 - Consider interagency “Key Strategic Issues List”
 - Open sources posting ??
 - Simulations:
 - Operational Art of War (modified)
 - JANUS
 - Exercise/Game:
 - Purple Hope (JFSC)
 - SENSE – (USIP)
 - Algezero – (FSI)
 - Survey existing SIMs exercise and models

our teaching institutions. At least at the combatant command level they are already doing so, as regards our strategic issues list.

PKSOI:

It's also available on line on the SSI (Strategic Studies Institute) website.

Group A:

OK. So that's a guide for research. We're writing hundreds of papers every year on topics and some of them have to deal with PS&RO just by default, I would think. Now what happens to those papers? A show of hands, how many in here are familiar with that resource? This is a participative exercise. OK. So it's less than 10% of this room are even familiar that there are over 500 papers being written every year at the graduate level, at least in theory they are, on strategic topics of interest. So that comes in later on our recommendations. This education council or this community of practice or this collaborative website is a way of sharing information. In terms of simulations, Ike, who's not here, talked about two different simulations he

used while at the school of Advanced Military Studies at Ft. Leavenworth. One was a game turned into a simulation called the operational art of war that they modified to get at peace, stability and reconstruction operations. Another is JANUS which is a standard simulation that we use but again modified to get at this particular peacekeeping operation. So they have used those successfully as part of his curriculum at SAMS.

Exercises and games. Purple hope, that was Taylor at Joint Forces Staff College used that as a response to a volcano episode, humanitarian assistance has used that exercise. SENSE is an acronym that we weren't able to tell what it meant. Evidently USIP has used that as a response to a failed state type exercise. Al-Jazera Foreign Studies Institute has used that also. So those were three specific exercises or games that we are aware of that dealt with PS&RO. However, at least based on our sample size of eight in our group, we still feel there's a need to conduct a survey, a fairly comprehensive list of what is available in the world of simulation exercising games. A start point was made, Larry, and you said that was by ----

Larry:

Sponsored by Pacific Command about six years ago; they did a complete survey of stability operations related simulations, games and tools.

Group A:

So we would just have to have that updated for the last six years, but probably a pretty good start point to go with.

Comment:

There's another simulation, it's like JANUS on steroids, it's called JCTS, Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation. It's labor intensive but you can have multiple factions as normally with like CBS, Core Battle Simulation. You got red and blue and they automatically want to attack one another. In JCTS you can tell the individual factions and you can change it while the game is going on. Okay, today if he does this, I'm going to be anti-him or I'm going to be pro-him or whatever. Like I said it's labor intensive, but JCTS is a good simulation.

Question:

Who has that?

Answer:

It's Army owned, I guess. It's Army proprietary. And I'll give you a card and we're licensed to go ahead and use it as a defense contracting agency.

Comment:

JCTS is widely used particularly as an urban simulation. It is very much a tactical level simulation that puts individuals against individuals on the streets in cities for the most part. But you can use it a little broader than that.

Comment:

There's others as well, I mean the Brits have DIMD. We have SEES and there's also STATMAS. So all these different simulations get at different parts.

Group A:

These are just a couple of examples.

Day 2 Questions A, B, C**Question 4.**

- Do you have access to other parts of the US government (the Department of State, Justice, USAID Treasury and Commerce)?
- Do those agencies have mechanisms for collecting "lessons learned"?

Better issues: Are we plugged in with relevant agencies and academia?

- Access varies widely
- Raw data exist in academic databases
- Need to tap into peace study academic institutions

Fourth question, access to other parts. And so we asked in our group, do you access to who you need to talk to in the other parts of government? The immediate answer was yes. Everyone in our group had access. It was more along what the previous group had said, personal contacts. So maybe we're not asking the right question. So relevance has to be here. Are we plugged in with the relevant agencies? Are we exchanging the right information more on

a push system? Are we aware of the things we ought to be aware of from the other agencies as it relates to us? I guess would be our definition of plugged in. And so that answer now was not 100% and it varied widely. There is a lot of raw data and we had an example of some of the quantitative studies that are done in the academic world that do not translate easily to how we would use them in the PS&RO world. And so a lot more can be done in pursuing resolution to the issues on here. So it's not just a question of access, it's a question of constant information exchange, but usable information.

Day 2 Questions A, B, C

Question 5.

- How do we identify best practices? Is there a mechanism for sharing best practices among institutions on the topic of stability operations?
 - Need to build bridges between institutions
 - Use of interns and exchange across institutions
 - Interagency Education Coordination Council
 - Communities of practice; consortium

How do we identify best practices? The first time we got to this question and it's not up here, but we said, well, doesn't it take the best people to identify the best practices? So how do we identify the best people? And are the best people always the ones that are our educators? And in the Department of Defense, at least in the Army, the idea of best is a lot of different variations. But let's take the one that will command a brigade, will command a division, will command a corps, will command an Army or become a combatant commander. Those type of so-called best don't sacrifice two or three years during their career to come to a senior service college and educate those who will take their place in five to ten years.

But then we said, well, maybe it doesn't take the best people to identify the best practices. Maybe what it takes is the right information and a process by which that information can then be hashed around and then decisions made if it gets to the right level. So the need is to build bridges across institution, again, with exchanges. We talked about the use of interns that one of our group had very successful experience with. And exchanges among the various agencies has come up several times in answers to several

of the issues that we dealt with this week. Once again, our recommendation is for the establishment of a something similar to a military education coordination council, but an interagency coordination council. The start point may be this community of practices, the consortium was already mentioned as something already ongoing in terms of getting together those that need to know, exchanging relevant information on a continuous basis to further advance and actually close some of these issues out.

Day 2 Questions A, B, C

Question 6.

- With so much information available from a myriad of sources, what have you found has worked best in terms of sorting through all the sources? Which sources have proved to be the best for your purposes?
 - Find out what the S&RO forums and journals are and which are most influential
 - Don't forget human researchers - valuable resources
 - Search by "concept" vs search by "index"
 - GOOGLE, PROQUEST, EBSCOHOST

The 6th question dealt with managing information, really, sorting through the sources. The bottom line really is on the bottom (of the slide). We asked around, have you used anything better than Google in going through sources. Well, no one in our group did. Although for some military specific research the Proquest that's at least used here at the Army War College is very good as a search engine. Ft. Leavenworth has something called Ebscohost. A couple of specific forums or journals were mentioned previously; we did not know of any specific PS&RO Journals that were okay. These were the accepted ones; these are the ten that you always try to get published in. Well, we either develop them or identified them as our recommendation. As we're looking through all the sources and managing information, a reminder not to forget our research assistants in the libraries, or the librarians who can help us.

And the interesting idea of the way we search nowadays is by word. If you have a book, up front you have the table of contents and in the back you have an index. And we're conditioned almost to search by what's in the

index, the words. I think what we need, though, is the ability to search by the concept, by what the table of contents represents. And if we can get to that, we think, at least in our group, our recommendation is that trying to find what you want would be much more manageable.

Day 2 Questions A, B, C

Question 7.

- How does your institution use technology to facilitate the dissemination of information on S R & O? What are your insights on the best use of technology?
 - Use of EMAIL
 - SHAREPOINT
 - Recommend surveying best tools and evaluating them for research
 - Leverage existing systems
 - Need to consider “Concept Based” search protocols
 - Need to survey who has what collaborative tool and what their capabilities are

And the 7th Question, how do we use technology? We’ve talked about a lot of different tools. We had a demonstration on a tool yesterday. When all else fails, we continually send either documents to each other or we post it on a site and send you an email note saying, “Hey, I just posted it here. Read it when you can.” Here at the War College we started using Sharepoint this year as a collaborative tool. We can have threaded discussions. We can post documents, make announcements. It doesn’t have VTC.

You know the capability of other tools. We recommend another survey to determine what are the best tools and evaluate them for research. But we also had a long discussion on, we really don’t want to come back here in September of 2006 and just talk about this issue again. If we haven’t started doing something by then, I think we will have failed on this point. Because we think it’s a relatively easy one to solve. Every tool we’ve talked about, every tool you have worked with or that you have works. It may be the 80% solution. And one may be 81%. OK, this has this, and this has this. But they both do this. And what they both do and what they all do is allow is to collaborate better than what we are doing today. So

really our recommendation is, let's pick one and use it. Let's start sharing information collaboratively instead of talking about how we're going to do it. And that's, I guess, what leverage existing systems means. Concept base search protocols is what we talked about on the last slide. And what their capabilities are. Those were pretty much the results of our discussions. Any further questions?

Chapter 7

Closing Remarks

PKSOI:

Thanks. First I'd like to just thank everybody for participating. I thought we got at what we were trying to get at which was, let's get together, get a dialog going and collaborative relationship to form the basis for continuing dialog. And I think that's what we, hopefully, have started to build on. As everybody said, strengthen the existing relationships and establish new relationships. And I think that was one of the utmost goals of this conference and to identify the desire and the willingness to continue to participate and to continue to move this ball forward. And I think we hit a homerun on that one. I'd like to thank the folks behind the screen. Sergeant Santiago who's been doing a great job back there for us. Thank you very much. I'd like to thank Mike Cross & Jeff McNary for pulling this thing together. You did a great job, thank you. I'd like to thank the facilitators in the different groups. I'd like to thank the folks who came up here and presented three times, four times, one time. Again, it's to see that the number of folks willing to come here and step up in front of the larger group and discuss the issues again, tells me that there's a large group out there who wants to continue to be a part of this discussion. A lot of folks left. I don't think that's because they were bored. I think it's because two and a half days is a hell of a lot of commitment. You can see we start talking about the inability to do training and education; we're trying to have a conference to discuss some key pieces and folks have real jobs. And they get pressure to go back to do their real jobs. But there were a lot of folks who, you know, couldn't make it on the first day who came up for the second day. There were folks who had to leave in between and come on back. And, again, folks like Spanky, thank you. You know you contributed significantly to it, so, again, I think there's definitely interest out there in terms of what we are trying to do. And I think we just need to continue moving forward.

If we get together in a year from now and we're discussing the same issues, then we are a failure. And we've really failed in our jobs because there is too much to be done. We've got to move forward. I'd like to highlight that in September we co hosted a conference with Ambassador Pascal's office, the US Institute for Peace, and PKSOI. And six themes came out. And let's talk about where we are on those six themes.

The themes were planning for stability operations. That was the number one theme. And right now at SCRS with JFCOM has the lead. They are moving forward. Multiple organizations are working with them. That's what got them to the exercise piece and they are making significant progress. They have their planning template and they are planning concepts out there. They are discussion how do we formalize and make progress on it.

NGO civil/military coordination was a number two issue. USIP took the lead, interaction, Department of Defense, OSD/SOLIC, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, as well as Ambassador Pascal's office. And we've had one major group meeting and we've had a series of workshops since then. And we will continue to move forward, and that's one of the things the forums are talking about to use as a forum to advance the idea of developing the collaborative material to tell each other about ourselves. We're looking at inviting Bob Coon to come to the next meeting. So Bob Coon could talk about the Army War College product of here's what the military looks like and to solicit support from ITEA and InterAction and USIP to see how we can continue now to develop the interactive DVD that already exists and improve upon it.

Information sharing and education and training initiatives was the number three issue. And there're a couple of issues in there. One was information sharing and we had somebody here from the Humanitarian Information Unit from Department of State. And we had people talk about the software, Dave, that you are working with that they are trying to get into the MEF EX. What's that software, the rapid data management system? So there're plenty of initiatives out there that people grab upon to share information. Spanky raised a key point there, classification. People are trying to work through that issue in DOD, because it is something that has been plaguing us for years on the classification of information. Talk to IO and NGO and ask them what do they hate the most about working with the military? Gee, we give you information, you classify it and can't give it back to us. Hey, thank you very much, why should I play with you? You know, we've got to really work our way through that system. I think it's a great system. We've got all the information, what the hell we got to give anything to you for. You know what I mean, come on. But we value your partnership. Great.

Education and training. That's what we are talking about today. And we would like to look at some more work on training and we'll talk about that at a later date. We'll put information out on that. But education, that's what we're trying to do today. Move the ball forward on education. But as

you can see, there're a lot of disparate activities already moving forward in education. And the key thing people are talking about is who's going to step up to the plate and be the moderator, be the lead to continue pushing the ball forward. Right now the finger is pointing at us and not a problem. That's what we'll continue doing. We'll continue being the moderators and the leaders pushing that ball forward in the education arena because we think it's critical. And we know that we're going to have the broad base support from all of you. So we'll do this as a collaborative effort, and we'll push that on forward and I think we can make some real progress here.

Transitional security forces and doctrine. Christine Stark from our organization is working on that very hard and through the Army Task Force for Stability Operations was able to get a RAND study commissioned on transitional security and we're working to finalize that. Mike is working with the COESPU and the global peace operations initiative in the Center for Excellence for Stability Police Units in Italy. The IMPRO system he's talking about to share lessons learned -- again, we're moving forward in that arena, making small steps, but making progress in that arena.

Metrics lessons learned. A tough one. We're not where we need to be. A lot of folks are looking at it and studying it. There was a fill in the gaps study done by USIP, CSIS, Mike was one of the key folks on that as well. A lot of folks participated in it. That did a good over view of the different proposed metric systems out there, but it still doesn't give us an answer as to what is the right metric system and what should be the right metric system. And if you want to talk about preventive diplomacy, you can't really do preventive diplomacy unless you know what the hell you're looking at and how you're going to measure progress. And you really can't do reconstruction and stability on the fly without understanding what the baseline is because as you impact on that environment, that environment changes, and how do you judge whether you are making progress if you don't know where the hell you started? So we've got some room to there in improvement in metrics and lessons learned. But particularly the metrics piece of it. But there is some being done.

Regional and/or civilian capacity building. Regional: The idea there was the global peace operations initiative and there's some work that needs to be done in that across the US government.

Civilian capacity building. SCRS is trying to step up to the plate. Mary Ann Zimmerman handed me a copy of the SCRS training strategy. She's going to go back and talk to her folks and with their permission, hopefully,

we'll be able to put that document on the CD that we're going to be sending out of here so people can see here's how Ambassador Pascal's office is approaching this because one of their tasks is to develop civilian capacity. But there are other ways besides Ambassador Pascal's office to develop civilian capacity. And we, as DOD, can significantly assist that effort because we have a vested interest in helping our civilian counterparts increase their capability and their capacity. And we have a vested interest in helping them improve our capacity and capability. And that's what we're talking about in the education arena as well as in the training arena. And hopefully Mary Ann will be able to put this on out there and put a little note in there, at least based on what she heard here talking about areas where she potentially could use some help, and capitalizing on the ideas that came out of this conference.

The final was strategic communications. And what is strategic communications? I think Sue hit it clearly. Whatever we want to call it, what do we mean there? But I think the key piece at a minimum is the importance of communicating what we're trying to do. What are we trying to do? And to make sure that we, at least as a minimum, between ourselves and among ourselves, when we're talking to one another, we understand that we're trying to do this in a collaborative fashion and we're trying to work, yes, to benefit ourselves, but also to benefit the other players. I mean that's critical. That's something we have to communicate. And this isn't just a DOD-centric exercise, it just isn't a USG-centric exercise, this is an exercise at increasing communications, capabilities and understanding of all the major players in a stability and reconstruction environment because that's what is going to be required if we're going to be successful in these interventions. Let's not kid ourselves, there are going to be more, not less in the upcoming years. So communicating and understanding, to me we need to start getting through the stereotypes, start getting the understanding, and then start ensuring people understand outside what we're trying to do, and therefore able to get the resources and the funding required, not because we're trying to build an empire, but we're trying to do a task that's pretty hard in an effective fashion, and get things in a better state than when we intervened.

From that point of view, some other things came out of this meeting. For example, Ike Wilson went back to West Point and asked if they would be interested in supporting funding to get the translation done for the CAST network. They have come back and said while they have not said definitely

yes, they've not said no. And they said that the folks up in the social sciences department would like to have you come up there and I'll pass you the email, and give a presentation to them, because they believe they do have some monies to support that translation effort. And they also would like to link you up with their foreign language department and see if they can't get some movement out of that. So good progress, we can link some folks together.

The DVD piece we talked about, Larry Smith talked about the joint military educational coordination council that's getting ready to meet here in the next couple of months. And the ability to take these ideas and, through the Army G-35, through the Army War College, General Huntoon, through Larry and the Joint-7, get a lot of these constructs and concepts and challenges that have been raised here, out in front of the council that helps to shape and set the standards of education for all military schools. So, again, understand that your viewpoints and your inputs, we're trying to take those and immediately get them to the right people so they can impact on what we're teaching to our military community so that they give to the community the ability to understand that they can help to shape what DOD is learning, and influence what DOD is learning. And something we told you we would try to do, and I think we're trying to come up with ways to deliver on that. And Larry will talk more about how we can make that happen. And, Dave, we need to talk about that for the Army perspective as well.

The other was the GMU and Allison. Allison approached us and Dave Davies approached us and said look, we'd like to partner with you on an academic consortium. Are you interested? I said sure, how can we help. So here's an academic institute approaching us and we thought it was a great idea. So we really appreciate that effort. And now Allison has put that out to all of you on how we can move forward in the academic consortium. But obviously the things we can do is link that with the KISL, link it with other research opportunities out there.

We have folks who are publishing papers; we know that. So how do we put something out there and incentivize the idea that if you get the best of the best out of those papers, and we put them out there, partnering with SSI, partnering with Parameters? Do we put out a separate stability ops journal? Don't know. There are multiple ways of putting it out there. I have a contact in South Africa who puts out a piece support journal and said I don't care if you publish it in any manual here or any form or media in the United States, we still want it because our audience is very different than yours and we'd

like to get it and get out to an international community. So those sort of things we will let people know about S&RO and hopefully incentivize the publishing out there and getting good articles out there. The Army Public Affairs Office, Brigadier General Brooks, same thing. You have articles that will cause people to have a good discussion, a good debate, and get at some key pieces, get them to him. He can work it through his connections into key journals out there. So we have a lot of potential here to get these articles out in front of the right people. If we don't do it, it's because we haven't thought a way through it. It's because we've given up or we got lazy. The opportunities are there, we just need to find what are the right pieces and the parts and how do we get them into the right market and into the right publication, and to the right audience. We have the opportunities. So we need collectively as a group to think about how we do that. And I think if you want to shape policy and concept development, you do that by research and publication to start to shape the framework for discussion that then starts to influence the policies and the concepts that need to be developed. And I think it's critical we get at this research and publication piece. So, again, we'll ask for some participation. Yes.

Question:

Are any of these efforts plugged into the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review)?

PKSOI:

Folks in the QDR working groups know about different pieces and parts, but have we tied this in as much as we'd like to? Probably not. But are we talking to folks like Hans Benedict and Jim Shearer, yes.

But, again, the key piece is I'd really like to say thank you. I thought the presentations were excellent. I thought the participation was excellent. We will take the lead in moving this ball forward and moderating the discussion. We will take these nuggets of information that you've given to us over the last couple of days. We'll digest them and in the next week or so, we'll get a letter out to you that talks about how we will look at advancing this ball forward. We'll be sending it also out to folks who wanted to participate but couldn't participate. FSI wanted to play. Tufts wanted to play but they just couldn't make it. We'll reexamine the timing of this conference. Probably September isn't the best time to do it. Maybe move it to a better timeframe. But, again, we'll get that letter out to you. We'll get the CD out to you with

materials and solicit from you, at least this is what we think is the way ahead. Here's how we look at racking and stacking, prioritizing based on what we thought we heard from you, and then solicit your feedback on that, and then continue shaping the agenda for how we move this forward. And, again, really look forward to continuing to get your support in this arena and appreciate your effort over the last few days. So, again, thank you very much. And a job well done. Thanks.

Annex A



CENTER for STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

June 2005

Concept Paper 6-05

The First Annual PKSOI Education Workshop

The United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) will conduct an unclassified education workshop from 13-15 September 2005. The forum will be conducted at the Center for Strategic Leadership, Collins Hall, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

BACKGROUND

With the emergence of peace and stability operations in locations such as Kosovo; Bosnia; Afghanistan; and Iraq, numerous institutions, both military and civilian, have had to adjust their educational curricula and programs. These institutions cater to a widely diverse audience with widely diverse missions. There has been little communication and cross fertilization between institutions on what is being taught, and how it is being taught. While some variance is necessary due to the wide range of tasks to be accomplished in peace and stability operations, communication between institutions on course content and best practices can only aid in providing the best educational experience possible for students, many of whom will immediately be engaged in these kinds of operations.

OVERALL WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES

The workshop will bring together educators from the military services, the Joint Staff, international and non-government organizations, interagency offices, and selected institutes and centers of higher education to identify

the opportunities for synergy and cooperation in peace and stability operations education. There are three objectives of the workshop: 1) capture best practices and identify gaps in the various approaches; 2) identify the programs, subject matter experts, and initiatives in the field of peace and stability operations education; and 3) establish a collaborative relationship among all participants that can form the basis for continuing dialogue.

PKSOI intends to formalize a quarterly video teleconference to assist conference participants in maintaining a continuous dialogue. It is possible that this technology may also be used in operational situations to maintain communications and situational awareness between civilian and military agencies in the field.

WORKSHOP DESIGN

This workshop will be conducted over the course of three days. Panel presentations on the first day will be followed in the afternoon with work groups addressing the integration of peace and stability operations into the curriculum and the preparation and development of educators / instructors. The morning of the second day each group will present their findings and recommendations to all participants of the workshop. The afternoon of the second day the four work groups will address Resources (best practices, gaps, and proposed solutions) and Human Capital (best practices, gaps, and proposed solutions) in peace and stability operations education. In the final session on Thursday morning each work group will present their findings and recommendations to all participants of the workshop.

WORK GROUP OBJECTIVES

- Identify best practices in peace and stability operations education
- Identify gaps in peace and stability operations education
- Establish and continue dialogue among entities/individuals in the peace and stability operations community. This would include methodologies to identify, expand, and share stability and reconstruction educational resources:
 - o Subject matter expert database
 - o Course materials, schedules, and attendance opportunities

- o Research project collaboration opportunities, recommendations, and resource requirements

WORKSHOP DELIVERABLES

Following the workshop, PKSOI will publish a report reviewing the issues, discussions and solutions recommended by conference participants.

TENTATIVE AGENDA

Monday, 12 September 2005 – The Collins Center

1400 – 1630 Registration, *Collins Hall lobby*

1830 – 2030 Icebreaker, *Letort View Community Center (LVCC)*

Tuesday, 13 September 2005 – The Collins Center

0800 – 1200 Plenary Session, *Normandy Main Conference Room (MCR)*

1200 – 1300 Lunch, *Ardennes Room*

1315 – 1730 Work Groups, *Group Rooms, 2nd Floor*

1830 – 2100 Dinner, with the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the U.S. Army, as guest speaker, *LVCC*

Wednesday, 14 September 2005 – The Collins Center

0800 – 0815 Admin Remarks, *MCR*

0815 – 1200 Work Groups Report Findings/Recommendations, *MCR*

1200 – 1300 Lunch, *Ardennes Room*

1300 – 1630 Work Groups, *Group Rooms, 2nd Floor*

1830 – 2000 No host dinner, *LVCC*

Thursday, 15 September 2005 – The Collins Center

0800 – 1200 Work Groups Report Findings/Recommendations, *MCR*

1200 Adjourn

CONTACT INFORMATION

For additional information regarding this event please contact Mr. Michael Cross at (717) 245-4380 or via email to michael.cross4@us.army.mil.

Annex B

Attendees

Last Name	Nickname	Organization Name
Agoglia	John	Director PKSOI
Allen	Tim	PKSOI
Anderson	Jim	Joint Special Operations University
Beattie	Taylor V.	Camber Corporation
Blakely	Frank	Dept. of Distance Education, USAWC
Bracken	Maj Stu	Expeditionary Warfare Training Group
Braun	Trey	Strategic Studies Institute
Brooks	Doug	International Peace Operations Association
Brown	J.B.	PKSOI
Campbell	Doug	Center for Strategic Leadership
Carr	Rob	Security Cooperation Education and Training Center
Carrington	Dave	Naval War College
Cherrie	Stan	CUBIC Defense Applications
Coker	Todd	Marine Corps University
Collins	Joe	National War College
Coon	Bob	Dept of Military Strategy, Planning & Operations
Cornett	Tim	PKSOI
Coyne	Jack	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense - Policy
Cross	Mike	PKSOI
Curtin	Leslie B.	U.S. Dept of State
Daly	Margaux	Center for Naval Analysis
Davidson	Janine	Center for Adaptive Strategies and Threats
Daze	Tom	Command & General Staff College
Decker	Marvin K.	Center for Army Lessons Learned
DeGrasse	Beth C.	U.S. Institute of Peace
Dziedzic	Michael	U.S. Institute of Peace
Esper	Mike	PKSOI
Feidler	Bob	OSD/Reserve Policy Board
Flavin	Bill	PKSOI
Freundak-Blume	Allison	George Mason University
Goldmann	Jeanne	JFK Special Warfare Center & School
Gossage	Andrew	UK Joint Doctrine Concepts Centre
Gough	Sue	PKSOI
Harlan	Dave	PKSOI
Hoffman	Richard	Center for Civil - Military Relations
Hoh	Chris	DOS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Huntoon	MG	Commandant, Army War College

Jackson Kelly	Don Lorelei	PKSOI Special Projects Fellow, US House of Representatives
Kievet		
Kipp	Jake	Foreign Military Studies Office
Kirsch	Spanky	OASD/Networks and Information Integration
Klippstein	Dan	Department of Army 3/5, SSP
Knack	Dave	Marine Corps War College
Kratman	Tom	PKSOI
Kruesi	Andres	International Committee of the Red Cross
Ladnier	Jason M.	Fund for Peace
Lee	Sarah	Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
Lewis	Mike	PKSOI
Lovelace	Douglas	Strategic Studies Institute
Madden	Craig	Dep Commandant AWC
McCallum	Jim	PKSOI
McFate	Montgomery	Institute for Defense Analysis
McNary	Jeff	PKSOI
Merrill	Susan	PKSOI
Morris	Sharon	U.S. Agency for International Development
Nichols	Hank	PKSOI
Nordstrom-Ho	Ingrid	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Palmer	Sam	National Defense University (ICAF)
Peacock	Tammi	National Defense University
Peterson	Bill	HQ Air Force Doctrine Center
Pierce	Linda	Army Research Lab
Polk	Fred	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Poteat	Linda	InterAction
Schultz	Tammy	PKSOI
Schultz	James	Center for Army Lessons Learned
Servold	Gary "BEAR"	Air War College
Smith	Larry	Joint Staff J-7
Spence	Fraser	UK Joint Doctrine Concepts Centre
Stark	Christine	PKSOI
Sullivan	Gen	AUSA
Swanson	Craig	MC Command & Staff College
Tomasovic	Bob	Center for Civil - Military Relations
Tomlin	Stephen	International Medical Corps
Unger	Noam C.	Humanitarian Information Unit, Department of State
Vaccaro	Matthew	Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
Wallace	Jamie	Combined Arms Center

Wasson	Gary C.	JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center
Wherry	Ross	U.S. Agency for International Development
Wilhelm	Tom	George C. Marshall Center
Williams	Roy	PKSOI
Wilson III, PhD	Isaiah	US Military Academy
Wohlschlegel	Bob	Center for Strategic Leadership
Zielinski	Peter	Dept of Command, Leadership & Mgt USAWC
Zimmerman	Mary Ann	S/CRS